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Abstract 
The central aim of the thesis is to examine the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement in the UK. In pursuit of that aim, the thesis seeks to examine institutional investors‟ 
engagement through the agency theory framework. Previous research on institutional investors‟ 
engagement has failed to illuminate the ways in which institutional investors‟ engagement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is applying multiple methods to 
engagement; particularly as a significant amount of institutional investors‟ engagement is conducted 
discreetly and the data and information relating to their engagement activities is not usually publicly 
disclosed. Very few researchers investigating institutional investors‟ engagement recognise that 
dialogue alone is, at times, insufficient and may not produce the results that they expect. Hence, 
extant research has not examined what path institutional investors take when a particular mode of 
engagement fails to yield the desired result. 
 
This research examines Foreign & Colonial Investments and reveals that, when one method of 
institutional investors‟ engagement, employed to influence corporate behaviour, is unsuccessful, 
F&C Investments makes use of another method of engagement to influence corporate behaviour, 
policies and practices. Hence, the traditional approach to institutional investors‟ engagement is 
changing. For example, in the past, institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility tended to occur separately. Institutional investors‟ engagement in 
corporate social responsibility was the focus of ethical and religious investors. However, this 
research clearly shows that institutional investors integrate corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility issues in F&C Investments‟ engagement practices. The integrating of corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility suggests that the practise of institutional investors‟ 
engagement may have is advancing. F&C Investments‟ engagement in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility indicates that corporate social responsibility has become mainstream, 
having progressed beyond the initial realms of religious and ethical investors to become a major 
aspect of corporate governance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Outline of Chapter 
This chapter begins with an overview of the major characteristics of a key distinctive group of 
investors/shareholders in capital markets around the world, namely institutional investors. First, an 
exploration of the term „institutional investors‟ is undertaken, in particular describing who they are 
and what they do. The relevance of, and also important roles played by, institutional investors in 
capital markets are then described in detail.  These aspects form the background to this study as its 
primary aim is to investigate the nature of these institutional investors‟ engagement in both 
1
Corporate Governance (CG) and 
2
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues. In addition, the 
study examines the use of multiple methods in engagements with the publicly-listed entities that 
these investors partly own. Next, the study‟s primary research questions are elaborated upon. A brief 
summary of the content of successive chapters is then provided. 
 
1.2 Institutional Investors 
The term „institutional investors‟ usually refers to a range of financial institutions such as investment 
companies, mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, banks, endowment funds, etc that 
manage funds on behalf of their clients. This is not a homogeneous group of investors as they vary 
greatly in size and structure (Clarke, 2007), nevertheless, they are typically seen as large financial 
institutions with great amounts of capital to invest. In fact, institutional investors form the largest 
percentage of participants in security trading and their share of stock market volume has consistently 
                                                             
1Corporate governance is a system in which companies are directed and controlled. It involves the roles and 
relationships between a company management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders and the goals 
for which the corporation is governed (Solomon, 2010). 
 
2 Corporate Social Responsibility is the way business organizations integrate social, environmental and economic 
concerns into their values, decision making strategy and operations in a transparent and accountable manner 
thereby establishing better practices within the business organization, as well as creating wealth and improving 
society (Keinert, 2008). 
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grown over the years. More specifically, Davis (1996) defines institutional investors as specialised 
financial institutions which manage savings collectively on behalf of small investors, towards a 
specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return-maximisation and maturity of claims. 
 
In the past few decades, institutional investors have gained prominence as a category of investors 
who are influencing and shaping decisions made to improve corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility practices in businesses, especially in publicly-listed companies (Clark and Hebb, 
2003). Partly as a consequence of a spate of worldwide corporate scandals, institutional investors 
have progressed from being largely passive owners (typically owning significant shareholdings of 
publicly-listed entities) to becoming active players in tackling corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility issues (Solomon, 2007). Consistent with this argument, Hsu and Koh (2004) 
observed a global surge in institutional investor shareholding and activism in the past two decades. 
This underlying trend has generated much interest amongst academics, regulators and also the 
business community in the role that institutional investors should and do play in enhancing both 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices by listed for-profit entities.  Even 
so, most empirical research in the past has focused primarily on exploring (i) the types of 
governance and CSR issues that are of concern to institutional investors and (ii) the types of 
engagement strategies that they adopt. However, little is understood in terms of the effectiveness of 
such strategies and the types of alternative actions that institutional investors would adopt if any 
such documented strategies were to fail. This study, therefore, focuses on the multiple methods of 
institutional investors‟ engagement strategies over time. Put simply, it focuses on whether 
institutional investors adopt alternative engagement strategies when the initial adopted strategy does 
not achieve the required response from the publicly-listed companies that they partly own and how 
this is approached. In addition, the study also documents strategies that seem to work effectively. 
 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
The study is carried out in the UK as it has one of the most developed capital markets in the world 
and also due to the fact that UK-based institutional investors are often touted to be pioneers as well 
as worldwide leaders in terms of active shareholder engagement. According to Dong and Ozkhan 
(2008), institutional investors in the UK hold an estimated 80% of issued equity in the UK stock 
market; pension funds account for 19.7%, insurance companies 24.2% and overseas investors 
37.6%. In the United States, the proportion of institutional shareholding is similarly significant; 
Brancato (2005) states that institutional investors in the US own an estimated 60% of all US equities, 
and that there is regular communication between institutional investors and firms because of their 
investment in their portfolio companies. 
Although, traditionally, government regulations in the US and UK made it costly for institutional 
investors to participate in the governance of their corporate holdings (Black, 1992), more recent 
regulations and guidelines have resulted in marked improvements in empowering institutional 
investors to play a more active role (Hsu and Koh, 2005). Consequently, in the last few decades, 
these investors have indeed been increasingly more active in championing governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices. 
 
As mentioned previously, one of the many reasons for increased involvement by investors has been 
the recent spate of worldwide corporate scandals. Incidences include Northern Rock in the UK, 
Parmalat in Europe and that of Enron and WorldCom in the US. These huge scandals have shaken 
the foundations of public trust and confidence in the corporate world (Coffee, 2005). Consequently, 
there have been serious concerns about the increasing need to monitor the activities of publicly-
listed 
3
corporations and their business activities and policies (Solomon, 2007). According to Yaron 
(2005) the high-profile and persistent scandals have focused attention on corporate practices and 
policies. 
                                                             
3
A corporation is a business organization or entity which has a separate legal personality with limited liability for its 
shareholders who buy and sell their stocks depending on the performance of the board. It is characterized by the 
issuance of shares or easily transferable stocks and the existence as a going concern (See Mallin, 2006). 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
Many questions have been asked concerning where the responsibility lies for corporate governance 
scandals: on the one hand, regulators have accused institutional investors of being passive owners, 
especially in the UK, and institutional investors have also traded blame and pointed the finger at the 
regulators, suggesting that the regulators have failed to equip them with the right tools, legislation 
and regulations to allow them to operate effectively. Yaron (2005) suggests that the hard lessons 
learned have instigated a number of corporate governance reforms in the UK and US. The UK 
Corporate Governance code and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US are corporate governance 
reforms intended to promote good corporate governance practices by encouraging institutional 
investors to become more involved in such practices. In the UK, initially, corporations and firms were 
resistant to the increasing involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance.  However, 
attitudes are slowly changing as corporations are beginning to accept the changing role of 
institutional investors. In a sense, corporations are becoming more proactive in aiding institutional 
investors by providing adequate information, especially before Annual General Meetings (AGM) 
(Solomon, 2010). 
 
1.3 Institutional Investors’ Engagement 
Institutional investors‟ engagement can be viewed as the voluntary monitoring and intervention of 
institutional investors to influence business management and organisation decisions, practices and 
behaviour (Clark and Hebb, 2004). Engagement provides investors with an opportunity to influence 
corporate behaviour. It involves addressing aspects of corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices and policies that could have an impact on the financial performance of an 
organisation and also its long-term wellbeing (Yaron, 2005). For example, it could include the 
restructuring of the board, in particular key executives who are considered to be ineffective, or it 
could consist of addressing potential social and environmental risks that may threaten to impact 
negatively on the corporation. Simply put, „engagement is the most direct approach institutional 
investors can use to try to influence corporate behaviour. The approach was developed to fulfil 
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institutional investors‟ aspiration to change the way corporations interact with and affect society‟ 
(Kinder, 2004). The purpose of institutional investors‟ engagement is to promote good corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices (Solomon, 2007). 
 
Sjostrom (2008) observes that often institutional investors pursue engagement in environmental and 
social issues as a matter of principle-based reasoning, for example safeguarding human rights, 
being a fundamental ethical principle.  Institutional investors use different methods to convey their 
message to senior managers of companies such as writing letters informing the company of their 
errors, raising issues at the AGM or maintaining a detailed and direct dialogue with the company, 
and the use of more public strategies including filing shareholder proposals, media campaigns and, 
in extreme situations, litigation. 
 
The literature review on institutional investors‟ engagement reveals that research on institutional 
investors has been expansive, covering areas such as institutional investors‟ ownership and 
company performance, institutional ownership and monitoring, institutional investors‟ activism (Black, 
1990; Black, 1997; Gillan and Stark, 2000; Karpoff, 2001; Romano, 2001) and the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance (Nelson, 2006; Mallin, 2006; Solomon, 2007). The evidence 
suggests that the initial interest of institutional investors focused exclusively on matters related to 
corporate governance (Gillan and Stark, 2000; Romano, 2001). Karpoff et al. (1996) research 
reveals that corporate governance issues accounted for 65.5% of the issues institutional investors 
were interested in; governance-related issues such as executive pay, independence of the Board, 
underperforming companies and aligning performance to pay. 
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Since the publication of Karpoff et al‟s (1996) research, work on institutional investors has expanded 
to include the role of institutional investors in corporate social responsibility practices. Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004) discovered that institutional investors‟ engagement has moved beyond the 
boundaries of corporate governance to embrace corporate social responsibility issues. Such issues 
include addressing concerns regarding climate change, efficient use of energy, reduction of carbon 
emissions, addressing discrimination in the work place and sustainable development. 
 
1.4 Relevance of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
An important factor which has made institutional investors more relevant is the increasing size of 
financial institutions. Additionally, an increase in aggregate ownership has resulted in greater 
concentration of power (Pound and Gordon, 1993 and Carleton et al., 1998). Pound and Gordon, 
1993 and Carleton et al. 1998, insinuate that the implication of the size increase is that it prevents 
institutions from exiting a company that they are not satisfied with, without incurring severe loss in 
the value of the share price. The only alternative lies in adopting activist positions. Institutional 
investors are capable of exerting some measure of influence on corporations when dealing with 
issues of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. They have more resources, 
given their voting weight and their size, that they can wield for, or against, companies in which they 
have investments. As a result of the enormous resources at their disposal and their size, institutional 
investors are able to employ information at lower costs when compared to individual investors and 
other, smaller, competing groups. 
 
Institutional investors are capable of influencing corporate governance, corporate behaviour and 
practices of companies that they have vested interests in, as well as mitigating potential business 
risks (Breen, 2006; Gillan and Stark, 2007; and Solomon, 2010). Institutional investors have become 
extremely vigilant in monitoring the activities of businesses in which they invest. They have come to 
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understand that it is not always in their best interest to be passive when dealing with the business 
activities of these companies, that monitoring, engagement and intervention are tools that they have 
at their disposal to ensure that certain foreseeable business risks are mitigated. The Stewardship 
Code recommends that institutional investors in the UK should: publish a policy statement on 
engagement, monitor and maintain dialogue with companies, intervene where necessary, evaluate 
the impact of their policies and report back to clients. 
 
Nisar and Martins (2006) suggest that these guiding principles have endowed institutional investors 
with the responsibility to work with board management teams and other shareholders to effect 
positive changes in corporate governance, financial structure and, most importantly, the strategies 
used to mitigate business managers‟ decreased appetite for risk that will bring about long-term 
improvement in company performance. Story and Price (2006) emphasise that the need to manage 
business risk is not done out of need for institutional investors to become more inquisitive in the 
business practices of the organisations in which they invest, but, as an inability to detect perceived 
risks could have dire consequences for the organisation, this may severely damage the business 
performance of the company and, at an extreme, may threaten the business organisation‟s  future 
viability. 
 
1.5 Motivation for the Research 
The researcher‟s interest in institutional investors‟ engagement is not entirely new; the writer has 
written a Masters dissertation on institutional investors‟ engagement and wanted to carry out a more 
in-depth examination of investors‟ engagement practices. Whilst intending to conduct interviews with 
fund managers, access to them proved impossible and another data source was sought. The 
researcher found an enormous amount of published data documenting F&C Investments‟ 
engagement practices over a number of years. This rich source of data offered the researcher an 
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alternative means of executing the research. The source of data included a diverse range of 
information contained in engagement reports, together with engagement policy booklets and 
research journals.  
This research is quite different from previous studies of institutional investors‟ engagement. The 
researcher found that most of the research work in this area has been largely quantitative in nature 
(Smith, 1996; Brav et al., 2006; Nelson, 2006; Gillan and Stark 2007) with measures such as market 
returns in the short and long term, abnormal profits, sales and turnover being some of the 
parameters used in examining institutional investors‟ impact on corporate governance. Research on 
institutional investors‟ engagement has also tended to focus on performance and outcome, to the 
detriment of important research interests such as the issues that institutional investors‟ engagement 
research addresses. The researcher finds that whilst a quantitative approach allows for examining 
cause and effect relationship, and to what extent engagement by institutional investors enhances 
financial performance of firms, it largely fails to provide a detailed account of how institutional 
investors‟ engagement practise has progressed (Karpoff, 2001; Nisar and Martins 2006; Becht et al., 
2007). 
 
The argument for choosing a quantitative research approach lies in the deductive nature of the 
research; one of the advantages of this approach is that it builds on existing frameworks and 
theories that lucidly explain institutional investors‟ engagement. The use of a structured approach to 
the research allows for a greater understanding of the ways in which research on institutional 
investors‟ engagement is progressing over time and what exactly the advancment is and how it has 
changed the nature of institutional investors‟ engagement. This research work proceeds to examine 
the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement. It is also unique in a sense as, 
whilst quantitative research on engagement has relied more on the use of questionnaires and 
interviews, the researcher has made use of a rich volume of documented data from a six-year period 
(2005-2011). 
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There are research papers that have examined institutional investors‟ engagement and some of the 
research in engagement has focused on the voting practices of institutional investors, the use of 
dialogue by institutional investors to influence corporate behaviour and practice on corporate 
governance issues, institutional investors‟ engagement on environmental, social and ethical issues 
or corporate social responsibility issues (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Solomon, 2007). This research 
on investors‟ engagement extends the extant research, which is largely focused on the use of 
engagement to influence corporate behaviour (Dresner, 2002; McLaren, 2004; Collier, 2004; and 
Vandekerckhove et al., 2007). 
 
The contribution to knowledge has focused more on how the nature of institutional investors‟ 
engagement is evolving. The traditional shareholder activist approach is currently being modified 
and it appears that traditional shareholder activism tends to focus more on corporate governance 
issues, to the detriment of corporate social responsibility issues. Institutional investors‟ engagement 
in corporate social responsibility appeared to be at the margin instead of mainstream; very few 
institutional investors seemed to be interested in corporate social responsibility, or even when they 
did appear to be interested, research on institutional investors‟ engagement shows that engagement 
in corporate governance issues tended to be examined differently from engagement in corporate 
social responsibility issues (Romano, 2001; Nelson, 2006; Gillan and Stark, 2007; Hendry et al., 
2007). 
 
Carr (1996) argued at the time that the sole responsibility of business is to create value for its 
shareholders and government was responsible for its other stakeholders. That thinking has 
obviously been flawed as research has shown that companies who fail to address potential social 
and environmental problems created by their business activities tend to be liable to litigation through 
causing social and/or environmental harm to their host communities. For example, the recent British 
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Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates that BP‟s failure to effectively manage 
health and safety risk cost the company more than an estimated $ 20 billion in fines and clean-up 
expenses (Schwartz, 2012). The methods used by institutional investors to influence corporate 
behaviour and practices are evolving; there is evidence to suggest that when a particular approach 
and method of engagement is applied but fails to achieve the institutional investors‟ objective, they 
tend to change their approach and use a different method of engagement. 
 
This research provides a theoretical understanding of the complexity of institutional investors‟ 
engagement practices, as institutional investors grapple with complex governance and corporate 
social responsibility issues. It does so by using the agency theory framework to explore institutional 
investors‟ engagement and finds that institutional investors are able to reduce agency costs by 
addressing 
4
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Institutional investors can address the 
5
adverse selection problem by reducing the asymmetries of information; they do so by encouraging 
managers and companies in which they have vested interests to disclose information concerning 
their corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices. Institutional investors also 
reduce the moral hazard problem by using corporate governance instruments to align the interests of 
investors and managers. Such instruments include performance based incentives for managers (e.g. 
benchmarking pay to performance), strengthening internal control mechanisms (e.g. appointing 
independent non-executive directors) and aligning managers‟ pay to selected corporate social 
responsibility criteria (e.g. aligning pay to health and safety performance). 
                                                             
4 Moral hazard is a situation where a party (the agent) will have the tendency to take risks because the costs that 
could incur will not be borne by the party taking the risks, the cost would be passed on to the principal (See 
Gomez-mejia and Wiseman 2007 for details). 
 
5 Adverse selection is an intentional misrepresentation by the agent. The agent may claim to possess certain skills 
when he or she has been employed. The problem of adverse selection arises because the principal cannot fully 
access the skills of the agent at the time of employment or even when the agent has been employed (See Jensen 
and Fama 1983 for details). 
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1.6 Research Question 
Initially, the researcher had set out to investigate institutional investors voting in the UK and had 
wanted to examine some of the factors that may have been responsible for the poor level of voting 
by shareholders and the voting practices in the UK. The research had hoped to shed light on a 
different aspect of institutional investors voting in the UK that has not been given much consideration 
at the moment. The research will be investigating shareholder voting practices by institutional 
investors: it intended to focus on issues that shareholders as institutional investors vote against at 
their annual general meetings. The research had intended to inform corporate governance practice 
by identifying areas where pension funds are unhappy with business practices of firms they have a 
majority shareholding in. The premise of the research at the time was that institutional investor vote 
against issues that they are not satisfied with, as a message or signal to management to inform 
them to make some changes in the way the business operates and performs.  The objectives of the 
research are as follows:  
 Identify corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues that institutional 
investors vote against during their annual general meetings. 
 Inform corporate governance regulations and business practices by identifying; if any; areas 
of weaknesses that institutional investors are dissatisfied with as revealed by their voting 
reports. 
The research questions the research had hoped to answer were: 
What are the issues that institutional investors vote against during their annual general meetings? 
Are they issues that deal more with corporate governance or corporate social responsibility? 
However, after my mid-point progression examination and due consultation with my supervision 
team, I was advised to change the focus of the research, my supervision team were of the opinion 
that there was not enough substantive material and data on shareholder voting in the UK to write up 
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a doctoral thesis. As a result of that, the focus of the research was modified to focus on some other 
aspect of institutional investors‟ engagement. 
This piece of research aims to illuminate different aspects of institutional investors‟ engagement in 
the UK in particular issues over a period of time, as the use of multiple methods in engagement is an 
aspect that has not previously been considered in depth. Specifically, this study intends to examine 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practice by identifying issues that 
institutional investors are concerned with. The research will investigate UK-based institutional 
investors‟ actual engagement practices and the types of alternative strategies adopted if, and when, 
initial initiatives fail. This research is a case study analysis of Foreign & Colonial institutional 
investors‟ engagement activities over a six-year period.  
 
The primary research questions posed are: 
What are the types of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues that 
institutional investors are concerned with? 
How do institutional investors‟ use multiple methods in engagement, especially in relation to those 
strategies that do not seem to achieve the desired outcomes? 
 
To address the research questions above, it was necessary for the researcher to use an extensive 
amount of information from Foreign & Colonial Investments (F&C Investments). F&C Investments 
can be regarded as one of the leading pioneers of institutional investors‟ engagement practice in the 
UK (Skypala, 2010). With over 230 investment professionals, F&C Investments has one of the 
largest investment teams in Europe and manages approximately £100.8 billion worth of assets for a 
diverse range of insurance companies, institutional clients and retail investors, representing more 
than three million investors (Russell, 2008). F&C Investments provides asset management services 
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including a range of investment trust options and venture capital trusts. It primarily operates in the 
UK and other European countries (Reynard, 2012). The company offers services through two 
segments which include investment management and property asset management. The company‟s 
vision has always been focused on creating value for its customers by delivering superior 
performance. The aim of F&C Investments‟ engagement is to be persuasive and pragmatic in order 
to achieve change that enhances not only the bottom line, but also corporate behaviour, corporate 
policies and corporate social responsibility practices. F&C Investments uses its leverage as one of 
Europe‟s largest investors to support the implementation of good environmental, social and 
governance practices. 
 
1.7 Outline of Research Chapters 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical underpinning of institutional investors‟ engagement from an 
agency theory perspective and a stakeholder perspective. It discusses the growth and influence of 
institutional investors in the UK and explores the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. Figure 1 on page 15 gives an illustration on the 
structure of the literature review on institutional investors‟ engagement. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the two approaches to engagement that institutional investors take and explains 
the different methods that investors can apply to engagement. It discusses institutional investors‟ 
engagement as an important mechanism that can be used to ensure that managers are acting in the 
best interests of the investors. The use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement is 
examined in the context of the application of various methods of engagement to influence corporate 
behaviour, practices and policies. When a particular method employed by investors does not work, 
an alternative is applied. For example, institutional investors‟ use of dialogue is an important tool for 
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influencing corporate behaviour, practices and policies, but at times dialogue alone is ineffective in 
producing the intended result. 
In Chapter 4 the researcher explains his research philosophy, methodology and methods. The 
researcher discusses his ontological position and justifies the research methodology used in 
executing the research. The choice of positivist theoretical perspective over the interpretivist 
theoretical perspective is explained. The use of case study methodology is described and the use of 
content analysis of the research data is explained in detail. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of F&C Investments. It gives an explanation of the organisation‟s 
structure and also explains its engagement philosophy:  the aim of F&C Investments‟ engagement is 
explored, F&C Invesments‟ corporate governance guidelines are discussed and its investment 
philosophy described. F&C Investments‟ engagement is targeted at enhancing not only the bottom 
line (e.g. increasing profit and earnings of shareholders), but also influencing corporate behaviour, 
corporate policies and corporate social responsibility practices. 
Chapter 6 analyses and discusses the data on F&C Investments‟ engagement practices. It begins 
with a discussion of the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues F&C 
Investments‟ engagement addresses. A longitudinal analysis of F&C Investments‟ engagement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility over a six-year period is examined. The 
use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement is discussed with illustrations of 
specific cases exemplifying where it has been applied. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the discussions and research findings on institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility and a conclusion. It also 
offers recommendations for further research in institutional investors‟ engagement which could 
provide invaluable and insightful information on improving governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices.  An explanation of the limitations of the research is also provided. 
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Figure 1:  Structure of the Literature Review 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 begins by defining the concept of corporate governance from the traditional agency theory 
perspective. This is followed by a detailed elaboration of the various roles, functions and/or 
responsibilities of shareholders/owners of publicly-listed companies from agency perspective with 
particular focus on institutional investors. The primary aim is to highlight the central role played by 
institutional investors as owners typically holding significant blocks of shares in publicly-listed 
companies in (i) monitoring managerial actions and (ii) shareholder activism, especially in corporate 
governance-related and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related issues. 
This chapter also examines many other important aspects relating to institutional investors, drawing 
mainly upon the extant corporate governance literature stream. These include (i) the benefits of 
having institutional investors as interested and powerful (by virtue of their significant shareholdings) 
monitors that can reduce asymmetries of information and agency costs, (ii) alternative theories and 
perspectives regarding the actual and supposed role of these investors in promoting better corporate 
governance and CSR practices such as the stakeholder perspective/theory. 
In essence, the review explores the debate and academic case for institutional investor involvement 
in shareholder activism. It illustrates how institutional investors, through active and persistent 
engagement strategies, can indeed influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance: A Traditional Conception 
With limited liability and an ease of transferability of ownership, the modern corporation is an ideal 
instrument for assembling vast amounts of worldwide capital from both public shareholders and 
private investors. As a consequence, such publicly-listed entities have emerged as a powerful and 
dominant form of business institution within the last century. Indeed collectively, corporations have 
tremendous influence on economies and also many other aspects of the global social landscape 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Mallin, 2006). 
Corporations tend to grow ever larger with (i) the accumulation of more capital from investors 
worldwide and (ii) the need to increase efficiency in production through economies of scale; the 
subsequent specialised division of labour results in a practical separation between ownership and 
control. Put simply, whilst shareholders collectively own such entities, the control and management 
of these corporations is delegated to a group of professional managers (Mallin, 2006). 
Berle and Means (1932) argued that this separation of ownership and the loss of control by 
shareholders have created a governance problem. This is due to the fact that such separation allows 
managers to act in their own self-interest rather than in the interests of shareholders. Indeed, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) noted that the interests of managers and investors are not always identical; 
managers may prefer to pursue business goals that ensure they receive increased remunerations 
and bonuses rather than focus on increasing the wealth of investors. 
According to Gillan and Stark (2003) the relevance of corporate governance arises largely as a 
result of conflicts between shareholders and managers in the corporate structure created by the 
separation of ownership and control.  These conflicts of interest are often referred to as agency 
problems. An underlying assumption of the agency problem is that managers are more interested in 
maximising their own welfare than the welfare of investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Schotter and 
Wiegelt, 1992). In this respect, Boatright (1999) argued that company managers have a tendency to 
pursue their own personal objectives such as aiming to gain large bonuses and increase their stock 
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holdings. Solomon (2010) observes that this kind of behaviour can result in managers pursuing 
business projects and company investments that are focused on yielding short-term benefits and 
profits (when managers‟ pay is bench-marked against these performance measures), rather than 
focusing on maximising investors‟ wealth by investing in business projects that would yield wealth for 
the investors in the long-term. 
The agency problem, as described above, has prompted policymakers and capital market 
participants worldwide to consider various means of ensuring that corporate managers act in the 
best interests of shareholders, as the owners of those entities. Here, the concept of corporate 
governance becomes relevant. Larcker et al. (2005) explain that corporate governance generally 
refers to a set of mechanisms that influences the decisions made by managers where separation of 
ownership and control exists. Examples of these monitoring mechanisms are the Board of Directors, 
institutional investors and the market for corporate control. 
Huse (2007) states that corporate governance is seen as the interaction between various internal 
and external actors and Board members in directing a firm‟s value creation. Internal actors are those 
who make decisions and take actions within the firm. External actors are those who seek to 
influence and control decisions from outside the firm and include non-governmental organisations 
and the local community. 
Tricker (1984) suggests that the role of corporate governance is not concerned with the running of 
the business of the company per se, but with giving overarching directions to the enterprise; 
overseeing the management‟s executive actions and satisfying legitimate expectations of 
accountability. In fact, Solomon (2010) suggests that corporate governance may be seen as a web 
of relationships, not only between a company and its owners but also between that company and a 
broad range of stakeholders: employees, customers, suppliers and bondholders. 
 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
19 | P a g e  
 
Overall, there is a lack of consensus on the definition of the term corporate governance. However, 
the various definitions of corporate governance suggest that, at the core, the concept encompasses 
the relationships between shareholders and managers as well as other stakeholders. It is also about 
the set of mechanisms that is used to influence the decisions of the senior manager and the Board 
of Directors. As agency perspective is by far the most dominant in the extant literature in explaining, 
and subsequently analysing, the corporate governance dilemma, the following section explores this 
perspective in a detailed manner.   
 
2.3 Examination of Institutional Investors from an Agency Theory Perspective 
Agency theory, as described in the previous section, attempts to explain the relationship between 
two or more parties in which one party is assigned the role of the principal and the other the role of 
the agent: the agent has been designated with the responsibility of performing some specific task on 
behalf of the principal (Eisenhardt1989; Hendry, 2005; Shapiro, 2005; Saam, 2007). Similarly, 
Guilding et al. (2005) argued that the agency perspective emphasises exchanges between two 
parties; one party, the principal (representing the owner of the business), delegates work to a 
second party, the agent (representing the manager). The theory elucidates the principal-agent 
relationship and also describes the conflicts that can arise when two parties who have a contractual 
agreement also have different interests and preferences (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Gomez-Mejia 
and Wiseman, 2007). The agency theory relationship exists in a variety of contexts that involve the 
delegating of authority and responsibility. Some common examples of agency relationships include 
doctor-patient, employer-employee, landlord-tenant, politician-citizen and investor-manager (Kivisto, 
2007).  
The basic assumption of the agency perspective in relation to publicly-listed companies is that 
managers‟ (agents‟) and owners‟ (principals‟) interests are not aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Senior management and directors are more interested in maximising their own wealth, power and 
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prestige while safeguarding their reputation, whilst shareholders are more inclined to maximise the 
value of their shares and asset holdings (Moldoveanu and Martins, 2001). This divergence in the 
alignment of interests has been the cause of severe tension between agents and principals. 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) posit that these divergences of interest can sometimes lead to what 
they call „agency loss.‟ Agency loss may occur when the return to the residual claimants (the owners) 
falls short or below what it would be if the principals (the owners) exercised direct control of the 
corporation. 
The reduction of agency costs by aligning the interests of the principal and agent can be achieved by 
increasing the principals‟ incentive to acquire information and by improving the principals‟ ability to 
foster a monitoring reputation viaa long-term relationship with management (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 2007). There are certain mechanisms and incentives that can be used to align the 
interests of managers and investors (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
According to Filatotchev et al (2011), aligning executive and owner incentive is regarded as a direct 
mechanism to address the agency problem. This is done by linking executive remuneration to 
company performance. The call by owners for intelligent design of compensation structures may not 
be in executives‟ best interests. The aligning of remuneration with specific performance criteria is 
believed to reduce agency costs such as excessive remuneration that is based on performance of 
high level managers (Forgarty et al., 2009). Agency theory posits that executive compensation can 
be considered an important lever or an effective method to control agent behaviour.  
 
Executive remuneration is a governance mechanism that is used to align the interests of corporate 
managers and directors with those of investors.  Director and executive pay has become the subject 
of debate and interest since the mid-1990s and has attracted great attention from investors, 
shareholders, the media and policy makers (Ferrani et al., 2003; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Cunat and 
Guadalupe, 2009).  In a bid to ensure that corporate managers and directors focus on enhancing 
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shareholder value, investors have intentionally designed executive pay to meet specific 
performance-related criteria. Among the many issues in which investors tend to be interested are 
those that deal with disclosure of executive pay and remuneration, benchmarking executive pay to 
performance indicators and reducing the pay of underperforming executives. Some of the known 
performance criteria include shareholder return, profit-based measures, return on capital employed, 
share price and earnings per share (Monks and Minnow, 2008).  
 
The dramatic rise in executive pay has been largely attributed to equity-based performance pay and 
the use of share options (Ferrani et al., 2003). According to Mallin (2006), the debate on executive 
pay has primarily focused on four key areas: (1) the overall level of directors‟ remuneration and the 
role of share options; (2) the suitability of performance measures linking directors‟ remuneration and 
performance; (3) the role played by the remuneration committee in determining the directors‟ 
remuneration; and (4) the influence that institutional investors and shareholders are able to exercise 
on directors‟ remuneration. 
 
One important reason for the interest in directors‟ pay is the perception that directors were receiving 
considerable remuneration packages, often with little apparent reward to shareholders in terms of 
company performance, which further fuelled interest in this area. The argument proffered has been 
that high levels of executive pay are necessary to attract talented executives and to reward good 
corporate performance (Conyon et al., 2000). While this seems sensible in theory, in practice there 
are concerns over instances where increases in executive pay may not have led to an increase in 
performance (Dong and Ozkhan, 2008). Growing evidence has revealed that some of the highest 
paid executives do not necessarily perform better than those who earn less but it is possible that 
high earnings, as a means of evaluating performance, may be a necessary, but may also be an 
insufficient mechanism for internal governance. 
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The relationship between the robustness and effectiveness of the board of directors and poor 
company performance is another core issue for institutional investors in the literature. The board of 
directors is responsible for leading and controlling a company and an effective board is fundamental 
to a company‟s success (Solomon, 2010). The board is the link between the managers and the 
investors and is essential to good corporate governance and investor relations (Mallin, 2006). The 
board is responsible for determining a company‟s aims and the strategies, plans and policies to 
achieve those aims, as well as monitoring the progress of their achievement (both from an 
overarching company viewpoint and also in terms of the analysis and evaluation of their 
performance as a board and individual directors). Solomon (2010) states that for a company to be 
successful it must be well governed; a well-functioning and effective board of directors is the Holy 
Grail sought by every ambitious firm. A company‟s board is its heart and as such needs to be 
healthy, fit and carefully nurtured in order to run the company effectively(Bates, Becher and 
Lemmon2008). Signs of fatigue, apathy, lack of energy and general poor health within the 
functioning of the board requires urgent attention. The literature on this area has been largely 
empirical and has wrestled with the following issues: how effective is the board in performing its 
monitoring function, does the board contribute to shareholders‟ wealth, are the board and control 
mechanisms substitutes, does board composition matter, how does the board interact with 
management and how effective is the differentiation between the roles of Chairman and Chief 
Executive?  
 
Academic research findings have remained mixed, with some studies finding that there is a positive 
relationship between an effective board and corporate performance, and some finding that there is 
no discernible relationship. Some researchers show that there is a negative relationship between the 
board and performance. The researcher posits that, while the board may play an important role in 
promoting good corporate performance, instances also exist where business organisations have 
failed or corporate scandals have occurred. Problems can arise as a result of board members who 
are not independent and seem to have more loyalty to other members of the board, ambivalent 
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towards enhancing shareholder value. Thus, whilst the board can serve as an important internal 
mechanism to enhance corporate governance and performance, it may not always be effective in 
resolving every corporate challenge and other internal mechanisms are necessary to complement 
the efforts of the board. The directors, while capable and competent in business matters and issues 
may not have the resources to monitor the activities of senior managers. 
 
Similarly, Lin et al. (2011) suggest that linking executive compensation to executive performance can 
ensure that consistent targets between owners and agents are achieved. The literature on agency 
theory explains that the use of executive remuneration-based compensation as a policy instrument 
has advantages and disadvantages (Samm, 2007; Lubatikin et al., 2007). The use of this policy 
instrument ensures that both the agent and the principal have the same objectives. On the other 
hand, this policy may encourage the agent to adopt risk-averse measures and may, in the long run, 
ensure that executives focus on short-term performance whilst ignoring the long-term strategic 
business interests of the company. 
 
Grossman and Hart (1983) hold the opinion that one of the major challenges facing corporate 
governance is solving the agency problem. To reduce agency costs, the use of strong internal 
corporate governance mechanisms such as an independent Board of Directors that consists of non-
executive directors, nominated by shareholders, is considered an important tool. The non-executive 
directors have been designated to preserve the interests of the owners, who have the resources to 
monitor management (Forgarty et al., 2009). Empirical research shows that an independent Board of 
Directors is an effective instrument in reducing agency costs (Solomon, 2010).  Competent, 
independent Board directors are greatly incentivised to monitor management effectively since their 
hard-earned reputation, as well as the value of their human capital, depends on the expertise in the 
area (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
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A second internal mechanism capable of having a considerable effect on reducing agency cost is the 
size of the board. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) acknowledge that, as the size of the board increases, 
there is a tendency for it to become less effective in monitoring management as a result of the „free-
rider‟ problem amongst directors and the increase in time of the decision-making process. Board 
size affects how effectively and efficiently board members share and fulfil their responsibilities; the 
smaller the board, the more likely members will experience a sense of unity, common purpose and 
ownership and every member can be active and engaged resulting in a more rewarding experience. 
Smaller boards are flexible in terms of scheduling meetings and agenda-setting. 
 
Unfortunately the use of these mechanisms may not always yield the intended or desired results. 
Carson (2003) notes that the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Andersen revealed that the 
self-interests of senior managers and executives motivated them to act in a way that was harmful to 
investors but also to the interests of the public. Many employees lost their jobs and also earnings in 
relation to pensions as a result of the activities of senior managers and executives.  
 
2.3.1 Institutional Investors’ Involvement Improves CG by Reducing Agency Costs 
More generally, Ayres and Cramton (1994) argue that moral hazard is a form of agency cost which 
results from principals‟ imperfect information. To some extent principals or investors are limited by 
the amount of information available; investors can use this information to attempt to design an 
incentive scheme that is targeted at reducing the costs that arise from moral hazards, however, as 
evidence from the principal and agency literature suggests, the principal or investor is not in the best 
position to assess the performance or ability of senior managers due to imperfect information or 
information asymmetries (Huddart and Ke, 2007).  
 
The greater the bias and information advantage the agent or senior manager has, the more difficult it 
becomes for the principals or investors to design an incentive scheme to reduce moral hazard 
problems. Institutional investors‟ involvement could potentially reduce the information advantage 
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managers possess. As discussed above, investors committed to holding large amounts of stock 
have a greater incentive to obtain information about managers‟ abilities or lack thereof and actual 
performance. Investors who are involved in the monitoring process go beyond evaluating the 
performance of companies using measures such as gross and net profits that can be influenced by 
economic recessions; investors who are involved can, to a large extent, base their support for 
management on less obvious indicators of managerial performance such as corporate governance 
practices. They are more willing to condition their support for senior management on greater 
indicators of managerial performance and can also acquire knowledge and information which 
provides them with the tools to evaluate and ascertain with increased confidence whether managers 
are unskilled, incompetent or underperforming. 
 
Institutional investors‟ involvement is better suited to mitigating moral hazard problems than other 
traditional corporate governance mechanisms.  For example, potential third-party bidders are less 
likely to respond to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection; they would not possess the 
knowledge and information to address such issues. This is also true in situations where you have 
evidence of strong capital markets; external monitors may not have the necessary tools and 
incentives to discipline managers who have in some way succumbed to moral hazards and caused 
the corporation financial loss. In some cases, such as Enron and WorldCom, allowing external 
market discipline may come too late; after the business has collapsed, and in such situations the 
shareholders and investors would suffer financially. The involvement of institutional investors 
provides opportunities for investors to resolve difficult business issues with senior managers before 
they become insurmountable. 
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2.3.2 Institutional Investors Can Improve CG by Reducing Asymmetries of Information 
According to McLaren (2004), institutional investors‟ involvement can reduce information 
asymmetries between senior managers and investors and also provides opportunities for senior 
managers to disclose difficulties and challenging situations faced by a company. Huddart and Ke 
(2007) acknowledge that timely disclosure of information is an important element of reducing 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. It allows institutional investors to collect 
information from external sources about the firms in which they have substantial holdings; with this 
information investors are then able to bridge the gap of information asymmetry, as investors armed 
with this information are better able to engage in dialogue and discreet negotiations about issues 
and concerns that would otherwise not have been possible.  
 
Agency theory also supports the notion that disclosure of information can result in reducing 
asymmetries of information between senior managers and investors. This reduction not only benefits 
investors, especially when the company is publicly-listed, it ensures that market participants and 
various stakeholders are informed of the firm‟s internal polices; it enables firms to enhance their 
exposure to capital markets through improving public perception of the firm; it allows extensive 
analyst coverage and attracts institutional investors who may otherwise have had no interest (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). 
 
Reducing asymmetries of information allows the tangible benefits of improved disclosure, public 
perception and standards. Keeping institutional investors informed can also contribute to a firm‟s 
ability to raise market capital as and when necessary. Institutional investors‟ monitoring not only 
improves disclosure, it also provides senior managers and investors the opportunity to improve the 
relationship between both parties and, in so doing, enhances trust. Institutional investors with a long-
term perspective do not believe in exiting companies due to conflicts of interest, rather these 
investors use their holdings and resources to influence behavioural changes which can be very 
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beneficial in the long run, as institutional investors can evaluate the decisions of senior managers of 
the companies in which they have investments over a period of time.  
 
This can result in a reduction of asymmetries of information in how competent the senior managers 
claim to be and how competent they actually are. As senior managers make decisions over a 
progressively longer period of time, investors can easily collate information on performance and 
ability. As a result, if necessary, they can revise senior managers‟ contracts, earnings and 
remunerations to ensure that they become more performance-oriented. To implement the type of 
contracts that reward good performance and penalise for poor performance and risky behaviour, it is 
important to have long-term investors, as investors who are not committed to holding shares for a 
long period of time would not be in a position to take advantage of this process. Thus, investors who 
monitor have the incentive to discipline certain types of managerial failures (particularly moral hazard 
issues) in situations where third-party bidders would not take corrective action (Ayres and Cramton, 
1994). 
 
Agency theory is not without flaws. Traditional agency theory tends to focus largely on performance-
related issues such as profit and gross earnings and makes the erroneous assumption that 
institutional investors‟ interests are purely monetary; this has been reinforced over recent decades in 
the mathematical modelling formulas of financial economics (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Seth and 
Thomas, 1994). As it stands, agency theory seems to fall short in a sense, as it fails to examine 
other issues such as environmental and social issues that can affect a firm‟s profitability, earnings 
and performance.  
In reality, the social and environmental costs of business to society have been greatly ignored; in the 
past this has allowed corporations to act irresponsibly, detaching themselves from social and 
environmental costs (Clarke, 2007). However, with the continuing harm that business activities 
cause to the environment and local community, the issue of environmental sustainability is becoming 
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an increasingly important and topical issue (Keinert, 2008). In addition, there are growing fears 
surrounding the consequences of non-financial risk as global environmental disasters, terrorism and 
the threat of nuclear war have focused attention on environmental and social issues (Keinert, 2008).  
It is increasingly evident that it is no longer possible for the environment to sustain the detrimental 
effects of certain business activities; questions are asked and concern is expressed, as many 
environmental issues such as climate change, global warming and increased flooding are plaguing 
the planet (Andriof and McIntosh, 2001). The call for more responsible business operations, in light 
of these occurrences, has ensured it is considered not only necessary, but vitally important to the 
environment and community as a whole, and also to the viability of businesses in the long run.  
Agency theory presents a clear picture of the importance of the economic element to the existence 
and survival of business, but fails to expose that economic activities have an impact on society, the 
environment and the local community. Conversely, stakeholder theory tends to incorporate the fact 
that business decisions have economic, environmental and social costs and that business, to some 
extent, has a responsibility to the wider community. In addition, stakeholder theory encourages 
moral and ethical principles when corporations are making business decisions that also affect 
society. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder Theory on Corporate Governance 
The stakeholder theory is one of organisational management and business ethics that addresses 
moral values in managing a business organisation (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jonker and 
Foster 2002). It takes into consideration a wide variety of stakeholders in making organisational 
decisions. Some authors are keen to highlight that stakeholder theory was developed to fill the 
vacuums and unexplored questions of agency theory. Agency theory tends to limit itself to two 
simple key actors; the principal and the agent. Stakeholder theory goes further, implying that there 
are more participants involved in a corporation than principals and agents. As Boatright (2002) 
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rightly suggests, stakeholder theory has been developed in opposition to the prevailing system of 
corporate governance in which shareholders or stockholders are thought to occupy privileged 
positions; that shareholders ought to have control; that managers have a fiduciary duty to serve 
shareholders‟ interests alone, and that the objective of the firm ought to be the maximisation of 
shareholders‟ wealth. 
Stakeholder theory challenges the notion that the primary purpose of a company is the maximisation 
of shareholder wealth (e.g. dividends) and argues that the goal of any firm should be to satisfy all of 
its primary stakeholders (Wall and Rees, 2001); that in addition to its moral obligation to employees, 
a firm has further responsibility due to the unique and specifically defined relationship between the 
organisation and its stakeholders. Hasnas (1998) adds that management's fundamental obligation is 
not to maximise the firm's financial success, but to ensure its survival by balancing the conflicting 
claims of multiple stakeholders. It has also become clear that in corporate governance failures which 
result in bankruptcy, it is not only the shareholders who suffer but also a wide variety of stakeholders.  
There are many and various ways of defining stakeholder theory and „stakeholder‟ depending on the 
user‟s disciplinary perspective. Solomon (2010) argues that one common feature of the various 
definitions of „stakeholder‟ is the acknowledgement of an exchange relationship: the stakeholders 
are not only affected by the company but the company has a considerable effect on stakeholders as 
they hold a „stake‟ rather than a „share‟ in the company. In defining „stakeholder theory‟, Clarkson 
(1994) states: the firm is a system of the host society that provides the necessary legal and market 
infrastructure for the firm‟s activities.  
The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by converting their stakes 
into goods and services. Blair (1995), as quoted by Turnbull (1997), offers that the key to achieving 
wealth creation is the need to align the goals of directors and managers to maximise total wealth and 
that this can be achieved through providing ownership-incentives to, and enhancing the voice of, 
those participants in the firm who contribute or control critical, specialised inputs (company-specific 
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human capital) and to align the interests of these critical stakeholders with the interests of external 
passive shareholders.  
A core principle of stakeholder theory is its emphasis on understanding the needs and interests of 
various stakeholders (Schwarzkopf, 2006). Schwarzkopf presumes that, in order to uphold this 
principle, conscientious managers must understand the needs and interests of other stakeholders. 
One meaningful way to achieve this is to enter into a dialogue, but for the dialogue to be significant 
each party must learn to appreciate the other‟s perspective or point of view as well as the risks 
posed by potential managerial action. 
In recent times, business and society scholars have moved away from the traditional neoclassical 
and behavioural theories to embrace the stakeholder theory as they contend that it provides a more 
realistic world view and provides a sound theoretical understanding of the intricate web of 
interrelationships between business organisations, societal institutions and the socio-political 
environment (Wartick and Wood, 1998; Hasnas, 1998).  Every business has complex involvements 
with people, groups and other organisations in society, some of which are intended and desired; 
while others are unintended and undesired.  All parties with which a business is involved have an 
interest in the decisions, actions and practices of that organisation.  The firm or organisation can 
thus be viewed as a set of interdependent relationships among primary stakeholders (Chakravarthy, 
1986; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Evan and Freeman, 1988; cited in Hillman and Keim, 2001).  
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Figure 2: External and Internal Stakeholders of a Company 
 
Source: Kendal and Sheridan (1992: p55) 
In Figure 1, stakeholders have been further categorised into internal and external stakeholders 
(Kendal and Sheridan, 1992). The internal stakeholders constitute employees, customers and any 
other party engaged in direct business with the firm, while the external stakeholders include, 
amongst many others, the media, financial word and local communities which supply land and other 
infrastructures to the company. The key emphasis or theme of stakeholder theory is the call to strike 
a balance between the various stakeholders and their numerous interests (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
Reynolds, Schulz and Hekman (2006: 286) recognise that balancing stakeholders‟ interests is a 
process of assessing and addressing the competing claims of those who have a stake in the 
operations of the organisation. The fundamental driving force behind most stakeholder strategies is 
the desire to balance stakeholders‟ interests (Freeman, 1984). Whilst extremely informative, the 
literature on balancing stakeholder interests has focused exclusively on the organisation and has 
failed, or is yet to consult individual decision-makers (Reynolds et al., 2006). However, the key 
question is: how can balance be achieved, since there are various stakeholders, with varying needs, 
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and also what methods or approaches can be used to harness this balance? There are basically two 
approaches to stakeholder management: the instrumental approach and the normative approach. 
The instrumental approach to stakeholder management posits that to maximise shareholder value 
over an indefinite period of time, managers ought to consider key stakeholder relationships. An 
elemental assumption of this model is that stakeholders are part of the environment that must be 
managed in order to assure revenue, profits and ultimately provide return to shareholders. 
The normative approach to stakeholder management postulates that managers ought to pay 
attention to key stakeholder relationships but also emphasises the need for proper management of 
relationships between stakeholders. Its focus differs from the former model by considering a 
normative moral commitment, rather than using stakeholders solely as a tool to maximise profits or 
create shareholder wealth (Berman et al., 1999). 
Reynolds et al. (2006) conclude that, on exploring the implications of using the two different 
approaches to balancing stakeholder interest, the instrumental approach is more valuable for 
organisations and individual managers than the normative approach. It is useful to note that whilst 
the instrumental and normative approaches to stakeholder management are very instructive of the 
roles managers need to play in managing the stakeholder relationship, they fail to give an account of 
the role that shareholders or investors can play in influencing managers and as such will not be 
relevant in explaining institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance. These two 
characterisations tend to portray shareholders and investors as weak, diffused and disinterested and 
managers as acting with uncurbed discretion – both insignificant in the light of institutional investors‟ 
influence, concentration and involvement in corporate governance as well as the constraints of 
managers (Ryan, 2003). In stakeholder theory, shareholders and investors lose their central position 
in the operation of the firm, they are just one of many stakeholders whose interests management 
must consider and balance (Dasuki, 2005). 
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The portrayal of shareholders and investors as weak and lacking in influence from the perspective of 
instrumental and normative approaches to stakeholder management is perhaps misleading as, in 
reality, shareholders and investors wield enormous influence and power as a result of their number 
and amount of shares held. Investors‟ renewed interest in corporate governance can be traced to a 
series of events that have shaped the thinking of institutional investors. Initially, investors were 
content with holding shares and playing a passive role in corporate governance. However, the 
occurrence of the following incidents: the deregulation of the financial and capital markets, managers‟ 
indiscretion and corrupt practices leading to the collapse of multinational companies such as 
Maxwell Communication Corporation, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Polly Peck, 
Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Andersen and the recent global financial crisis that was triggered by 
the sub-prime mortgages scandal in the US has encouraged institutional investors‟ increased 
involvement in corporate governance.  
Mitchell et al. (1997), observing the proposed weakness of shareholders and investors in the 
conventional stakeholder theory, proffered a theory of „stakeholder salience‟ to resolve this problem. 
In order to identify stakeholder relevance, Mitchell et al. (1997) proposed the stakeholder salience 
theory. This theoretical framework aims to identify stakeholders‟ reliability, indicating their salience, 
which is understood as “the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims” 
(Mitchell et al., 1997: 854). Within the stakeholder salience theory, power, legitimacy, and urgency 
are independent attributes of stakeholders used to define the company‟s relationship to these groups. 
 
Power refers to the capacity of a stakeholder to influence a firm‟s survival based on the ownership of, 
and/or access to, relevant resources. Depending on the amount of resources owned or controlled 
and the relevance of these resources it is possible for stakeholders to exert lesser or greater 
influence on the firm. Legitimacy refers to “socially accepted and expected structures or behaviours” 
(Mitchell et al., 1997: 866). Individuals that have legitimate standing in society or a genuine claim in 
the company are defined as legitimate stakeholders. Urgency is understood as the degree to which 
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management can delay attending to stakeholders‟ claims before being perceived as unacceptable 
(due to time sensitivity). Further, urgency refers to the importance of a claim or the relationship to the 
stakeholder (criticality) (Mitchell et al., 1997). It is obvious that the importance of a stakeholder 
increases with the degree to which a stakeholder claim calls for immediate attention.  
 
In a nutshell, stakeholder theory recognises that there are various categories of stakeholders: the 
primary and secondary stakeholder. It illustrates that whilst a corporation must be profitable, the 
business of corporations also affects a wide range of stakeholders who must be considered in the 
decision-making process. While there are numerous stakeholders as a whole, this research is 
specifically concerned with financial stakeholders, namely institutional investors. At first glance, it 
appears that stakeholder theory and agency theory are contradictory, that they have seemingly 
opposing philosophical and theoretical paradigms, but closer inspection may prove that they have 
similarities in terms of objectives and outcomes.  
Both agency theory and stakeholder theory aim to create value; in the case of agency theory, for the 
shareholders and in the case of stakeholder theory, for the stakeholders. Agency theory tends to 
focus on corporate governance issues that are likely to affect the creation of value for shareholders 
and stakeholder theory in a sense extends that boundary, encompassing a broader spectrum of 
issues that are environmental and social, which can also have a significant influence on shareholder 
value as well as stakeholder value.  
Solomon (2010: p20) is of the view that, in the long-term, “there is little inconsistency between the 
ultimate goal of agency theory and the practice of a stakeholder approach. It is only by taking into 
account stakeholders‟ as well as shareholders‟ interests that companies can achieve long-term profit 
maximisation and ultimately, shareholder wealth maximization.”  
In summary, the theoretical and philosophical stances of agency and stakeholder theory appear to 
be at variance. Shankman (1990) maintains that the conflicts between agency and stakeholder 
theory have been extensively debated in the business and management literature.  Agency theory 
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posits that managers are opportunistic and self-serving and, given the opportunity, managers are 
more likely to practice self-serving behaviour than that which is in the interests of their shareholders 
(Jecken and Meckling, 1976). On the contrary, stakeholder theory has a more optimistic view; 
managers believe their responsibility is to address the legitimate needs of a variety of 
stakeholders(Boatright, 2002). 
Although both theories appear to be contradictory and inconsistent they seem to share a similar 
objective regarding creating value for shareholders and stakeholders. Of equal importance is the fact 
that in practice, in the case of F&C, institutional investors do not choose one theoretical position over 
the other. Both theoretical positions are integrated into their engagement practices, considering not 
only the corporate governance issues but also the corporate social responsibility issues. It is 
important that these insights can be integrated into institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility and thus become potent tools in explaining 
institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility; it is 
not simply a choice between agency and stakeholder theory, nor is it a choice between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility, institutional investors are learning that corporate 
social responsibility issues are equally as important as corporate governance issues. 
 
This research investigates the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement in the 
UK, therefore it is important to examine research on institutional investors from the UK. The next 
section presents a compelling explanation as to why UK institutional investors are increasingly 
persuaded to take a more active stance on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. 
This research presents a forceful argument for institutional investors‟ ability to influence corporate 
behaviour, practices and policies and in so doing adding value to the company.  
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2.5 Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom 
In the past two decades there have been a series of corporate governance failures that have 
resulted in the collapse of firms in America, Europe and Asia (Chakrabarti et al., 2011). Corporate 
governance failures have endangered and damaged the financial welfare of millions of employees, 
customers, shareholders, vendors and other stakeholders (Mardjono, 2005). This increasing number 
of corporate governance failures has shaken the foundations of public trust and confidence in the 
corporate world (Coffee, 2005). Deetz (2007) suggests that corporate governance failures and 
scandals have occurred due to a number of circumstances: irregularities in financial reporting, a lack 
of investor confidence and public trust in the financial markets, the worldwide wave of privatisation in 
the last two decades and deregulation of the capital markets, and the East Asian Crisis. The East 
Asian Crisis placed the spotlight on corporate governance in emerging markets, as has the recent 
banking crisis that triggered global recession. Corporate governance failures have stimulated 
debates about corporate governance that have led to regulatory action and reforms. 
In the UK for example, the collapse of corporations such as the Maxwell publishing group at the end 
of 1980 instigated the development of the Cadbury Code of 1992, Marconi, Poly Peck and BCCI, 
and the dot-com bubbles and financial scandals have stimulated a series of further enquiries and 
recommendations. More recently, the banking crisis that led to the collapse of Northern Rock in the 
UK initiated the Turner Review 2009, an inquiry that examined the causes of global financial crises 
in order to make recommendations for changes to regulation and the supervisory approaches 
required to create a more robust banking system for the future (Solomon, 2010). 
Also instigated was the development of the Walker Review 2009 that focused on executive 
remunerations and the role of the board in the banking industry; focussing on corporate governance 
issues such as risk management and internal control. Regarding corporate governance failures, 
some of the corporations collapsed as a result of business fraud or an intentional cover-up by some 
of the senior executives. In the UK, the cases of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley are recent 
examples of corporate governance failure that clearly resulted from bad business plans and poor 
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managerial decisions. In some instances, government policy or informal pressures and regulatory 
forbearance have also been contributory factors.  
According to Kirkpatrick (2009), the financial crisis of 2009 can be attributed to failure and 
weaknesses in corporate governance practices, and under rigorous examination, corporate 
governance routines were not fit for purpose to safeguard against excessive risk-taking in a number 
of financial services firms. Risk management systems failed in many cases due to corporate 
governance procedures rather than an inadequacy of computer models alone: in a number of cases 
information about exposure did not reach the board or even senior levels of management, whilst risk 
management was often activity-based rather than enterprise-based.  
However, in many of the cases cited above, legitimate questions have arisen regarding the quality of 
the board and whether it was in a position to exercise independent judgement. In addition, it is 
questionable whether the board demanded additional information from management and it is 
possible that management may actually have been collusive. Consequently, there have been 
serious concerns about the increasing need to monitor the activities of such corporations, their 
business activities and policies (Solomon, 2007).  
 
Yaron (2005) suggests that high profile and persistent governance failures have focused attention on 
corporate practices and policies. Yaron (2005) suggests that the difficult lessons learned have 
instigated a number of corporate governance reforms in the UK. The Cadbury Report, the Turnbull 
Report, the Combined Code, the Turner Review and the Walker Review are corporate governance 
reforms intended to promote good corporate governance practices by encouraging institutional 
investors to become more involved. The UK reforms in corporate governance have covered several 
issues that have been addressed in the Combined Code.   
The core areas of corporate governance reforms in the UK that were addressed, as stated by 
Solomon et al. (2000), are executive remuneration, restructure of board composition, internal and 
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external audit, investor relationships, widening board representation and a voluntary or regulated 
framework for corporate governance. The Cadbury Report (1992), The Myners Report (1995) and 
the Hampel Report (1999) all stress the importance of institutional investors becoming more involved 
in the companies in which they invest, suggesting that institutional investors hold regular meetings 
with the executive team and an increase in dialogue between institutional investors and companies. 
The Cadbury, Myners and Hampel reports canvassed for a paradigm shift where institutional 
investors‟ roles as passive players within investee companies would no longer be suitable or valid. 
In the UK, institutional investors have continued to increase in size in terms of percentage ownership 
of equity. This increase has become more prominent in UK markets. UK markets exemplify how 
share ownership has moved away from individual ownership and become concentrated in the hands 
of a few powerful institutional investors (Mallin, 2006). Institutional ownership in the UK tends to 
mirror that of the US. However, ownership of equity by UK investors is slightly higher than the US in 
percentage terms. It is estimated that institutional investors own between 65%-75% of shares of 
quoted companies in the UK (Mallin, 1996).  
At the end of 1992, insurance and pension funds accounted for 51.8% of share ownership of the UK 
stock market. Unit and investment trusts held 8.5% and banks held 0.2%. Individual shareholders 
held only 20% of UK listed company shares, while overseas investors accounted for 12.8% (Aguilera 
et al., 2006). The dominance of pension funds and insurance companies in the UK has not always 
been so. Table 1 shows that individual investors held the bulk of shares in the UK market in the 
1960s and early 1970s. Gradually that figure continued to decline. In 2002, individual ownership 
accounted for 14.3% of the shares held in UK markets. Pension funds, insurance companies, unit 
trusts, banks and other financial institutions in the early 1990s held an estimated 60% of UK market 
shares, but that figure declined by an estimated 10% a decade later. The sharp fall in percentage 
equity reflects the fall in the stock market due to the crash in dot.com shares in 2000 and also the 
relatively poor performance of the equity markets in the aftermath (Short and Keasy, 2005). 
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Prior to the publication of the Cadbury Report, there was much anecdotal evidence to imply that 
institutional investors did not adopt an active role in influencing corporate governance practices in 
the UK, preferring to sell their holdings in „problem‟ companies rather than intervening in the 
management of the company (Stapledon, 1995; Mallin, 1996).  The work of Goergen et al. (2008) 
confirms this: although institutional investors are the largest owners of UK listed firms, they have 
been blamed for being too passive by the Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998) and Newbold (2001) 
corporate governance committees. 
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Table 1: Pattern of Share Ownership in the UK 
Beneficial Owners 1963 1969 1975 1981 1990 1993 2001 2002 
Pension funds 6.4 9.0 16.8 26.7 31.7 31.7 16.1 15.6 
Insurance companies 10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 20.4 20.4 20.0 19.9 
Unit trust 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 6.1 6.6 1.8 1.6 
Investment trusts     1.6 2.5 2.2 1.8 
Other financial institutions 11.3 10.1 10.5 6.8 0.7 0.6 9.9 10.5 
Banks 1.3 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 1.3 2.1 
Total financial institutions 30.3 35.9 48.0 57.9 61.2 62.0 51.3 51.5 
Private non-financial institutions 5.1 5.4 3.0 5.1 2.8 1.5 1.0 0.8 
Individuals 54.0 47.4 37.5 28.2 20.3 17.7 14.8 14.3 
Rest of the world 7.0 5.6 5.6 3.6 11.8 16.3 31.9 32.1 
Charities, churches etc 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 
Public sector 1.5 2.6 3.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 ____ 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Short and Keasy (2005: p.64) 
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According to Black and Coffee (1994) there are several explanations as to why, in the past, UK 
institutional investors were unlikely to intervene. Firstly, public intervention would draw public 
attention to the problems faced by the company. The financial market is likely to perceive this as bad 
news which may consequently result in a fall in stock price.  A fall in the value of the stock price also 
reduces the value of institutional investors‟ investments and shareholder value. Secondly, when 
institutional investors become involved with companies in difficulty they become privy to inside 
information and, as a result, will be unable to trade their shares, exacerbating their loss. Finally, 
effective institutional investors‟ engagement is expensive, requiring enormous amounts of resource 
in terms of time and money, particularly for institutional investors that have diverse portfolios. 
In a bid to encourage institutional investors in the UK, the Myners Review (2001) states that there is 
a lost value to institutional investors through the reluctance of fund managers to actively engage with 
companies in which they have holdings, even where they have strong reservations about strategy, 
personnel or other potential causes of corporate underperformance. Mallin (2006) mentions that four 
committees have examined different aspects of corporate governance in the UK: Cadbury, Higgs, 
Hampel Greenbury and the UK Stewardship codes. In terms of specific recommendations, the UK 
Stewardship codes (2012) suggested that institutional investors: 
 Should publicly disclose their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship 
responsibilities. 
 Should have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship which 
should be publicly disclosed. 
 Should monitor their investee companies. 
 Should establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their stewardship 
activities. 
 Should be willing to act collectively with other investors where appropriate. 
 Should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity. 
 Should report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities. 
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Given the size of their shareholdings, the power of institutional investors in the UK is beyond doubt. 
Institutional investors, as previously argued, have the potential to exert a significant level of influence 
on companies and this has clear implications for corporate governance practices, especially with 
regards to setting the standards for corporate governance and issues of enforcement (Clarke, 2007; 
Burmajster, 2009).  
According to Solomon (2010), institutional investors, as shareholders, have moved away from being 
the cause of, but are now a means of solving, the agency problem. Institutional investors are not in a 
prime position to monitor management and help align the interests of management and shareholders. 
Indeed, institutional investors today are much more involved in all areas of corporate decision-
making and have been encouraged to take on a more active role by the recommendations in 
corporate governance codes of practice and policy documents. Through concentrated ownership of 
shares, together with the financial strength and expertise of the institution, institutional investors are 
able to effectively overcome the problem of diffused shareholding.  
Mallin (2004) suggests that the power of institutional investors should not be underestimated and 
that the influence they wield is enormous. Their views may be influenced by various institutional 
investors‟ representative groups in the UK. Large institutional investors, mainly insurance companies 
and pension funds, are usually members of one of the two representative bodies which act as 
professional groups on their behalf. These two bodies are the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). Both the ABI and the NAPF have best 
practice corporate governance guidelines which encompass the recommendations of the Combined 
Code. They monitor the corporate governance activities of companies and provide advice to 
members. Institutional investors will generally consult ABI and/or NAPF reports on whether particular 
companies are complying with good corporate governance practice, as well as undertaking their own 
research and analysis.  
This research has been placed within a shareholder activism context; it intends to focus more on 
shareholder activism and the various strategies and methods that have been employed by 
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institutional investors and shareholders to influence corporate governance behaviour, policies and 
practices. The next section gives a brief overview of shareholder activism and the various methods 
used by shareholder activists to influence corporate behaviour, policies and practices.  
 
2.6 Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activists are often viewed as investors who, dissatisfied with some aspect of a 
company‟s management or operations, try to bring about change within the company without a 
change in control (Gillan and Stark, 2007). In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) classified the 
exercise of shareholder activism within an exit and voice framework, arguing that shareholders can 
express their dissatisfaction by selling their shareholdings; the exit option, or they can express their 
dissatisfaction to management; the voice option. Until the mid-1980s, shareholder activism was 
practiced by a handful of individuals and religious organisations (Romano, 2000; Gillan and Stark, 
2007). However this trend began to change when financial institutions such as pension funds, banks 
and insurance companies began to purchase significant amounts of shares. 
 
The embracing of shareholder activism by large institutions has been widely publicised and in some 
circles explained as a logical response to the historical development in the corporate market (Karpoff 
et al., 1996). Carleton et al. (1998) suggest that one factor that has increased shareholder activism 
is the increase in size of financial institutions and pension funds over the years. In addition, the 
increase in aggregate ownership has resulted in an increase in the concentration of power. They 
insinuate that the increase in size could imply that these institutions cannot exit from a company they 
are dissatisfied with without incurring severe loss in the value of the share price, and the only 
alternative lies in adopting activist positions.  
 
Instead of acting in a passive manner and merely as a „rubber stamp‟ for managerial actions and 
decisions, institutional investors are becoming increasingly involved. Their aim is to wield influence 
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on managerial decisions and endeavour to modify managerial policies that they believe are harmful 
to shareholder wealth. Institutional or shareholder activism is a range of actions taken by institutional 
investors or shareholders to influence the corporate management board of the companies in which 
they own substantial amounts of shares. Gillian and Stark (1998) suggest that shareholders wishing 
to influence management may do so by: 
 
i) Buying and selling shares. 
ii) Raising their concerns with management in writing and meeting and negotiating with the 
management board.  
iii) Shareholder resolutions and voting.  
iv) The use of public campaigns and media pressure. 
v) Takeover mechanisms. 
vi) Threat of divestment.  
vii) Calling a General Meeting. 
 
A detailed examination of the various methods that shareholders use to influence management will 
be discussed in the next chapter. There is a wealth of literature on shareholder activism; within this 
literature there is an examination of the three core issues: which companies are targeted by 
shareholder activists? What is the motive of the investors that engage in shareholder activism? What 
economic benefit and shareholder value does shareholder activism add to the selected company? 
The first question has been explored by Pound and Gordon (1993) and Romano (2000): they both 
conclude that shareholder activists are more likely to select firms which are performing poorly; 
performance in this regard is examined more from a financial perspective, with financial indicators 
such as sales, profitability and turnover as the key indicators and parameters for assessing 
performance.  Shareholder activists are moving away from merely requesting improvements in 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
45 | P a g e  
 
performance and turning towards ethical issues such as environmental concerns, employee welfare 
and community related practices (Rehbein et al., 2004). 
The second question addresses the issue of motivation for shareholder activism: is the motivation for 
engaging in shareholder activism purely to enhance shareholder value and wealth, or are there 
some unexamined underlying motives? Two alternative explanations are given: Gillian and Stark 
(2007:p.58) inform us that the primary motivation for shareholder activism is to address the agency 
conflict; they say “shareholder activism is, at bottom, a response to the potential gains from 
addressing the agency conflict at the core of largely traded companies with absentee owners.” 
Hendry et al. (2007) agree that to a large extent shareholder activism is motivated by maximising 
shareholder value, but they also argue that there are some political and moral undertones. For 
example, in the UK, the Blair government encouraged investors to not only act responsibly, but also 
to ensure that they held accountable companies in which they invested, not only on financial 
performance, but also on corporate governance, social, ethical and environmental responsibilities. 
The third question has inspired much research and debate in academic circles with three emerging 
schools of thought: that to a great extent shareholder activism indeed adds value to the target 
company and also increases shareholder wealth (Gillian and Stark, 2002 and Becht et al., 2007); 
that shareholder activists are unlikely to cause any significant organisational or policy changes and 
are therefore unlikely to have any positive effects on a firm‟s performance and value (Karpoff, 2001 
and Nelson, 2006); and lastly, that shareholder activism has a harmful effect on company 
management, degenerates performance and in the long run decreases the value of the company 
(Bainbridge, 2005).  
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2.7 Institutional Investors’ Involvement in Corporate Governance 
In his seminal work on the relevance of institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance, 
Black (1992) argued that institutional investors‟ involvement can reduce a firm‟s cost of capital. 
Better supervision and monitoring by institutional investors can reduce risk and thus the risk-
adjusted cost of capital. Institutional investors can reduce the cost of capital through better 
supervision and monitoring; better supervision may reduce risks and also the risk-adjusted cost of 
equity. German and Japanese firms have a lower cost of capital precisely because of this reason. In 
Japan, institutional investors who provide equity also provide debt capital and this provision resolves 
the investor-creditor conflict and also enhances the lender‟s willingness to lend in times of crisis. 
Institutional investors can also reduce investor and manager myopia. According to Black (1992), 
when investors and managers verbally interact they can discover that they both have the same goal 
to ensure successful future company performance, and investors who are kept informed of senior 
managers‟ activities tend to be more tolerant of those activities.  
Institutional investors can strengthen other aspects of corporate governance practices; their 
involvement can reduce the possibility of a senior managers‟-sponsored anti-takeover and also 
ensure institutional investors are involved in developing better remuneration plans for themselves 
than managers are capable of. Black (1998) postulates that there are systemic shortfalls in corporate 
governance practices in the following areas: board structure and composition, corporate acquisition 
strategy, corporate diversification, pro-incumbent management rules, corporate cash retention 
policies and executive remuneration. He believes that these systemic shortfalls are amenable to 
institutional investors‟ scrutiny as they have access to relevant resources and can realise economies 
of scale in acting to overcome poor corporate governance practices. 
Bainbridge (2005) argues that allowing institutional investors to influence the decisions of company 
management could set a dangerous precedent and possibly lead to large-scale chaos and disruption 
in corporate management, resulting in many executive director and board member elections. The 
orchestration of these elections in turn would interfere with and disrupt company activities. 
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Threatened senior managers and directors would retaliate by launching full-scale election contests 
including the use of multiple mail shots, full page newspaper adverts and road shows. Such contests 
would require enormous amounts of resources and incur substantial out-of-pocket costs, resulting in 
a waste of resources that could have been used more productively.  
More importantly, these activities would divert the focus of directors and senior managers away from 
attending to the affairs of the company.  While this allegation may seem plausible in theory, in 
practice institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance has not led to widespread 
chaos and the instigation of executive director and board member elections. Huyghebaert and Hulle 
(2004) argue that if business organisations fully understood the positive influences of institutional 
investors and that the benefits of institutional investors‟ involvement outweighed any perceived costs, 
they would be more proactive and encourage these professional investors to invest in the company. 
Davis (2003) suggests that lower profitability and poor investment allocation decisions are largely a 
result of the failure to address agency problems and that this may lead to corporate governance 
failures.  
Black (1992) suggests that institutional investors‟ involvement can address poor corporate 
governance practices. Black (1992b) argues that institutional investors can add value when focussed 
on addressing the following process and structural issues: mixed issues, deterrence and targeting 
poor performance and also strengthening the board of Directors. The process and structural issues 
to which institutional investors‟ involvement can add value include those relating to board structure 
and composition, confidential voting, that senior managers consult institutional investors before 
taking action such as selling a large block of stock, creating a leveraged employee-shareholder 
programme and adopting golden parachutes, anti-takeover amendments proposed by corporate 
managers, rescinding a poison pill, and opting out of anti-takeover statutes. 
In Black‟s opinion, a mixed issue is a corporate governance issue that affects a number of 
companies for which large economies of scale exist. One example of a mixed issue is executive 
remuneration. The yearly pay increases of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), even when the 
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company‟s profits decline, is a corporate governance practice that should be improved, for example 
institutional investors could ensure that the CEO‟s pay is structured in such a way that it does not 
exceed the bounds of decency and reason. Institutional investors could change the corrupt process 
of determining CEO pay where the CEO recruits a supposedly independent consultant to 
recommend a remuneration plan to the remuneration committee. Institutional investors can also 
encourage long-term performance to be used to benchmark executive pay.  
 
 
A major concern of institutional investors in corporate governance practice is poor performing 
companies. Mallin (2006) states that institutional investors can use good corporate governance 
practices as a tool to extract value from underperforming and under-valued companies. This 
approach has been very successful for, amongst others, Lens Inc., CalPERS, Hermes, and Active 
Value Advisors. By targeting companies which are underperforming in one of the main market 
indices and analysing those companies‟ corporate governance practices, improvements can be 
made which unlock hidden value. These improvements often include replacing poorly performing 
directors and ensuring that the company complies with perceived best practice in corporate 
governance. 
Institutional investors‟ involvement extends beyond corporate governance issues; institutional 
investors are also actively engaged in corporate social responsibility issues, triggered by the 
increasing environmental and social costs of business. The activities of business organisations can 
have a significant impact on local communities and other stakeholders. Environmental pollution, for 
example oil spills, can cause considerable damage to the environment and may pose severe non-
financial and reputational risks to the continuity of the business as a result of lawsuits and litigations. 
Institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate social responsibility is targeted at mitigating that risk.  
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Disagreement exists regarding the corporate governance issues examined by institutional investors. 
Various researchers have classified issues into various taxonomies. Karpoff et al.‟s (1996) research 
reveals that corporate governance issues can be classified into three main categories: external 
control market issues, internal corporate governance issues and compensation-related issues. They 
conclude that the majority of governance issues tend to focus on internal corporate governance. 
Wahal (1996) states that the corporate governance issues investors are concerned with include the 
removal of blank cheques, changing the structure of the board (requiring a greater percentage of the 
board to be outsiders or eliminating a classified board), separation of the roles of Chairman and 
CEO, prohibiting green mail, redeeming poison pill, requiring the firm to publish names of 
shareholder proposal proponents, opting out of state anti-takeover laws, establishing shareholder 
committees, and opposing target share placement.  
 
Gillian and Stark (2000) categorised the governance issues institutional investors are concerned with 
into three distinct groups: issues related to the repealing of anti-takeover devices, board and 
committee independence issues, and voting issues. Romano (2001) alternatively classifies the 
governance issues into four key areas: board of Directors, takeover defences, executive 
remuneration, and confidential voting.  Monk et al. (2004) emphasise that, in order of importance, 
investors are concerned with: executive remuneration, poison pill, board elections (term 
limits/declassification), voting, director nomination, shareholder rights, director/board independence, 
board leadership, director remuneration/stock ownership, auditor independence, expense stock 
options, strategic alternatives, board governance and dividend payments.   
 
The work of Thomas and Cotter (2006) builds on that of Gillian and Stark (2000); it classifies 
governance issues into external market control issues and internal corporate governance issues. 
Gillian and Stark (2007) find significant change in the past two decades in the corporate governance 
issues addressed by institutional investors. Previously, they found that investors tended to focus on 
removing poison pills, classified boards and the supermajority amendment from takeover charter. 
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Presently however, institutional investors show increased concern regarding board-related issues, 
the repealing of classified boards and executive pay. There has also been a significant increase in 
achieving the election of directors through supermajority votes and independent board Chairmen.  
 
2.8 Institutional Investors’ Involvement in Corporate Social Responsibility 
Scholarly articles on institutional investors‟ involvement can be categorised into three distinctive 
schools of thought: those which postulate that institutional investors‟ involvement in CSR is based on 
pecuniary benefits (Hockert and Moir, 2004; Haigh and Jones, 2007; Warba, 2009); those scholars 
who argue that institutional investors‟ commitment to corporate social responsibility is largely a result 
of regulatory reforms that stipulate they embrace CSR practices (Cox et al., 2004; Solomon, 2010); 
and lastly, those who suggest that institutional investors‟ participation in corporate social 
responsibility is due to their moral and ethical obligations towards the society (McWilliams et al., 
2006; Starks, 2009; Godfrey et al., 2009). Aguilera et al. (2006) examine institutional investors‟ 
engagement in CSR, suggesting that their reasons for doing so can be categorised as: instrumental 
motive, relational motive and moral motive (Cropozano et al., 2001). 
 
Institutional investors understand that environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can have 
financial implications that can positively or negatively affect any business organisation. These 
investors are particularly concerned about companies‟ CSR practices and policies because of the 
competitive advantage that can be gained by addressing these issues in a proficient manner and 
also the competitive disadvantage that is likely to arise from their mismanagement (Kramer and 
Porter, 2006). Institutional investors are particularly concerned with the competitive advantage that 
could result from either investing in companies that outperform on these measures or alternatively, 
engaging with companies to enhance performance in these areas (Armour et al., 2003; Solomon et 
al., 2004). Instrumentally motivated institutional investors are interested in protecting the value of 
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their investments and closely monitor the relationship between a company‟s reputation and its share 
price. 
 
In the case of relational motive, institutional investors tend to embrace corporate social responsibility 
more as a result of emerging industry standards and practices. The role of institutional investors in 
corporate social responsibility and the strategic decisions of their portfolio companies has attracted 
more attention in recent years, not only from researchers but also from government and regulatory 
bodies.  For example, in the UK there are regulatory stipulations that encourage institutional 
investors to state their corporate social responsibility policy. The government has played an 
important role in driving pension funds trustee corporate social responsibility disclosure requirements. 
The change in industry standards is also evident in the statement of principles of the Institutional 
Shareholders‟ Committee (2005) which encourages institutional investors to intervene when a 
company‟s approach to corporate social responsibility is considered to be inadequate and improper. 
 
Research in the UK reveals that institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate social responsibility 
resulted from an increasing demand for ethically and socially responsible investments (Solomon, 
2010). Andriof and McIntosh (2001) observe that business organisations have socio-economic and 
environmental impacts. Business activities generate various by-products that are harmful to society. 
For example, in the course of making their products, many manufacturing companies emit carbon 
substances that are harmful to the environment. Also, oil spills and leakages from oil companies‟ 
pipelines can have disastrous consequences for the local environment and community (Werhane, 
2008).  In the information communication technology sector, there are also concerns regarding the 
correct disposal of outdated and unsalvageable hardware which, if not disposed of properly, could 
be harmful to the environment.  
 
An examination of the CSR issues upon which institutional investors‟ engagement focuses reveals 
that several issues are addressed (see Table 3 for a summary of the issues).  A study by 
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Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) on institutional investors‟ engagement examined withdrawn CSR- 
related shareholder proposals and found that major CSR issues include international human rights, 
equal employment, tobacco trading, board diversity, energy and the environment. The study also 
found that an estimated 20% to 45% of CSR-related proposals have been withdrawn by sponsors.  
In considering possible explanations for such a high withdrawal rate, sponsored CSR-related 
proposals are withdrawn for many reasons such as expedient negotiation and settlement between 
CSR institutional investors and management (Campbell et al., 1999) and it is also possible that 
withdrawn CSR-related proposals are addressed by existing policies and measures.  CSR policies 
are also withdrawn if they are unpopular. 
The work of Grave et al. (2001) builds upon that of Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999). It examines 
the nature and focus of institutional investors‟ engagement over an 11-year period (1988-1998). 
Grave et al. found that institutional investors‟ engagement focuses on many different issues, 
however the following are the most prevalent: human rights, the environment, diversity, tobacco 
trading, labour rights, the military, governance, political action, energy and South Africa. Of particular 
interest is the waxing and waning nature of CSR issues; at one time it was apartheid in South Africa 
and abortion that made the headlines at annual general meetings and in the media. However, with 
the demise of apartheid in South Africa, this has ceased to be one of the issues, but the issue of 
abortion continues to be relevant in the United Kingdom. 
A second finding is that, while some CSR issues, such as apartheid in South Africa, tend to have a 
limited life span and come to a natural conclusion, there are some CSR issues such as the 
environment and climate change that remain relevant for a long period of time, largely unresolved 
and unlikely to dissipate for many years. However, more importantly, there are CSR issues that 
remain unresolved yet still fade naturally. Grave et al. (2001) offer some plausible explanations for 
these occurrences; the first is that of the shifting external regulatory environment and government 
policies and the other is internal factors and changes that occur within organisations. 
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A more recent paper by Tkac (2006) focuses on all institutional investors‟ proposals using data from 
the Investor Responsibility Research Centre from 1992–2002. Tkac (2006) finds that CSR proposals 
can be summarised into four key issues: external financial aid; disclosure of information; change in 
corporate policy; and fundamental change in operations, productions and marketing practices. Of the 
four key issues, the most common type of request related to a change in corporate policy or a 
fundamental change in operations.  
The most common CSR proposals related to the following issues: antidiscrimination; environmental; 
domestic labour; international conduct; alcohol, tobacco, firearms; reproductive issues; 
miscellaneous social issues; healthcare; animal rights; military/weapons; energy; food/agriculture; 
corporate policy; media/TV; political contributions and executive (performance-related) pay. In 
conclusion, Grave et al. state that there is significant evidence to suggest that the CSR activities 
carried out by religious organisations, unions and socially responsible mutual funds have achieved 
some measure of success. Success, in their opinion, is measured by the number of CSR proposals 
that are withdrawn; „a withdrawn resolution usually signals some type of action on the part of the 
corporation – dialogue, agreement to resolution, or some other compromise – and that can be 
viewed as success‟ (Tkac 2006: pp. 15).  
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2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter began by defining the concept of corporate governance; it explores the theoretical 
perspective, the debate and academic case for the need for institutional investors in corporate 
governance, agency theory is used to explain the relationships between institutional investors and 
the managers of the companies that institutional investors attempt to influence. The significance of 
agency theory in institutional investors‟ engagement is easily observable: the most important 
perspective it reveals is the tension that generally exists between the principal and the agent. This 
tension is evident in today‟s modern corporations; institutional investor engagement is intent on 
aligning the values and goals of the principals and agents. 
 A variety of methods can be used to align the needs of the principal and the agent including 
incentives, monitoring and threat of exit. Incentives are gentle measures such as the offer of 
attractive bonuses and allowances to encourage agents to be more responsive to the needs of 
principals.   It elucidates the importance of institutional investors‟ voice in ensuring that managers or 
the agents are acting in the best interests of the owners or institutional investors. It went on to 
explain how institutional investors‟ monitoring can reduce asymmetries of information and agency 
costs that arise as a result of the agency problem.  
While the agency theory does explain the motivation behind institutional investors‟ involvement in 
corporate governance, it does fail to explain institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate 
governance. The stakeholder theory is examined to explore the reasons why institutional investors‟ 
involvement in corporate governance. The stakeholder theory offers a different explanation on the 
reasons for institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance. Stakeholder theory 
recognises that there is more to an organisation than the principal and agent. It places considerable 
responsibility on management, not only to identify key stakeholders, but further to encourage 
managers to respond to stakeholder needs. Stakeholder theory appears more relevant in explaining 
some of the current trends and behavioural patterns of modern day corporations, in particular the 
involvement of institutional investors in corporate social responsibility. 
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Institutional investors have gained prominence as a category of investors who influence and shape 
decisions made to improve corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices in 
business organisations (Clarks and Hebb, 2003). This has not always been the case however; they 
have progressed from passive to active players in handling corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility issues (Solomon, 2007). According to Hsu and Koh (2004) there has been a 
global surge in institutional investor shareholding in the past two decades which has significantly 
increased interest amongst academics, regulators and the business community in the part that 
institutional investors could play in improving corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices.  
 
Institutional investors are actively engaged in enhancing corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices. This has occurred because of the following reasons: a spate of corporate 
scandals that has resulted in the collapse of multinational corporations; the increasing need for 
businesses to adopt better corporate social responsibility practices; deregulation of the financial 
markets and the growing availability of financial resources that institutional investors have been able 
to procure. Engagement can be seen as a vital tool used by institutional investors to influence 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices. Exiting may not be an option for 
large institutional investors who have large amounts of company shares and stockholdings, as this 
would incur substantial loss of value in their shares and stockholdings. Their only remaining option is 
proactive engagement; addressing current business matters and issues and ensuring ailments are 
rectified, readying the firms for a productive term and ensuring that long-term shareholder value is 
created. Institutional investors‟ engagement can enhance shareholder value, reduce business risks 
and encourage better governance and corporate social responsibility practices. 
In reviewing the literature of institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility, the researcher finds that it is still being examined as two broadly 
diverse and separate elements. Institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance has 
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largely focused on economic issues that affect the performance of the firm, however research into 
institutional investors‟ involvement reveals that there are social and environmental issues which, if 
not addressed or mitigated, could also affect a firm‟s financial performance.  
 
However, very few research papers examine institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues in an integrated manner. The norm is that 
research on institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance issues is conducted in 
isolation, to the detriment of research on institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate social 
responsibility and vice versa. Researching institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility in such an isolated manner is problematic as it fails to 
reveal that institutional investors‟ involvement is evolving; institutional investors need to take a 
slightly different approach now from what has been the norm and it is essential that they embrace a 
holistic approach to engagement that focuses on both corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility issues. 
 
Thus far, this chapter has provided the theoretical basis for investigating this research; the agency 
theory has been used as a basis for examining institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. The various schools of thought on shareholder 
activism have been explored and it is the researcher‟s considered opinion from an extensive study of 
the literature that institutional investors can influence corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices. This has provided the basis for arguing that institutional investors‟ 
engagement does influence practice in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.  
 
In the next chapter, the approaches used by institutional investors to engage in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility are discussed. The various methods used by 
institutional investors to influence corporate behaviour, policies and practices are examined and the 
case is made for the evolving nature of institutional investors‟ engagement practices. 
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Chapter 3: Engagement and Use of Multiple Methods in Institutional 
Investors‟ Engagement 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter two, agency theory was examined in detail from the perspective of institutional investors. 
Agency theory confirms that institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance is crucial 
although it tends to focus on performance-related issues in corporate governance and fails to explain 
why institutional investors are involved in corporate social responsibility. The stakeholder theory 
examined offers some explanation of investors‟ involvement in corporate social responsibility. The 
growth and development in the UK of institutional investors‟ involvement was discussed and the call 
for increased institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance explained. The role of 
institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility was 
examined and the issues they address were discussed. 
 
This chapter gives a detailed explanation of the term „institutional investors‟ engagement‟ and 
examines the two engagement approaches employed by institutional investors; the micro approach 
and the macro approach, and also explains the different methods that investors can use to inf luence 
corporate behaviour, practices and policies. The strengths and weakness of the methods are 
explained. The use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement is discussed in the 
context of using various methods to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies, when a 
particular method has been unsuccessful. 
 
3.2 Institutional Investors’ Engagement 
Institutional investors‟ engagement can be viewed as the voluntary monitoring and intervention by 
institutional investors to influence business management and organisation decisions, behaviour and 
practices (Clark and Hebb, 2004). Engagement provides investors with the opportunity to influence 
corporate behaviour. It involves addressing aspects of corporate governance and corporate social 
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responsibility practices and policies that have an impact on the financial performance of an 
organisation and also the long-term wellbeing of a corporation (Yaron, 2005).  For example, it could 
include the restructuring of the board and key executives that are considered ineffective or 
addressing potential social and environmental risks that may threaten to impact negatively on the 
corporation. Put simply, engagement is the most direct approach institutional investors can take to 
try to influence corporate behaviour.  
 
Collier (2004: p.241) summarises the process of engagement in the following words: 
 
„Engagement is based on voice and loyalty rather than exit responses of selling shares in a last-ditch fund 
response. It should be emphasised that institutional investors regard engagement as a process whereby they 
aim to achieve change over time in the CSR policy and performance of the company, hence improving 
shareholder value. Engagement thus targets both governance and CSR policy and practices. The methods of 
engagement used range from informal contacts to shareholder resolutions at annual general meetings (AGMs) 
to the use of media pressure and public protests, but the preferred engagement strategy is that of quiet 
dialogue and rational discourse.‟  
 
The definition of engagement that has been adopted for the purpose of this research, is the definition 
given by Collier (2004) that has been mentioned above. The purpose of engagement is to focus on 
influencing corporate behaviour and practices through the initiation of dialogue and negotiations, 
however there are a range of methods institutional investors can apply (McLaren, 2004). 
Engagement usually begins with a non-confrontational approach (Collier, 2004; Sparkes and Cowton, 
2004) and is more proactive in nature; instigating discussions on a range of issues in order to find 
common ground and resolve disagreements between institutional investors and management. 
However, investors may find they need to assert themselves in order to gain the attention of 
management (Pierce and Ganzi, 2002). The aim of institutional investors‟ engagement is to bring 
about positive change in corporate behaviour on issues ranging from poor corporate governance to 
social, ethical and environmental practices and the potential risks that those issues may pose to the 
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corporation (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). Engagement is not a one-off event but must occur over a 
period of time in order to achieve improvements and significant progress in changing poor corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices. It is therefore important that investors 
proceed with a great deal of patience as they encourage business organisations to adopt better 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices (Solomon, 2010).The approach 
was developed to fulfil institutional investors‟ aspirations to change the way corporations interact with 
and affect society (Kinder, 2004). 
 
The initial debate on institutional investors‟ engagement tended to focus on which firms attract 
engagement and intervention (Romano, 2000). Research suggests that firms that are performing 
poorly are more likely to attract engagement by investors (Gillan and Stark, 2000); performance in 
this regard is examined more from a financial perspective. Financial indicators such as sales, 
profitability and turnover are the key indicators and parameters for assessing performance (Pound 
and Gordon, 1993; Smith, 1996; Romano, 2000; Gillian and Stark, 2000). In addition to poor 
performance, institutional investors also intervene as a result of poor governance practices (Gillan 
and Stark, 2007). 
The research progressed to examine the influence of institutional investors‟ engagement and 
whether it improved company performance. There  are three schools of thought: those who think that 
institutional investors‟ engagement adds value to the company and also improves the performance 
of the firm (Smith, 1996; Gillian and Stark, 2002; Del Guerico et al., 2006; Becht et al., 2007); those 
who believe that institutional investors‟ engagement is unlikely to cause any significant 
organisational or policy changes and that therefore institutional investors are unlikely to have any 
positive effects on a firm‟s performance and value (Karpoff, 2001; Brav et al., 2006; Nelson, 2006); 
and those who maintain that institutional investors‟ engagement has a detrimental effect on company 
management, harms performance and in the long run decreases the value of the firm (Bainbridge, 
2005). The researcher believes that institutional investors‟ engagement can influence corporate 
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governance and corporate social responsibility practices, as discussed extensively in the previous 
chapter. Institutional investors‟ engagement can be executed using two different approaches: the 
micro and the macro approach. The next section discusses the various approaches to institutional 
investors‟ engagement.  
 
3.3 Approaches to Institutional Investors’ Engagement 
The approaches to engagement have not been extensively explored. There are indications that 
some research exists but the extent is difficult to estimate (Lydenberg, 2007). Dresner (2002) and 
Kleijen (2006) briefly explained that institutional investors have two approaches to engagement: the 
micro and the macro approach.  
 
 
3.3.1 The Micro Approach to Engagement 
In relation to the micro approach to engagement, institutional investors focus on certain companies 
and deal with more company-specific issues.  Rather than using a public campaign to raise 
awareness of a particular issue, institutional investors prefer to engage with senior company 
managers to address their concerns. 
The micro approach to engagement addresses company-specific issues such as those relating to a 
company‟s operational characteristics or strategic business as well as sector-specific social and 
environmental standards. The focus of institutional investors‟ engagement on company-specific 
issues is intended to influence corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices/policies, usually with an economic rationale dictated by the investors. Institutional investors 
who use a micro approach to engagement typically argue that issues are likely to pose a threat to 
shareholder value and thus press senior management to engage in dialogue to address specific 
issues. 
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Figure 3: A Framework for Institutional Investors‟ Engagement 
 
Source: Sullivan and Mackenzie (2006: p 35) 
 
In Figure 2 above, Sullivan and Mackenzie (2006) use an issue-led approach or thematic approach 
to engagement; firstly identifying important emerging environmental and social issues which they 
believe pose significant risks to the businesses in which they invest. Secondly they undertake in-
depth research to identify the sectors and companies that are most vulnerable and exposed to those 
risks. Lastly they design an appropriate engagement programme to address issues. Insight 
Investment may communicate in writing or meet with a company, non-governmental organisation or 
other institutional investor. Meetings with companies to resolve issues may occur several times a 
year. They also respond to issues that are brought to their attention by the media, other institutional 
investors and non-governmental organisations. The primary focus of their engagement is to ensure 
an improvement in the quality of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices/policies. Kleijen (2006) notes that in the use of a micro approach to engagement, 
institutional investors are focused on addressing company-specific issues; thus the dialogue that 
ensues between institutional investors and companies is usually focused on areas of corporate 
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governance and corporate social responsibility practices that are of upmost importance to the 
company.  
 
3.3.2 The Macro Approach to Engagement 
The macro approach to engagement can only be pursued by those institutional investors with a more 
robust or mature research and engagement methodology. Institutional investors who take a macro 
approach to engagement are focused on influencing the adoption of best practice across specific 
industrial sectors of the business community. Kleijen (2006) notes that in taking a macro approach to 
engagement investors tend to examine a sector or a numbers of sectors which are experiencing a 
particular issue and then develop an engagement programme to address that issue in those sectors. 
In 2006, Insight Investment engaged with companies that had high emission issues such as Centrica, 
British Gas, International Power, National Grid, Scottish Power, and Scottish and Southern. 
Following the engagement exercise, Insight Investment published a series of recommendations for 
European electricity companies including how to best report emissions. Institutional investors who 
make use of the macro approach to engagement tend to make reference to their economic and 
moral rationales towards their engagement to senior managers. The economic rationale tends to 
centre on the importance of long-term sustainable economy while the moral imperative is centred on 
fund managers‟ responsibility to contribute to sustainability (Collier, 2004).  
 
Dresner (2002) finds that when institutional investors are faced with the opportunity to choose 
between the use of micro or macro engagement, they differ in opinion. Dresner‟s findings reveal that 
the perception of the macro approach to engagement was inconclusive and a consensus lacking as 
to its efficacy. Some institutional investors considered it a sensible approach, others that it was 
impractical and a third group failed to agree whether it would yield a positive or negative result in the 
engagement process. However about two thirds of institutional investors unanimously agreed that 
the use of a micro approach to engagement was more effective when targeting specific companies 
(Dresner, 2002). Once institutional investors have chosen a micro or macro approach to 
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engagement, they must then consider the range of methods that are available with to engage with 
companies or business firms with which they have specific concerns. 
 
3.4 Methods of Engagement/Activism 
Within the engagement literature, the various types of engagement are not clearly defined. Hendry et 
al. (2007) observe that institutional investors employ various approaches to engagement and make 
use of different methods with which to practice engagement. Pierce and Ganzi (2002) suggest that 
there are five methods of engagement, and Collier et al. (2004) classify engagement into four 
different groups (see Table 4). Although there is disagreement surrounding the various methods of 
engagement, there is a consensus that the preferred approach to engagement is the use of dialogue 
(Wahba, 2009) and it is only when this method has failed to achieve the intended outcome that 
investors pursue another form of engagement.  
 
The outcomes of dialogue and negotiation to a great extent can determine what happens next. In 
instances where dialogue yields tangible results, it is unnecessary for institutional investors to 
pursue other forms of engagement. However, dialogue does not always produce satisfactory 
outcomes for institutional investors and in these instances they employ other types of engagement. 
Engagement methods are considered in the following manner: methods that are similar will be 
discussed collectively, for example dialogue and negotiation; and the same approach will apply to 
collaboration and collective engagement, as well as public media and the use of media pressure. 
Different engagement methods such as mixed engagement and confrontational engagement will be 
discussed subsequently. 
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Table 2: Methods of Engagement 
Pierce and Ganzi (2002) Collier (2004) 
Dialogue and negotiation 
Collaboration 
Voting 
Shareholder resolution 
Public campaign 
Buying shares 
Informal dialogue 
Shareholder resolution 
Use of media pressure 
Public protest 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Dialogue and Negotiation 
Logsdon and Van Buren (2009) suggest that dialogue and negotiation may consist of any of the 
following activities: a private meeting between institutional investors and senior managers, investors 
sending electronic mail to senior managers informing the managers of their concerns, or institutional 
investors meeting with management and undertaking a specific sight visit (Breen, 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, various researchers agree that the use of dialogue and negotiation is the most 
preferred method of engagement (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Solomon, 2010). Vandekerckhove et 
al. (2007) also acknowledge that dialogue is the most preferred approach by investors whose aim is 
to optimise return on their market-wide portfolio and who engage with corporations to encourage 
them to enhance/improve their non-financial performance.  
Solomon (2010) finds that investors are keen to engage in informal dialogue and negotiation with the 
managers of companies in which they invest on a regular basis. He observes that dialogue is 
developing and becoming a more interactive communicative process between managers and 
investors. Collier (2004) acknowledges that the form these dialogues take varies between investors; 
possibly an intensive questioning debate between investors and managers or a quiet 
conversation/discussion. The duration also varies depending on the managers‟ responses to 
questioning; it is expected that fewer disputes would occur in dialogues where investors and 
managers are in agreement than those where investors and managers express differences in 
opinions and attitudes.  
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3.4.2 Shareholder Proposals/Resolutions 
The use of shareholder proposals as a tool or mechanism with which to influence and change 
corporate behaviour has been widely used by religious organisations, fringe investors, institutional 
investors, non-governmental organisations and unions (Clark and Crawford, 2012). According to 
Monks et al. (2004) institutional investors have, at a basic level, sought to influence managers of 
publicly-listed companies through a mechanism that promotes accountability and transparency. A 
shareholder resolution is simply a proposal submitted by investors for ballot at the company‟s annual 
general meeting on a specific environmental, social or governance issue about which institutional 
investors are dissatisfied. Ramsay et al. (2000) suggest that voting can be seen as one of several 
mechanisms used in minimising the divergence of interests between senior corporate executives 
and investors. According to Martin and Nisar (2007) voting forms a very essential part of investors‟ 
approach to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as votes cast on key 
management issues enable stronger management focus on the issues and interests of shareholders. 
They further suggest that the process of voting can be made more meaningful when consideration is 
given to votes which are consistent with well-considered policy towards enhancing the corporate 
governance of companies and markets.  
 
Sparkes and Cowton (2004) maintain that investors make use of shareholder resolutions when initial 
discussions with managers fail to resolve disputes regarding particular issues that are of concern to 
the investors. Hebb et al. (2012) maintain that when compared to corporate dialogue, the results of 
shareholder proposals prove to be much easier to quantify and assess as it is obvious when a 
shareholder proposal has received or failed to receive a majority support. Even when shareholder 
proposals fail to achieve a majority support, they tend to be credible as the firm‟s practices or 
policies have been exposed to a variety of stakeholders beyond merely shareholders.  
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O‟Rourke (2003) suggests that when a proposal is submitted, there are generally three possible 
outcomes: 
1. The proposal may be withdrawn by the shareholder. 
2. The proposal may be omitted or excluded by the company. 
3. The proposal can be presented at the shareholder meeting for ballot, and possibly 
resubmitted if it garners enough support. 
Withdrawal of Proposal by the Shareholder: 
A study of institutional investors‟ engagement by Chidambaran and Woidtke (1999) examined 
withdrawn shareholder proposals and they found that an estimated 20% to 45% of proposals were 
withdrawn by sponsors. Sponsored proposals are withdrawn for many reasons including earlier 
negotiation and settlement of issues by institutional investors and management (Campbell et al., 
1999). It is also possible that withdrawn proposals had been addressed by existing policies and 
measures or had been unpopular.  
Omission or Exclusion of Proposal by the Company: 
O‟Rourke (2003) states that there are six identifiable reasons for the exclusion of a proposal 
including: 
1. The proposal relates to the operation which accounts for less than 5% of the company‟s total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
2. The absence of power or authority on the part of the company to act – the company would 
lack the power or authority to implement the proposal. 
3. Management functions – the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company‟s ordinary 
business operations. 
4. The proposal has already been substantially implemented. 
5. Duplication – the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to 
the company by another proponent included in the company‟s proxy material for the same 
meeting. 
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6. Insufficient votes received at first submission of proposal. 
 
The Proposal is presented at the Shareholder Meeting for Ballot 
When all the above conditions are met and the proposal is submitted to the shareholder annual 
meeting, investors then solicit support (and thus vote) for their shareholder resolution which includes 
the identification of shareholders or proxy voters and generation of endorsement from major 
shareholder groups or proxy advice groups. A substantial body of literature has examined whether 
shareholder proposals influence corporate behaviour and practices and can be categorised into two 
main schools of thought: that shareholder proposals influence corporate behaviour and practice, and 
that shareholder proposals fail to influence corporate behaviour. 
 
Earlier studies reveal that the influence of shareholder proposals on corporate behaviour and 
practice is dependent on the identity of the sponsor of the proposal; the issue addressed by the 
proposal, insider ownership, institutional ownership, the number of times a proposal has been 
submitted, the governance structure of the targeted firm and whether the proposal is related to the 
removal of anti-takeover mechanisms are of vital significance to its success (Pound, 1993; Wahal, 
1996; Del Guerico and Hawkins, 1999; O‟Rourke, 2003; Gillian and Stark, 2000; Monks et al., 2004; 
Gillan and Stark, 2007). Research has shown that favourable votes have been higher in cases 
involving repeal proposals, proposals by public pension funds, companies with fewer insiders, 
companies that have performed poorly on the stock market and smaller companies (Karpoff, 2001; 
Tkac, 2006). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that proposals sponsored by institutional 
investors, labour unions or coordinated shareholder groups have also received substantially greater 
support than proposals sponsored by individual investors (Wahal, 1996; Bethel and Gillan, 2000). 
Research also shows that governance proposals typically receive greater support than social 
responsibility proposals (Monks et al., 2004). 
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Conversely, several studies conclude that shareholder proposals are generally ineffective and 
unlikely to cause significant organisational or policy change. Thus, it is deemed that shareholder 
proposals can have a negligible effect on a firm‟s performance and value. It could be argued that this 
is not surprising given the agency problems that are likely to exist between investors and managers. 
In support of this view, the works of Wahal (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Romano (2002), Brav et al. 
(2006) and Nelson (2006) find that there is no significant improvement in terms of the operating 
performance and share price movements of companies that are targets of shareholder proposals. 
Such research has been mostly positivist in nature and has examined stock market reaction in the 
short and long-run as well as companies‟ profitability after proposals have been submitted. 
 
There are practical explanations for the difference in results. Karpoff (2001) suggests that 
researchers tend to define success in institutional investors‟ engagement differently, using terms 
such as „effective,‟ „ineffective‟ and also „successful‟ and „unsuccessful‟ to characterise institutional 
investors‟ engagement with target companies. A major discrepancy occurs in their conclusions 
however, that authors define success differently. The definitions of success used by researchers 
include increase in share value, increase in accounting measures of performance, change in 
operations or management, actions sought by the activist are adopted by the targeted firm, actions 
are taken that are attributed to shareholder pressure, and shareholder proposals receive high voter 
support (Wahal, 1996; Del Guerico and Hawkins, 1999; Romano 2000;Gillan and Stark, 2002). 
 
3.4.3 Collaborative Engagement and Collective Engagement 
Collaborative engagement and collective engagement occurs when two or more investors join forces 
to engage a company on a particular issue of concern. McLaren (2004) observes that, theoretically, 
the use of collaboration increases the effectiveness of engagement by enhancing leverage and also 
reducing free-rider costs. The UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF: 2003) notes that investors use a 
collaborative approach to communicate with companies and discuss their shared concerns, also 
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highlighting a collective position on environmental, social and governance issues, for example, the 
public health crisis in emerging markets. Becht et al. (2006) observe that 
6
Hermes Investment uses a 
collaborative engagement approach when companies have similar corporate governance or 
corporate social responsibility issues that must be addressed. 
According to Mansley and Dulgolecki (2001) individual investors are likely to make a significant 
impact on corporate behaviour, however success is much more likely if there is collaboration 
between a number of institutional investors, especially when the activity is structured as a formal 
initiative. Such collaborative initiatives could also address company-specific engagement activities. 
The specific merits of collaboration include: 
 the potential to reduce the costs of the initiative to a level acceptable to individual institutional 
investors and other financial institutions, also reducing the likelihood of „free-riders‟ who 
might benefit from the activity without actually contributing; 
 increased effectiveness, both in hard financial terms (i.e. representing more of the market 
and a larger pool of capital) and those of credibility and influence both with corporations and 
the public policy process; 
 improved management of the learning challenges and reputational risks of this new and 
potentially controversial area. 
 
Black and Coffee (1994) highlighted that collaborative engagement was relatively infrequent and 
coalitions small and rare. They find that most institutional investors in the UK persist in the practice 
despite poor results. In addition, they argue that collaborative engagement is expensive to 
implement in practice and the free-rider problem persists. However, they conclude that UK 
institutions are more involved in corporate governance than their US counterparts but institutional 
investor activity in the UK is still constrained by costs associated with forming and maintaining 
                                                             
6
 Hermes Investment is a multi-specialist asset manager fully owned by BT pension scheme and it is one of UK 
largest pension fund scheme; who focus on a long term responsible approach to investing and delivering returns. It 
has an estimated £25.7 billion pounds under management. 
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coalitions and limited incentive for money managers to invest in monitoring. Thus, the British 
experience suggests one lesson the United States could implement to enhance collaborative 
engagement; reduce regulatory controls and institutional investors will become more active. 
It has been more than 17 years since the publication of Black and Coffee‟s research and, in the UK, 
institutional regulatory reforms introduced by the Cadbury, Myners and Hampel reports have 
strengthened institutional involvement in investee companies (Mallin, 2006; Solomon, 2010). As the 
size of UK institutional investors increases, they absorb more easily the costs of monitoring, and 
technology advances have significantly reduced communication costs associated with collaborative 
engagement. 
Sullivan and Mackenzie (2006) believe that collaborative engagement allows investors to present a 
consistent and unified voice on corporate social responsibility issues (thereby ensuring that 
companies are not facing competing and contradictory priorities from different investors) whilst also  
broadening the group of investors that target a specific issue. In addition, issues such as free-riding, 
the risk of lowest-common-denominator approaches and the possibility of significant transaction 
costs potentially limit the use of collaboration as an activism strategy. There are two types of free-
riding that affect collaborative initiatives: individuals using participation to demonstrate their 
„commitment to activism‟ (even when their contribution has been minor) and; shareholders who are 
not party to the collaborative effort benefiting from the resultant improvements in corporate 
governance or corporate social responsibility performance. 
 
Collaborative investor activity has also been hindered by the lack of a clear, shared view on the 
standards shareholders should expect of companies in relation to corporate social responsibility 
issues. Whilst a consensus exists regarding the systems and processes that companies should have 
in place (e.g. corporate policies, clearly defined responsibilities, performance monitoring and 
reporting), the specific performance measures (or outcomes) are not so obvious. The challenge of 
achieving consensus has meant that the lowest-common-denominator approach (i.e. a focus on 
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management systems and processes) has prevailed. Whilst this is an important contribution to 
addressing rationality issues, it is not clear how well these address market failure issues. Finally, it 
has been observed that large-scale collaborative initiatives involve significant time and effort and 
tend to have long lead times and are highly bureaucratic. 
 
3.4.4 Public Campaigns 
Investors who have been unable to resolve engagement issues through dialogue (Lipton, 2008) use 
the media to publicly reprimand directors and senior management.  Pierce and Ganzi (2002) note 
that, from a survey carried out by the Future Centre for Sustainable Development and the Finance 
Institute for Global Sustainability, only one UK investor would contemplate a public campaign as a 
tool for investor engagement. Conversely, many US investors use, or threaten to use, public 
campaigns as a key engagement tool, for example RiskMetrics has made use of the media spotlight, 
encouraging shareholders to vote against members of Citigroup‟s remuneration committee (Lipton, 
2008). 
3.4.6 Buying Shares to Increase Influence 
Pierce and Ganzi (2002) maintain that buying shares to increase influence is a particular strategy 
that has been used successfully in the UK. For engagement to be effective in this approach a close 
relationship with and an adequate knowledge of the company is required. Although this model 
seems promising, most UK investors do not regard it an appropriate tool for engagement. 
 
3.5 Classifications of Engagement 
Becht et al (2006) classified engagement into three distinct categories, collaborative, confrontational 
and mixed, collaborative engagement has already been discussed above, so the focus will be on 
confrontational and mixed engagement.  
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3.5.1 Confrontational Engagement 
Confrontational engagement, as the name implies, is an approach in which investors apply a degree 
of pressure and is most likely to occur when investors and senior company managers disagree over 
a particular issue. According to Becht et al. (2006) engagement is classified as confrontational when 
a CEO initially rejects a proposal for change or does not make changes voluntarily throughout an 
engagement period. Other engagement activities targeted at replacing the CEO and/or Chairman 
against their own will were also classified as confrontational. 
 
3.5.2 Mixed Engagement (Collaborative and Confrontational Engagement) 
Mixed engagement is an approach that is limited in use; the researcher finds that this approach is at 
present employed solely by Hermes Investments in situations where collaborative and 
confrontational engagement strategies are used by investors to persuade managers of particular 
companies to change their behaviour. In mixed engagement, the demands of Hermes Investments 
were reluctantly met by senior managers of the companies in question. Surprisingly, Hermes 
Investments find that the best results were generated by the use of mixed engagement with a 
success rate of 55.1%, while the use of collaborative engagement accounted for 14.1% and 
confrontational engagement 30.5% (Becht et al., 2006). 
 
There are some similarities between collaborative and mixed engagement; these two methods 
usually involve coalition and collaboration between various investors concerned over a particular 
issue. Collaborative engagement, to some extent, is regarded as more extensive than dialogue as it 
involves several investors who are collectively concerned over an issue. Media pressure, public 
campaigns and protests are similar in some contexts: targeted at raising public awareness of issues. 
The use of media pressure is rather expensive to implement as an engagement strategy and may be 
detrimental to the reputation of a company as damaging information about the company‟s practices 
is made available for public scrutiny. This can affect not only how the public views the company, but 
also its share price and eventually shareholder value. 
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Generally, institutional investors tend to resort to voting when dialogue fails to produce the desired 
outcome. Compared to other methods of engagement, dialogue is more popular among investors; 
the least costly and least likely to lead to confrontation. Telephone communication, letters, e-mails 
and meetings with management are inexpensive and can be productive in resolving issues with 
senior management. However, dialogue does not always conclude favourably (Collier, 2004), even 
after persistent use, forcing investors to rethink their strategy and employ more suitable methods to 
communicate their message.  
 
 
3.6 Use of Multiple Methods of Institutional Investors’ Engagement Strategies 
The traditional shareholder activist approach has examined institutional engagement through the 
lens of agency theory. Although agency theory is creditable, it is not comprehensive. Research 
surrounding institutional investors‟ engagement has focused more on performance-related issues 
and the ways in which investors‟ engagement can address poor performance earnings and 
underperforming board members.  Traditionally, shareholder activism has clearly focused on 
7
short-
termism or the short-term.  Short-termism exists in situations where corporate stakeholders – 
investors, managers, board members and auditors – favour strategies that add less value but result 
in earlier payoff relative to strategies that would add more value in the long run. Such short-term 
strategies are often based on accounting-driven metrics and profit maximisation that fail to fully 
reflect not only the complexities of corporate management and investment but also the significant 
opportunities and risks associated therein. Such strategies are focused on enhancing profit 
maximisation, earnings per share, increase in market share and short-term market reactions (Pound 
and Gordon, 1993; Smith, 1996; Romano, 2000; Gillian and Stark, 2000). 
 
                                                             
7
Short term approach in the researchers opinion is a period of time that is less than one year or consisting of a few 
months. 
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Stakeholder theory reveals that institutional investors‟ engagement addresses more than corporate 
governance issues relating to company performance and performance of the board.  Institutional 
investors also address corporate social responsibility issues previously considered unimportant and 
inferior. In the past the prevailing argument was that the sole aim of corporations was to create profit 
for shareholders and that any harmful social and environmental impacts created by corporate 
activities are the responsibility of the government(Carr 1996). Institutional investors have since 
changed this perception as their engagement in corporate social responsibility issues is seen as 
equally important as their engagement in corporate governance issues. Institutional investors 
acknowledge that the corporations in which they have vested interests have a responsibility to 
monitor social and environmental issues that may otherwise threaten the sustainability of their 
businesses. The emerging trend in UK institutional investors‟ engagement is that investors tend have 
a broad mandate (Monks et al., 2004; Solomon, 2010; Hendry et al. 2007, Gifford, 2010). 
 
Although significant progress has been made, the research into institutional investors‟ engagement 
tends to examine engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as two 
different and separate research fields. The researcher believes this gap needs to be addressed. 
Institutional investors‟ engagement is evolving, and it is necessary for research to begin investigating 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in an inclusive manner. 
Current business and management research on corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility shows both are equally important and can affect a firm‟s performance (Solomon, 2010). 
It is the author‟s opinion that inclusive research in the field of institutional investors‟ engagement on 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility will yield useful insights intothe 
advancement of institutional investors‟ engagement practices. 
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Institutional investors‟ engagement must now focus on long-term sustainable strategies: the 8long-
term approach includes ensuring that company performance goes beyond maximising shareholder 
value to include enhancing environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards. According to 
Hebb (2008), institutional investors‟ engagement does not require companies to sacrifice long-term 
profitability; rather it requests higher corporate standards from corporations in order to reduce risk 
over time. Though such corporate standards are often referred to as corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), it is important to note that institutional investors‟ engagement isnot solelyconcerned with the 
long-term interests of shareholders. Hebb et al. (2012) acknowledge that since the aftermath of the 
financial market crash in 2008, many institutional investors are using their influence to engage, and 
in some cases aggressively challenge the management of corporations in order to improve ESG 
standards of corporations in which they invest. Such activity is focused on enhancing long-term 
shareholder value for future beneficiaries. 
 
Furthermore, Hendry et al. (2007) emphasise that a broader variety of issues is addressed, covering 
investment and acquisition decisions and board effectiveness and transparency, as well as specific 
governance issues such as remuneration, contract terms and board structure. To pursue these 
issues, new administrative structures and practices have been developed and new channels of 
communication opened up between investors and the companies in which they invest, and between 
investors themselves. Institutional investors have research teams who extensively investigate and 
examine potential financial and non-financial risks that may pose significant threats to companies in 
which they have shareholdings (Clark and Hebb, 2005). 
 
The traditional shareholder activist approach posits that institutional investors‟ engagement employs 
shareholder proposals, public campaigns and media pressure to influence corporate behaviour, 
practices and policies. Previously, institutional investors were afforded the opportunity of exiting 
                                                             
8
Long term approach in the researcher’s opinion is a period of time that consists of a period of five to thirty years 
or more. 
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corporations which they deemed were underperforming, but this option is no longer profitable for 
institutional investors as a result of their size; exiting would lead to a significant fall in share price and 
loss of value for institutional investors. The more advantageous alternative is for investors to use 
their influence to change the corporate behaviour and practices of erring corporations. Extensive 
examination of the empirical literature shows that the traditional approach, thus far, has largely 
focused on the static nature of institutional investors‟ engagement and has failed to take a long-term 
perspective to reveal how institutional investors‟ engagement has progressed over a period of time. 
A review of the extant literature on institutional investors‟ engagement reveals that institutional 
investors tend to use one method of engagement. Existing research has debated extensively 
institutional investors‟ use of various methods of engagement (dialogue, shareholder 
proposals/resolution, voting, collaborative engagement, public campaigns/use of media pressure), 
however discussion has focused on the use of each method and strategy in isolation and not in a 
continuum. 
 
For example, dialogue, gentle negotiation and rational discourse are considered the most preferred 
methods and strategies of institutional investors‟ engagement (Collier, 2004; Sparkes and Cowton, 
2004; Solomon, 2010). Whilst there are advantages to the use of dialogue, there is evidence to 
suggest that the results of corporate dialogue are difficult to quantify, that dialogue is not always 
productive and can fail to influence corporate behaviour (Collier, 2004). When failure occurs, what 
action do institutional investors take? What alternative routes are available? Research in this area is 
sparse; few, if any, have examined the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement. This research aims to illuminate the action institutional investors take when a particular 
method of engagement does not produce the intended outcome. In so doing, the research seeks to 
contribute to the existing body of knowledge on institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the various strategies and methods used by institutional investors to 
influence corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practice and behaviour. It goes 
on to show the macro and micro approaches used by institutional investors  - the macro approach is 
adopted by institutional investors who intend to influence specific firms or industries, while the micro 
approach is used by institutional investors who intend to engage specific companies. The choice of 
approach does have a significant influence on the strategy and methods applied by institutional 
investors.  
 
The various strategies and methods of engagement that can be applied by investors to influence the 
behaviour of companies have been examined. It would seem that dialogue is the more popular 
choice among investors; it is also the least costly and least likely to lead to confrontation. However, 
dialogue does not always conclude favourably, even after persistent use, forcing investors to rethink 
their strategy and employ more suitable methods to communicate their message. Media pressure, 
public campaigns and protests are similar in some contexts: targeted at raising public awareness of 
issues. The use of media pressure is rather expensive to implement as an engagement strategy and 
may be detrimental to the reputation of a company as damaging information about the company‟s 
practices is made available for public scrutiny. This can affect not only how the public views the 
company, but also its share price and eventually shareholder value. Shareholder proposals are seen 
as a useful means of influencing corporate behaviour.  
 
The use of shareholder proposals is inexpensive in comparison to the use of public campaigns and 
media pressure. Collaborative engagement can be considered instrumental in influencing corporate 
behaviour; a group of investors pooling their resources can significantly influence corporate 
behaviour and practice. The use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement is 
explained and discussed in the context of the application of various methods of engagement to 
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influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies; when a particular method fails to address the 
needs of institutional investors. 
 
In reassessing the literature on the approaches and methods that institutional investors use to 
influence corporate behaviour, the research finds that there is ambiguity in the examination of the 
literature. The research on the methods of institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility reveals that institutional investors use dialogue, 
shareholder proposals, collaborative engagement, public campaigns and the buying and selling of 
shares to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. These methods have been 
examined in isolation and not in a continuum. A minority of research papers disclose instances 
where a particular method or approach fails; the use of shareholder proposals or dialogue may not 
yield the necessary changes in corporate behaviour, practices and policies that institutional investors 
intended. What is the reaction of institutional investors in such situations, do they pursue an 
alternative course of action? Research into the methods of engagement is advancing; institutional 
investors are beginning to apply a variety of methods in corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility in order to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies.   
 
This chapter thus far, has examined the various strategies and methods used by institutional 
investors to influence corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. It has identified that 
that the methods used by institutional investors in influencing corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility tend to focus on the use of one method and not the use of a variety of methods, 
especially in situations when the first method fails to yield the desired outcome. 
 
In the following chapter, the researcher explains and justifies the research philosophy, methodology 
and methods that have been used in investigating institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the term „institutional investors‟ engagement‟ was explained in great detail 
and the macro and micro approaches to engagement were described. The various methods and 
strategies used by institutional investors to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies 
were discussed. Extant literature was used to exemplify and argue that institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is evolving. Institutional 
investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is no longer 
investigated as two separate areas but in a more inclusive manner. This chapter begins by 
discussing epistemology and research philosophy, methodology and methods that the researcher 
employed.  The chapter explores the epistemological stance and lenses that have been adopted to 
examine institutional investors‟ engagement related to corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility practices. The choice of a positivist philosophy is justified and the design of the 
research explained. The selection of content analysis as the tool for the analysis of the research 
data and the data analysis procedure are explained. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy and Epistemology 
Research philosophy is mainly concerned with rigorously establishing, regulating and enhancing the 
methods of knowledge creation in all fields of intellectual endeavour (Chia, 2002). Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2008) suggest three significant benefits to understanding research philosophy. Firstly, it is very 
useful in clarifying research planning. This involves not only considering what kind of evidence is 
required and how it is to be gathered or interpreted, but also how this evidence will provide sound 
answers to the basic questions being investigated in the research. Secondly, knowledge of 
philosophy can help the researcher recognise which research plan will work and which will not 
(Baker, 2003), as it enables the researcher to understand the limitations of a particular approach. 
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Thirdly, knowledge of philosophy can aid the researcher in identifying, and even creating, research 
plans which previously would have been beyond his scope.  At the heart of research philosophy is 
the controversial debate of how knowledge can be best created (Chalmer, 1990). 
 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that examines the nature, origin and limits of knowledge. 
According to Bryman (2007) epistemology is basically concerned with the question of what is or what 
should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. Cruz (2003) explains that epistemology 
is an attempt to make sense of the possibilities, nature and limits of human intellectual achievement. 
He suggests that epistemology aims to investigate specific domains of knowledge or rational belief. 
In epistemological investigation, the aim is to reflect on the methods and standards through which 
verifiable knowledge is achieved (Girold-Sevile and Perret, 2001).  It endeavours to characterise the 
type of knowledge a given method of study might yield about a certain type of subject matter, and to 
what extent that type of knowledge conforms to what is accepted as genuine knowledge (Harre, 
1972).  
 
Hallebone and Priest (2009) state that an epistemological stance in business and management 
research can be classified into two main categories: positivist and interpretivist epistemology.  
Adopting the epistemological stance in any research has serious implications for the research as a 
whole, as the epistemological stance defines and influences the theoretical perspective, 
methodologies and methods used in executing the research, as well as the overall research strategy 
and approach (Zikmund 2003). To a great extent, the epistemological stance has a significant 
influence on the reasoning and logic adopted in answering the research questions.  
 
There are two possible means of producing academic knowledge: using scientific inquiry and the 
use of deductive methods such as observation and experimentation (Remenyi et al., 2005) and; 
through the use of social constructions and interpretivsm (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Crotty (1998) 
emphasises that there are four key elements which all research must address: the philosophical 
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world view or epistemological stance; the theoretical perspective; the methodology and; the research 
methods used to answer the research questions posed by the researcher.  
 
 
4.2.1 Positivism 
In simple terms, positivism demands that scientific knowledge is positively verifiable, in contrast to 
dogmatism, speculation or superstition (Delanty, 2005). On a broader spectrum, positivism is an 
approach that applies scientific methods to human affairs perceived as belonging to a natural order 
that is open to objective enquiry and investigation (Hollis, 1995). The aim of logical positivism was to 
defend science and distinguish it from metaphysics and religious discourse, which were dismissed 
as non-scientific nonsense (Chalmers, 1990).  
The positivist also endeavours to cleanse scientific knowledge of speculative and subjective 
viewpoints through the use of mathematics and logic and in so doing, provide an analytical 
statement about the observed world (Chia, 2002). The positivist believes that it is possible to be 
objective in scientific inquiry, that the social world can be observed in an objective manner and that 
data can be gathered in order to test theoretical predictions (Klee, 1997). Explained in another way, 
positivists reason that if scientists rid themselves of their biases, they would be able to grasp the 
facts of reality and would then be able to test various theories to determine which best explained 
those facts (Fay, 1996). Positivists believe that empirical observation and testing free of 
preconception are the means by which theories are explained and verified, therefore there is a 
strong emphasis on techniques such as observation, measurement and quantification (Fay, 1996). 
An alternative philosophical research perspective is interpretivist epistemology. Darlaston-Jones 
(2007) emphasises that the fundamental contention of interpretivist epistemology is that reality is 
socially constructed by the individuals who experience it (Gergen, 1999). From the interpretive 
perspective, reality is determined by people rather than an objective external factor (Easterby-Smith 
2008).  Burell and Morgan (2011) state that the interpretivist paradigm is informed by a concern to 
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understand the world as it is; to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of 
subjective experience. Intepretivists have a subjective view of reality (Guba and Lincoln 2005). 
Unlike the positivist, the interpretivist denies that only one real world exists and has different beliefs 
about the concept of reality (Hudson et al., 1988). According to Berger and Luckman (1967) reality is 
no more than a social construction and all human knowledge is advanced, disseminated and 
maintained in all social situations. The intention of the interpretivist is not to discover reality, since he 
perceives that multiple realities exist and are continuously changing, rather the interpretivist is more 
concerned with understanding social realities and social actions (Schwandt, 2000). Invariably, the 
interpretivist is interested in developing an understanding of the culturally shared meanings, the 
perspective and rationale of those involved in creating these social realities and the context in which 
these constructions are occurring (Hudson et al., 1988).  
 
The choice of the positivist approach is, to a large extent, a result of the ontological position of the 
researcher who believes that reality is external, objective and knowledge significant only when it is 
based on the observation of an external reality. The researcher believes that a social world exists 
externally and its properties should be measured by objective methods, rather than via subjective 
reflections and intuitions (Easterby-Smith, 2008). In the fields of accounting, finance, business and 
management elements can be studied as hard facts and the relationships between these facts can 
be established as scientific laws. In the researcher‟s opinion institutional investors‟ engagement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility has been extensively documented: the 
issues, strategies and methods are well known, have been discussed at length and can be easily 
quantified, measured and verified. For example, executive pay, an area of concern for investors, is 
quantifiable; it is easy to measure how much an executive is paid. Also, it is easy to verify whether 
an executive is performing well and company performance can be measured via gross earnings and 
profits. The strategies which have been listed and outlined in the literature can be quantified, as can 
the outcome of particular strategies. In addition, the research philosophy must be relevant to 
address the questions set out in the first chapter of the research: 
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1. What are the types of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues with 
which institutional investors are concerned? 
2. How do institutional investors‟ use multiple methods in engagement, especially in relation to 
those strategies that do not seem to achieve the desired outcomes? 
It is the researcher‟s belief that the above questions are best addressed in a positivist philosophical 
context and that the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues with which 
institutional investors are concerned have been quantified in the existing literature. Also, the 
strategies and methods used by investors to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies 
such as shareholder proposals, voting and public campaigns are quantifiable. For example, the 
number of proposals that an institutional investor puts forward can be counted and easily 
ascertained. Previous research into institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility has adopted a positivist philosophy in investigating these issues. The 
work of Del Guericio and Hawkins (1999); Gillian and Stark (2000); Grave et al. (2001); Hendry et al. 
(2007); Tkac (2006); Thomas and Cotter; Becht et al. (2008) was conducted using a positivist 
research approach.  
 
The use of a positivist approach has implications for the way research is executed. The researcher 
who adopts a positivist approach is considered an independent observer or, in other words, is 
independent of the subject matter being investigated. The researcher is thus an external observer 
and is objective in their investigation. The researcher presents the exact facts and does not indulge 
in subjective interpretation and analysis of the data in question. Using an objective approach allows 
for the research to be easily replicated using the same data. The positivist epistemologist stance has 
limitations in terms of its conception of valid or received knowledge (i.e. science) as to what is 
perceived to be unproblematic observable „sense data‟. Gill and Johnson (2003) posit that there are 
specific types of research for which a positivist philosophical position is not suitable; research 
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involving human experiences and attitudes. Research containing a relatively small sample size might 
be more appropriate for inductive and qualitative research.  
 
4.22 Post-Positivism 
Post-positivism emerged largely as a result of criticisms and weaknesses of the positivist research 
philosophy; some of the elementary tenets of positivism could no longer be entirely defensible 
(Bronowski, 1956; Popper, 1959). Post-positivists maintain the same set of philosophical beliefs as 
positivists, however they argue the existence of multiple realities rather than one reality as put 
forward by positivists (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).Post-positivists are of the view that reality cannot 
be known perfectly and that it is constructed by the individuals involved in the research (Blaxter et al., 
2006). There are various underlying factors that can influence how reality is constructed such as 
cultural, gender and religious beliefs. Post-positivism recognizes that a set of complex intricate 
relationships exists between the behaviour of an individual, socio-cultural issues and external 
structures.  
 
From the post-positivist philosophical perspective the researcher cannot claim to be independent of 
the research. In other words, post-positivists accept that the researcher‟s theories, background, 
knowledge and values can influence what is observed, differing from the positivist who believes that 
the researcher is independent of the research. In contrast to positivism, post-positivism does not 
seek an absolute predictive truth in order to establish generalizations and propound laws, rather the 
approach is focused on examining the existence of trends or occurrences and its aim is to construct 
and interpret representation of the lived experience in a social context (Stewart and Floyd 2004). 
Forbes et al.(1999) explain that post-positivism is primarily concerned with searching for and 
establishing a „warranted assertibility,‟ that is, valid and soundproof evidence of the existence of 
phenomena (Philips 1990).  
 
 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
85 | P a g e  
 
Clarke (1998: p.1245) suggests that it is not necessary for „post-positivism research to exclude 
qualitative data or truth found outside quantitative methods; acceptance of this is crucial to rejecting 
the strict dichotomy often drawn between the qualitative and quantitative paradigms‟. According to 
Letourneau and Allen (1999) post-positivist approaches lend credence to the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. While objectivity remains fundamental, qualitative techniques are 
used increasingly to check the validity of findings(Jankowicz, 2005). Thus post-positivism rejects the 
truth present in methodologies which focus on individual experiences as encompassed by the 
phenomenological, grounded theory and other interpretive methodologies.  
 
Despite its openness to other methods of inquiry, it can be said that post-positivism suffers from 
some of the limitations of positivism (Gill and Johnson, 2003). Post-positivism focuses on rendering 
complex aspects of human beings researchable, seeking causation, prediction and explanation in 
terms of regularities of life. In addition, that post-positivist research allows for the inclusion of 
qualitative research methods is also considered its weakness (Parahoo, 1995). The close proximity 
the researcher has to the research investigation is a main limitation as he or she is subject to 
researcher bias. The use of qualitative research methods precludes generalisation (Clarke 1998). 
Qualitative studies often feel chaotic as it is difficult to control their pace, progress and end-points. 
 
4.3 Methodological Choices  
In investigating institutional investors‟ engagement, business and management researchers have 
adopted objective and subjective methodologies. For instance, the works of Gillan and Stark (2000); 
Karpoff (2001); Romano (2001) and Thomas and Cotter (2006) have adopted an objective 
methodology whilst a subjective methodology has been adopted by Southwood (2003); Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004); Gifford (2010) and Hebb et al. (2010). The choice of methodological position has 
been dictated by the world view of the researcher, the nature of the research question and the 
practicalities of the research design. In deciding which approach to adopt, the most important 
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consideration is relevance to institutional investor engagement practice. Institutional investors‟ 
engagement concerns investors influencing corporate behaviour, practices and policies and 
proposing sensible reforms managers of corporations can adopt. 
 
A small number of researchers have applied case study methodology in investigating institutional 
investors‟ engagement. Collier (2004) used the case study approach and found that institutional 
investors can use dialogue to influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. However her 
research made use of a qualitative case study approach and focused more on the use of dialogue in 
influencing corporate behaviour. Gifford (2010) employs a case study approach in examining 
institutional investors‟ engagement from a stakeholder perspective. He concludes that institutional 
investors can influence corporate behaviour based on three attributes: power, legitimacy and 
urgency and that institutional investors who possess these three attributes tend to be more 
successful in influencing corporate behaviour, practices and policies than those that do not. Tess et 
al. (2012), extending the work of Gifford (2010), test the salience of institutional investors‟ 
engagement .usinga qualitative case study methodology to examine institutional investors‟ 
engagement and the ability of institutional investors to raise the environmental, social and 
governance standards of a firm.  
 
This research differs from that of Gifford (2010) and Tess et al. (2012) in that their research focuses 
on the impact of institutional investors‟ engagement, highlighting that dialogue is one 
strategy/method of institutional investors‟ engagement to influence corporate behaviour. However 
their work fails to show that institutional investors‟ engagement is evolving. Institutional investors do 
not rely solely on one method of engagement; when one method fails to influence change in 
corporate behaviour and practices, institutional investors apply another. Also, Gifford (2010) and 
Tess et al. (2012) used an intepretivist perspective in their investigations and conversely, in this 
research the researcher has used an objective research methodology in examining the use of 
multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate 
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social responsibility. Lastly, Gifford (2010) and Tess et al. (2012) make use of the stakeholder 
theoretical framework and perspective in their case study analysis of institutional investors‟ 
engagement, while this research uses agency theory.  
 
Case study methodology typically combines various data collection techniques such as surveys, 
questionnaires, interviews and document and text analysis, and both quantitative data collection and 
analysis methods (concerned with numbers and measurement) and qualitative data collection and 
analysis methods (concerned with words and meanings) can be used (Yin, 1994). 
The case study literature lacks consensus as to a definition of case study methodology; some 
researchers deem case study a method, as do writers such as Crotty (1998), Patton (2002) and 
Stake (2005). Stake (2005) stresses that case study is not a methodology, but a choice of what 
should be studied, however other writers such as Yin and Gray differ in their opinion. Yin (2003), 
Creswell (2007) and Gray (2009)) defend case study as a methodology giving the following reason: 
Case study research in a quantitative approach allows the researcher to investigate a bounded 
system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, this is normally done through 
detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g. interviews, 
audiovisual materials, observation and documents and reports) and reports a case description and 
case-based themes. The researcher agrees with the views of Yin (2003), Creswell (2007) and Gray 
(2009) in the sense that in the case study approach a longitudinal examination of an event or case 
can occur and a variety of methods can be applied to the analysis of the data collected. 
Creswell (2009) suggests that there are a number of quantitative research strategies that can be 
used to conduct quantitative research. Gray (2009) suggests that the case study approach is 
particularly useful for the researcher endeavouring to uncover a relationship between a phenomenon 
and the context in which it is occurring and requires the collection of multiple sources of data that the 
researcher must somehow distill. Yin (2003) observes that, despite the fact that the case study 
approach remains one of the most challenging of all social science endeavours, it has become a 
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common research strategy in sociology, political science (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), psychology 
(Bryan et al., 2007), and also in business (Gibert et al., 2008) and finance and management 
(Seuring, 2008). According to Sekeran (2003), case study designs are the simplest involving the 
description of an on-going event of interest (e.g. organisational change) in relation to a particular 
outcome. He suggests the following as advantages of case studies: 
1. The information yielded can be rich and enlightening and may provide new leads or raise 
questions that otherwise might never have been asked. 
2. The people or organisations involved usually comprise of a fairly circumscribed and captive 
group allowing the researcher to describe the event in detail. 
3. An entire organisation or entity can be investigated in depth and with meticulous attention to 
detail – this highly focused attention enables the researcher to carefully study events and the 
order in which they occur and concentrate on identifying the relationships between functions, 
individuals and entities (Zikumund, 2003). 
 
4.4 When Should Case Studies be Used? 
Yin (2003) states that the choice of research strategy is dictated by the type of research question 
being posed, the extent of control the researcher has over the actual behaviour of events and the 
degree of focus on contemporary, as opposed to historical, events. Yin (2003) and Gray (2009) 
emphasise that the case study method is ideal in addressing „how‟ or „why‟ questions in relation to a 
contemporary event over which the researcher has no control. They posit that „what,‟ „who‟ and 
„where‟ questions are better answered by using a survey approach. The case study approach is not 
dissimilar to the use of unobtrusive measures such as examining document archives and the use of 
historical evidence – in both instances and cases no attempt is made to manipulate behaviour. But 
while unobtrusive measures can rely only on the use of existing documentation (historical or 
contemporary), case studies must focus on collecting up-to-date information. For this reason, data 
collection may involve the use of not only contemporary documentation but also direct observation 
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and systematic interviewing. The researcher is aware that a significant amount of qualitative 
research makes use of the case study approach, however its use is not limited to qualitative 
research, it can also be applied to quantitative research.  
 
A case study approach to research is not without its weaknesses. Remenyi et al. (1998) cite two 
particular criticisms of the case study approach: 
1. As a type of empirical research methodology it has been viewed as less desirable than 
surveys or experiments, accused of bias and a tendency to use incomplete evidence. 
However such views ignore that bias can occur in any other research method including 
experiments and surveys. 
2. Case studies are time consuming, expensive and generate too much documentation. 
Although case study research is frequently expensive, at least in terms of the researcher‟s 
time, it is not always necessary for case studies to be large or cause excessive 
documentation.  
 
4.5 Collection of Data 
F&C published quarterly engagement reports over a six-year period (2005-2011) detailing F&C 
engagement with investee companies over the period. The discussion of engagement activities 
focused on both successful and unsuccessful cases of engagement with companies in influencing 
corporate behaviour. The data used in the research analysis is secondary data. Secondary research 
is used when a research project requires a summary or collection of existing data, as opposed to 
data collected directly from respondents or „research subjects‟ for the express purpose of a project 
(often called „empirical‟ or „primary research‟). According to Stewart (1984) secondary data can 
simply be defined as the additional analysis of an existing data set with the purpose of addressing a 
research question that is different from that which the data set was originally collected, and 
generating novel interpretations and conclusions. A significant amount of research in the business 
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and management is conducted with the use of secondary data (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). 
Secondary data can embrace a wide spectrum of empirical forms; they can be generated through 
documentary analysis, systematic reviews and also from international surveys as well as national 
census (Cowton, 1998; Long-Sutehall et al, 2010). Some of the notable sources of secondary data 
include company reports, previous research reports, newspapers, magazines and journal content 
and government and NGO statistics (Zikmund, 2003; Jankowicz, 2005).  
Long-Sutehall et al (2010) posits that the use of secondary data can be applied for the following 
reasons: the performance of an additional analysis of an original dataset (Heaton 1998); the 
pursuance of interests different from those of the original analysis (Hinds et al. 1997); the application 
of a new conceptual focus or new perspective to the original research problem (Heaton, 1998). This 
latter point was the primary focus of this research. As previously discussed by the researcher, one of 
the reasons for the use of secondary data set in this research, was the difficulty encountered by the 
researcher in collecting primary data for the research. When access to primary data became 
inaccessible, secondary data became a particularly important option for the researcher in executing 
the research. Cowton (1998) suggests that secondary data is capable of providing some useful 
material when it becomes impossible to gain access for collecting of primary data. 
Secondary data has positive attributes, the most important of which is that it saves the researcher 
enormous amounts of time and money – the researcher needs only to access library facilities 
(information contained in hard copy or stored electronically). Many a time, researchers spend an 
enormous amount of time, energy and resources in gathering primary research data and sometimes, 
researchers have been unable to complete research papers and projects because of inability to 
gather and collect primary research data (Cowton, 1998; Quinlan, 2011). Other advantages include: 
the reduce possibility of bias due to, for example, non-response and recall as well as the size of the 
sample (Rabonovich and Cheon, 2011). 
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However, secondary data has limitations; one major drawback is that data collected for another 
study with different objectives may not be completely relevant to the research problem (Andersen, et 
al. 2011).  Since the data were not collected to answer the specific research questions the 
researcher had in mind, the researcher does not enjoy the flexibility that would have resulted if he 
had collected the data through primary research (Soreson et al. 1996). Secondary data can only be 
worked with as it is, not as the researcher would have wished to have it. The loss of control is 
considered a serious limitation of secondary research data as the researcher is not able to exercise 
any control over the creating or making of secondary data (Church, 2001). 
 
4.6 Selection of Case Study Organisation 
The choice of engagement practices investments funds was a carefully selected. In choosing an 
institutional investor to investigate, the researcher carefully examined institutional investors‟ actively 
practicing engagement in the UK whose institutional investors‟ engagement strategies had advanced 
beyond the traditional approach. The first selection criterion was that the institutional investor should 
be based in the UK, as most of the re-emergence of institutional investor engagement occurred 
there. Institutional investors not based in the UK were excluded from the sample in question. There 
were a total of 14 UK institutional investors, rated top class, who actively practiced engagement. On 
closer examination, the researcher observed that all 14 institutional investors maintained information 
on their overall engagement policy statements including, amongst others, selection of engagement 
themes, guidelines on dealing with investee companies, management of disputes and the resolution 
of conflicts of interest. 
However not all institutional investors publicly disclose their engagement practices, HSBC is one  
example. Only nine institutional investors reported on engagement issues with companies with which 
they had engaged (Henderson, CIS, Rathbones, Jupiter, USS, Hermes, Insight Investment, Morley 
and F&C Investments). The second criterion of selection was one based on the amount of 
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information the institutional investors disclosed in relation to their engagement activities. The 
investors that had disclosed a substantial amount of information were given a status of high priority 
and those that had not, low priority. USS, Jupiter and Insight Investment did disclose information on 
their engagement practices but it lacked the breadth and depth that F&C Investments seemed to 
provide.  
The robust and detailed information disclosed by F&C Investments over a six-year period delivered 
significantly more than that disclosed by USS, Jupiter and Insight Investment in comparison, 
allowing for a detailed follow-up of institutional investors‟ engagement over an extended period of 
time. This provided insight into the strategies F&C used that yielded results and those that did not. In 
some instances a considerable amount of time can elapse between the initiation of institutional 
investors‟ engagement and any results or outcomes. Most of the engagement reports by USS, 
Jupiter and Insight Investment were not substantial enough to allow for a detailed analysis of the 
institutional investors‟ engagement strategies and to what extent they may have succeeded or failed.  
4.7 Content Analysis 
Content analysis can be regarded as a research instrument and tool used in a systematic and 
objective manner to quantify the presence of particular words, phrases and concepts contained 
within a text or set of texts (Krippendorff, 1980; Lederman, 1991; Saunders et al., 2007). It is a 
research method used in collecting and organising data and codifying text (or content) of a piece of 
writing into various groups (or categories) depending on selected criteria (Weber, 1990). The aim of 
content analysis as a research method is to provide new insight, knowledge and the representation 
of facts that enable the research to replicate and make valid inferences from the data to the specific 
context in question (Elo and Kygnas, 2007). This is done with the intention of attaining a broad, 
condensed depiction of the phenomenon and to analyse the concepts and categories used to 
describe it.  
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Content analysis can be a simple procedure that entails the summarising of data or tallying the 
frequency of an event. It could include more complex measures that involve the analysis of trends or 
identification of subtle differences in the intensity of the data. According to Bryman and Bell (2007),in 
content analysis the frequency/themes can emerge from the following: theoretical understanding of 
the phenomenon being examined, the characteristics of the phenomenon being studied, from local, 
common-sense constructs and from agreed professional definitions found in the literature. Harwood 
and Garry (2003) state that in business and management research, content analysis is a useful and 
effective tool in accessing requisite information without requiring respondents to answer questions in 
a particular manner orbring to mind past events.  Additionally, the use of content analysis allows for 
large volumes of data and written material to be easily analysed with the assistance of an explicit 
coding manual, precise categories and comprehensive reliable checks can be executed by skilled 
research individuals in order to code the material. 
Content analysis is not without controversy, with one leading debate querying whether content 
analysis should be considered a quantitative or qualitative research method - various researchers 
have expressed their views on this issue. Berelson (1952) argues that content analysis is a 
quantitative research method as it makes use of objective, systematic and quantifiable procedures in 
its analysis. Also, Silverman (1993) believes that content analysis should not be used in the 
discussion in qualitative data analysis, because it is largely a quantitative method.  
In the quantitative field, it is suggested that content analysis it is too simplistic and fails to make use 
of robust statistical techniques and analysis, whilst in the qualitative field content analysis is not 
considered a sufficiently qualitative method (Morgan, 1993). Earlier research tended to limit the 
debate on content analysis to its classification as a quantitative versus qualitative research method 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Weber (1990) is dismissive of the reference to content analysis as 
simplistic; he argues that it is possible to obtain simplistic outcomes by virtually any method when 
analysis skills are deficient. The reality is that a research method is as easy or difficult as the 
researcher intends it to be (Neundorf, 2002). The researcher agrees with those such as Berelson 
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(1952) who view content analysis as a largely quantitative method: content analysis is objective, 
quantitative in nature and allows for simple mathematical procedures to be performed such as the 
calculation of percentages from the frequency of the variables. In deductive content analysis, the aim 
is to retest existing data in a new context. The first step in performing deductive content analysis is 
the coding of the data. Since the researcher is using deductive analysis, the coding of the data has 
been drawn from an existing framework. An explanation of how the data has been coded is 
explained in the following section. 
4.8 Data Analysis Procedure 
Bryman (2007) suggests that in quantitative research, the type of data and size of the sample 
collected have a significant influence on the type of quantitative analysis that can be performed on 
the data. Saunders et al. (2007) explain that categorical data refers to data whose value cannot be 
measured numerically but can be either classified into sets according to the characteristics that 
identify or describe the variable or placed in a rank order. These are known as descriptive data or 
nominal data as it is impossible to rank or define the category numerically. These data result from 
simply counting the number of occurrences in each category of a variable.  Although these data are 
purely descriptive, they can be counted to establish which category appears most frequently and the 
following values derived: mean, median, mode, median deviation and standard deviation. 
Categorical data can also be dichotomous and ordinal data. Dichotomous data can be divided into 
two distinct categories, for example where the variable gender is divided into female or male. 
Ranked or ordinal data are considered a more precise form of categorical data. 
In quantitative analysis, the ability to understand and distinguish between types of data is extremely 
important when analysing quantitative data (Baumard and Ibert, 2001). Using analysis software it is 
extremely easy to generate inappropriate statistics from the data which are consequently of little 
value. The data collected for this research can be classified as categorical data. As part of the 
process of analysing quantitative data, all data should, with a few exceptions, be recorded using 
numerical codes (Basit, 2003). In the case of categorical data, the codes are applied with scant 
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
95 | P a g e  
 
consideration, although a coding scheme can be designed to ensure subsequent analysis is much 
simpler.  
To get an in-depth understanding of the report, the researcher read the reports several times. Initial 
method of analysis focused on the use of content analysis. The number of reports analysed by the 
researcher on F&C Investment engagement practices were 24 in number. F&C Investment 
published 1 report every quarter and 4 reports every year. Over the six year period, 24 reports were 
examined. The total number of engagement incidents examined by the researcher in F&C 
investment reports was 454. Of the 454 incidents, 225 were corporate governance issues and 229 
were corporate social responsibility issues. 
To begin the analysis, particular corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues that 
had been raised in the literature review, were initially used. For example, excessive executive pay is 
considered a serious issue investors have raised concern over in the literature review, a keyword 
search with executive pay was initially used to search the F&C Investment engagement reports. This 
would enable the researcher to analyse the executive pay issue that investors are concerned about. 
But this method, while it proved to be helpful initially, tended to be limited in a sense. The researcher 
encountered a number of difficulties analysing the secondary data using this method. The use of a 
keyword search tended to limit the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues, 
to issues that have been raised in the literature review. It failed to capture, new or emerging issues 
that had not been discussed in the literature review. The researcher, found that using key corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility word searches would limit the knowledge of 
engagement issues F&C Investment where interested in, to issues that have been discussed in the 
literature, consequently new emerging corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues would be excluded if this method of analysis was taken. 
Also, there were times, a keyword search such as executive pay would emerge from the data, when 
a keyword search was used, but that did not necessarily mean that institutional investors 
engagement activity or practices was actually occurring in that section of the  text that emerged. 
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Using a keyword search and counting the number of times that a particular word occurred in the 
researcher‟s mind did not explore the richness of the institutional investors‟ engagement data. While 
the use of a keyword allowed the researcher an overview of the engagement activities, the 
researcher was unable to delve deeper into the issues. Consequently, the researcher had to apply 
another method in analysing the data. To do this, the researcher felt that there was a need to adopt 
a different approach to analysing the data on institutional investors‟ engagement. The researcher 
decided to use a more robust approach to explore the particular engagement issue that was of 
concern to F&C Investment. The analysis of the text was based on three criteria. Each text on F&C 
Investment engagement had to contain three specific elements, the issue of engagement (corporate 
governance or corporate social responsibility), the methods of engagement and the specific 
company in question. The text analysed could range from one sentence to a few paragraphs. The 
most important thing for the researcher was that the engagement activity was clearly defined, the 
methods spelled out, the company in question mentioned.  
The data on F&C Investment engagement was disaggregated into the following sub-themes that has 
been listed above as can be seen in Table 5 in the next page. This approach to analysing the data 
allowed the researcher to examine specific corporate governance issues and corporate social 
responsibility issues that F&C Investment were concerned about, the method of engagement and 
the company that was engaged as well. The benefit of this approach is that it broadened the scope 
of the analysis, as it removed from the researcher‟s mind, any preconceived notion of what the 
corporate governance or corporate social responsibility issues were. Any engagement activity in the 
text and in F&C Investment report that did not have all three elements inclusive in the text (issue of 
engagement, method of engagement, company in question) were not analysed, as the researcher 
found that such information were not sufficient enough for a more detailed analysis. 
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Table 3: Example of Data Coding Used in the Analysis 
 2006 1
st
 Quarter F&C Engagement Report Corporate Governance  Method of Engagement Companies  
1.1 Quality directors are key to effective boards, and 
F&C   values the opportunity to meet with them 
so as to reach a judgments based on the merits 
of each individual. We recently met with all four 
newly-appointed non-executive   directors at 
troubled UK supermarket group William 
Morrison. Three of the four were little known to 
institutional investors, coming from major private 
companies, and the meeting reassured us of the 
valuable   perspectives and skills they bring to 
the board. 
Meetings with newly elected non-
executive directors 
Face to Face Meeting 
(Dialogue) 
William Morrison 
 2008 2
nd
 Quarter F&C Investment Report Corporate Social Responsibility Method of Engagement Companies 
1.2 In face-to face meetings with China‟s mining and 
oil majors China Shenhua, PetroChina and 
CNOOC, F&C recommended they assess 
climate-related risks and publish a climate 
change strategy. We also met with China Life, 
and recommended it factor climate change 
impacts on property and health into insurance 
risk models, and develop insurance for 
individuals vulnerable to adverse weather in 
China, such as rural farmers whose crops were 
recently affected by snowstorms. 
Assessment of Climate change 
related risk 
Face to Face meeting 
(Dialogue) 
Chian Shehua 
PetroChina 
CNNOC 
China Life 
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The use of this approach in the analysis of the data also created its own set of difficulties. The 
researcher found that the use of this approach allowed several corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility themes to emerge from the data. The researcher found that some themes, were 
repetitive, some other themes were not repetitive. The researcher had to deal with the issue, of how 
to categorise corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues. Since the number of 
themes that emerged from the data were numerous, the researcher decided it was best to have 
major themes and sub-themes in the classification. 
 
4.8.1 Stages of Data Categorisation 
The first stage involved identifying key corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues from the literature review. In Table 5, the work of Gillian and Stark (2000); Karpoff (2001); 
Romano (2001) and Thomas and Cotter (2006) was used in classifying the corporate governance 
themes. The work of Grave et al. (2001); Monks et al. (2004) and Tkac (2006) was used to classify 
the corporate social responsibility themes in Table 6. F&C Investments‟ engagement reports data 
was transferred to a Microsoft Excel spread sheet to enable the researcher to execute a more robust 
analysis. The data was transferred with the intention of classifying and quantifying the corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues into similar categories. The researcher 
deemed it important to record the number of times a particular corporate governance or corporate 
social responsibility issue was discussed in F&C engagement reports to enable the researcher to 
identify some of the key corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues that were of 
concern to F&C. For example, in the analysis of executive pay six core themes emerged from the 
data: clawback, bonus payments, executive pay and performance, voting on executive pay, review 
of executive pay and independence of remuneration consultants. Bonus payments, executive pay 
and performance, voting on executive pay and review of executive pay were further classified into 
sub-themes that can be seen in figure 4. The same approach was taken in the classification of 
bribery and corruption in figure 5. In the analysis of bribery and corruption, six core themes emerged 
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from the data: enhancing internal control reporting systems, concerns on UK government cordoning 
of corrupt practices, poor regulatory practices, allegation of corrupt practices, whistle blowing issues 
and corruption as an investment risks. Allegation of corrupt practices and whistle blowing were 
further divided into sub-themes. 
Table 4: Corporate Governance Issues Identified in the Literature 
 Corporate Governance Issues 
1 Executive Pay 
 
Restrict executive compensation 
 
Disclose executive compensation 
 
Review executive compensation 
 
Require option shares to be held 
 
Abolish stock option 
 
Implement executive compensation 
plan 
 
Board and Committee 
Independent Issues 
 
Increase board independence 
 
Limit directors‟ term 
 
Nomination of directors 
 
Directors‟ compensation 
 
Directors‟ attendance at general 
meetings 
Issues Related to Repealing 
Anti-Takeover Devices 
 
Repeal classified board     
 
Eliminate poison pill 
 
Eliminate golden parachutes 
 
Prohibit greenmail payments 
 
Source: Compiled from Gillan and Stark (2000); Karpoff (2001); Romano (2001); Thomas and Cotter 
(2006). 
 
Table 5: Corporate Social Responsibility Issues Identified in the Literature 
 Corporate Social Responsibility Issues 
1 Political Donation 
 
Disclose political donation 
 
Affirm non-partnership 
 
Enact shareholder vote on 
political donation 
Diversity/Non-Discrimination 
 
Board diversity 
 
Sexual orientation non-
discrimination 
 
Domestic partner benefits 
 
Environmental 
Climate change 
 
Pollution/recycling 
 
Greenhousegases/radiation 
release 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Grave et al. (2001); Monks et al. (2004); Tkac (2006)    
 
The second stage involved reading F&C engagement reports several times to identify key corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues addressed by F&C engagement. The 
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identification of corporate governance issues and corporate responsibility issues was guided by the 
key corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues identified in the literature review. 
The third stage undertaken by the researcher was the classification of corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility issues in the F&C engagement reports. The classification is based on 
the researcher‟s understanding from the literature review and an examination of the data in question. 
For example, in Table 7, in the case of executive pay, seven core issues were identified in the data:  
voting on executive pay, disclosure of executive pay, bonus payments, executive pay and 
performance, review of executive pay, independence of executive pay consultants and clawback
9
. Of 
these seven core issues, three of the issues; bonus payments, voting on executive pay and 
executive pay and performance were sub-divided into the following: disclosure of executive pay and 
performance, linking executive pay to CSR performance, restructuring executive pay to meet specific 
performance criteria and reward exceptional performance with exceptional pay. 
Table 6: Classification of Executive Pay 
 Executive Pay 
1 Voting on executive pay 
1) Vote against director fees 
2) Encourage shareholders to vote on pay 
3) Request shareholders to vote on advisory pay 
2 Disclosure of executive pay 
3 Bonus payments 
1) Abolish retirement bonus payments 
2) Payment of retirement bonus 
3) Disclosure of bonus payments 
4 Executive pay and performance 
1) Disclosure of executive pay and performance 
2) Linking executive pay to CSR performance 
3) Restructuring executive pay to meet specific performance criteria 
4) Reward exceptional performance with exceptional pay 
5 Review of executive pay 
6 Independence of executive pay consultants 
7 Clawback 
Adopted from: Gillan and Stark (2000); Karpoff (2001); Romano (2001); Thomas and Cotter (2006). 
                                                             
9
Clawback is a mechanism used to recover executives’ income and earnings when their performance falls short of 
specific benchmarks  (see Peter, 1993). 
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The researcher used the same approach to classify the corporate social responsibility issues. In the 
case of labour standard practices in Table 8, five core issues were identified in the data: disclosure 
of labour standard practises, use of child labour, implementation of labour standard codes, 
improvement of labour standard codes and provision of quantitative indicators for labour standard 
practices.  
Table 7: Classification of Labour Standard Practices 
 Labour Standard Practices 
1 Disclosure of labour standard practices 
2 Use of child labour 
3 Implementation of labour standard codes 
4 Improvement of labour standard practices 
1. Inadequate accommodation for migrant workers 
2. Poor factory working conditions 
3. Poor employment practice 
4. Poor supply chain practice 
5. Unfair terms of work 
6. Aggressive anti-union labour practices 
Adopted from: Grave et al. (2001); Monks et al. (2004); Tkac (2006). 
 
4.9 Classifying the Use of Multiple Methods in Institutional Investors’ Engagement  
The strategies used in F&C engagement to influence corporate behaviour have advanced in two 
ways. The first is individual or firm-specific engagement. To determine at what point a new strategy 
is applied, the researcher decided that it was important to establish a time frame for the efficacy of a 
particular engagement strategy. A time frame of one year was prescribed to determine whether a 
particular strategy was effective in influencing corporate behaviour. When the one-year period 
elapsed and another engagement strategy was applied by F&C that generated the kind of results 
they had been expecting, the research then classified that as the use of multiple methods in 
engagement. The use of multiple methods in engagement by F&C Investments can be seen in 
Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Use of Multiple Methods in Engagement by F&C Investments     
 
The following example is presented to consolidate the point the researcher is making. In its 2007 first 
quarter engagement report, F&C acknowledged it had been dialoguing with an American company, 
CVS, over a two-year period. F&C had requested CVS to publish a sustainability report. After two 
years of fruitless dialogue, F&C decided to change its approach to engagement since dialogue was 
not yielding the desired result. It filed a shareholder proposal formally requesting a sustainable report. 
CVS publishes sustainable reports on its websites hence the researcher has been able to confirm 
their publication. The use of shareholder resolutions to engage CVS influenced their non-disclosure 
policy and practices. 
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4.10 Limitations of the Research Design 
As with any research of this nature, this research has limitations therefore the results should be 
treated with some caution. The first of many limitations is that of the selection bias. Selection bias 
can be said to occur in experimental or survey research when the data selected is not drawn from a 
sufficiently random sample to draw a general conclusion. When selection bias is not explained in the 
research, there is a tendency by researchers to claim that the results are widely applicable.  
Institutional investors‟ engagement is not practiced extensively in the UK, only a few investors are at 
the forefront and the organisation selected for this research is one that practices institutional investor 
engagement. 
Secondly, although the selection of one organisation, examined over a long time period, has benefits 
in that the trends, changes and the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement 
can be examined, it does have limitations since it may fail to present a holistic picture of UK 
institutional investors‟ engagement practices. A small sample size could produce misleading results. 
The use of a small number of cases could result in the omission of important insights and the 
selection of such cases renders the research not truly representative, consequently the findings 
cannot be generalised. However, from the outset, the goal of this research has been not to 
generalise but to examine how institutional investors‟ engagement practices are evolving. A large 
sample size would give a detailed and more robust picture of engagement practices in the UK and 
allow for a general conclusion to be drawn from the findings. 
Thirdly, institutional investors‟ engagement reports have some limitations as they report specific 
engagement activities. Not every engagement activity in which F&C Investments participated was 
detailed in the reports. The reports are published on a quarterly basis and there is a tendency for 
certain engagement activities not to be included. The omission of such engagement activities would 
also have some influence on the findings, the analysis of the data and the outcome. In some 
instances, though these were few, a particular engagement activity initiated in one report was not 
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discussed in successive reports, therefore the researcher was unable to perceive the eventual 
outcome. 
Finally, the researcher is aware of the implication of the use of categorical data in the research 
analysis. The use of categorical data limits the application of a wider variety of statistical tools and 
techniques in the analysis. Quantifiable data on the other hand are those data whose values are 
measured in numerical quantities and are therefore more precise than categorical data. Quantifiable 
data can each be assigned a data value position on the numerical scale and the data can be 
analysed using a far wider range of statistics. Further, the use of secondary data does present 
another limitation; the analysis would have been more robust had the use of secondary data been 
combined with questionnaires or interviews. The use of questionnaires and interviews would enable 
a more robust analysis and ensure that follow-up questions were answered, especially when 
secondary data fails to provide the requisite information. Efforts made by the researcher in 
requesting an interview with F&C investments failed to yield any meaningful result. As such, this 
research would have benefited from a deeper exploration of the use of multiple methods in 
engagement. 
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4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the research philosophy, methodology and methods that the researcher 
has considered in executing the research. The researcher had adopted a post positivist 
philosophical stand because he believes that research can be best produced when objective 
ontological position is taken. The researcher has presented his case for conducting the research 
with a post positivist perspective using scientific principles and methods. It is his conviction that it is 
possible to be objective in scientific inquiry, that the social world can be observed in an objective 
manner.  
The adoption of a case study methodology and the selection of the organisation is explained. The 
analysis of the research is discussed and the classifications of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility issues are explained. The classifications of the corporate governance and 
corporate governance issues were based on existing frameworks examined in the literature review 
that was extensively discussed in chapter two. 
The overall theme that emerges from the analysis of institutional investors‟ engagement is the use of 
multiple methods by investors in engaging in corporate governance or corporate social responsibility 
issues. Institutional investors have gone beyond the use of a one method or a static approach to 
engagement. Institutional investors‟ engagement is becoming more dynamic and methodical in its 
approach. If a particular method fails to yield an intended result, institutional investors are learning to 
apply another method in engagement. 
The next chapter provides a brief overview of F&C Investments. It gives a detailed description of the 
organisation, its structure and the size of its assets. The engagement philosophy of F&C is explained 
and the purpose of its engagement activities is described in detail.  
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Chapter 5: An Overview of F&C Investments  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to provide a detailed elaboration of this study‟s primary institutional investor case 
study; F&C Investments. First, a brief outline of F&C‟s major attributes (historical development, 
organisational structure, assets under management, other investment holdings etc) is provided. This 
is followed by a detailed account of F&C‟s extensive involvement in shareholder 
activism/engagement initiatives. Of particular focus is the integrating of corporate governance-
related and CSR-related corporate engagement policies and practices by F&C investment in 
engagement. And also, the use of multiple methods in engagement by F&C.To simplify, this study 
will scrutinise the decisions made by F&C‟s fund managers to effectively manage the risks and 
opportunities associated with significant governance, social, ethical and environmental issues. This 
chapter is based on information obtained from F&C Investments‟ website unless referenced 
otherwise. Although F&C Investments has contributed immensely to improving and influencing 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices in the UK, very little academic 
research exists around its engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices. 
 
5.2 Brief History of F&C Investments 
F&C Investments began with the inauguration of the Foreign & Colonial Investments Trust in 1895 
and was the first investment trust in the UK (The Financial Times, 2012). The company was the 
world‟s first publicly-listed pooled of investment vehicle and a leading pioneer in the fund 
management industry. Its aspiration was to ensure that investors could take advantage of 
investment opportunities that would diminish the risk of investing across the globe in countries such 
as Chile, Brazil and the United States (1868); Germany, Australia, India, France, South Africa and 
Japan (1883); and China (1886) and Hong Kong (1934).   
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In 1999, the company's international expansion involved entering into a joint venture with the Guoco 
Group to form FIS Asia, with its headquarters in Hong Kong. The purpose of the venture was to 
develop retail and institutional asset business for the Asian region. In 2001 the company formed a 
strategic alliance with State Street Global Advisors. After purchasing the asset management 
business of Royal & Sun Alliance, the company changed its name to ISIS Asset Management in 
2002. 
 
In 2004, ISIS completed the management buyout of Market & Opinion Research International 
(MORI), an independent market research organisation. In the same year, the company merged with 
ISIS Asset Management and formed what is now known as F&C Investments. In 2005 F&C 
Investments entered into the private equity fund segment with the acquisition of Martin Currie 
Investment Management's private equity funds business unit. In 2007F&C Investments launched 
four investment funds under the asset manager Richard Philbin with asset mixes tailored to specific 
risk/return profiles. In 2008, the company merged with REIT Asset Management, an international 
property asset manager and named the resulting company F&C REIT. 
 
Today F&C Investments can be best described as a diversified independent investment 
management company specialising in the provision of asset management services which include a 
range of investment trusts and venture capitalist trusts. F&C asset management offers a range of 
products and services through two channels; its investment management and property asset 
management arms. The F&C management group invests across a wide variety of major asset 
classes as well as a range of specialist expertise including commercial property, private equity funds 
and hedge funds. The company‟s vision has been to consistently focus on creating value for its 
customers by delivering superior performance in all aspects of the business. The company focuses 
exclusively on asset management and is renowned for its promotion of best practice corporate 
governance and socially responsible investments. 
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F&C currently manages approximately £100 billion of assets for a diverse range of retail investors, 
institutional clients and insurance companies, representing more than three million end investors 
(Russell, 2008). Insurance funds constitute the majority of F&C Investments‟ clientele, accounting for 
an estimated 60% of funds managed by F&C. Institutional funds account for approximately 30% of 
the funds. Investment trusts and UK retail mutual funds collectively account for a further 10%. Assets 
managed under F&C can be classified into the following categories: fixed interests, equities, property, 
money markets and alternative investments.  Most of F&C‟s assets are allocated as fixed interests 
and equities accounting for approximately 80% of investments (F&C Investments Annual Report, 
2010) (see Tables 9 and 10 below). 
 
 
Table 8: Asset under Management of F&C by Client Category 
 30
th
 June 2009 
£bn 
31
st
 March 2009 
£bn 
31
st
 December 
2008  
£bn 
Insurance Funds 62.2 59.2 59.0 
Institutional Funds 29.1 28.4 29.5 
Sub-Advisory 3.3 4.6 5.0 
Investment Trusts 5.3 4.7 5.1 
UK Retail (Mutual Funds) 2.5 2.1 2.3 
International Wholesale (Mutual Funds) 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 103.7 100.1 102 
Source: http://www.fandc.com(accessed: 28
th
 of July, 2012) 
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Table 9: Asset under Management of F&C by Asset Category 
 30
th
 June 2009 
£bn 
31
st
 March 2009 
£bn 
31
st
 December 
2008  
£bn 
Fixed Interest 62.2 61.8 62.6 
Equities 24.1 21.2 25.2 
Property 9.2 8.9 8.1 
Other Alternative Investments 1.7 2.2 2.6 
Money Market 6.5 6.0 102.0 
Total 103.7 100.1 102.0 
Source: http://www.fandc.com(accessed: 28
th
 of July, 2012) 
 
It is F&C investment philosophy that financial markets are largely inefficient, that not all information 
is captured in the share prices and market forces can drive asset prices above or below their true 
value. Thus, in an inefficient market, some securities will be overpriced and others underpriced. 
Inefficient markets present investors with opportunities to exploit share prices and hidden value 
within companies. Through application of its specialist investment knowledge and skills, F&C has 
developed the ability to exploit such inefficiencies. Although F&C Investments operates in the UK, it 
enjoys significant patronage from institutional investors in France, Ireland, Germany, the US, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. The group has no single investment strategy/approach that is imposed 
across the business, but have a multi-specialist investment business model. The F&C Investments 
philosophy is based on five key tenets:  
 It is the belief that individual fund managers are in the best position to manage the funds 
and have been given full responsibility to do so. Individual fund managers are employed and 
given the support and resources they need. Accountability and performance of funds lie in 
the hands of the fund managers and fund managers‟ pay is linked to performance of their 
fund, rather than the volume of their assets. 
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 Managers are also given the need support and advice to run the funds effectively: Fund 
managers are encouraged to work in robust teams and investment decisions are made on 
the basis of strategic thinking and risk modelling, not on the basis of personal intuition. 
 Managers in F&C are given some flexibility in how they manage and run their funds: Fund 
managers are not constrained to apply any particular investment style such as growth and 
value, instead the investment style provides room for flexibility allowing fund managers to 
adapt to continually changing markets conditions. 
 Managers in F&C are allowed to work as part in small teams: Investment professionals are 
allowed to work as part of a small, highly-focused team. This ensures that they focus on 
specific products and affords a rare degree of control over the investment process. 
 Acting responsibly: Acting responsibly calls for engagement with the company in which they 
invest, aiming to enhance and protect long-term shareholder value. The approach adopted is 
constructive dialogue with companies highlighting potential risks that emerge from poor 
corporate governance and social responsibility practices.  
 
Acting responsibly is a key tenet that is consistent with the focus of this research; UK institutional 
investors such as F&C Investments have been encouraged to get involved with companies in which 
they have vested interests (Holland, 1998; Short and Keasy, 2005). Institutional investors should 
advance from being passive investors and become actively involved by influencing poor corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices (Monks, 1994; Hendry et al., 2007). 
Institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
enhances the long-term value of the corporation (Gifford, 2010; Hebb et al., 2012).  
Acting responsibly is considered an integral part of F&C‟s investment philosophy. Its engagement 
practices in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are geared towards active and 
responsible involvement with investee companies. F&C Investments is an institutional investor who 
understands that it is not enough to invest in companies as a passive investor. It is important for 
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investors to act responsibly by taking an active role in encouraging corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices that can add value to their investee companies.    
 
5.3 F&C Investments’ Engagement in Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Issues 
 
Of considerable importance to F&C Investments is the need to achieve best practice in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility a dynamic process between the board, management 
and shareholders (Bow, 2010). F&C Investments is of the opinion that prudent management of 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues is fundamental in creating 
shareholder value for investors (Skypala, 2010). The aim of F&C‟s engagement is to be persuasive 
and pragmatic in order to achieve change that enhances the bottom line, rather than the alternative 
of imposing prescriptive demands on companies in which they invest (Russell, 2008). F&C uses its 
leverage as one of Europe‟s largest investors to support the implementation of good environmental, 
social and governance practices, where this can boost returns to investors (Russell, 2008). This is 
achieved through the use of sustained dialogue with companies allowing for two-way communication 
that ensures both parties discuss the issues and generate meaningful solutions and better methods 
to effectively manage risks and negative impacts on the environment and the wider society.  
 
A particular concern for F&C investment is the need to effectively manage corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility issues as it is consider an important component of good 
governance practices (Skypala, 2010). Companies that ignore such risks may suffer serious damage 
to their reputation and brand value, as well as litigation and operational risks. Creating a governance 
culture of transparency and accountability that exceeds compliance with codes and legislation is key 
to addressing effectively these aspects of performance. Renowned scandals illustrate the 
importance of companies‟ alertness to the business risks inherent in a broad range of issues such as 
fraud, bribery and corruption, insider trading, climate change, human rights, labour standards, 
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including those in supply chains, and the health impacts of products. Three major elements comprise 
the core of F&C‟s responsible investment practices: dialogue, voting and collaborative engagement. 
 
5.3.1 Dialogue 
The purpose of F&C Investments dialogue with companies is to engage with the companies in which 
it invests aiming to enhance and protect long-term shareholder value. Its approach is constructive 
dialogue with companies. Engagement by F&C tends to be proactive; acting before corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues deteriorate to begin engagement. It tends to 
anticipate environmental, social and governance issues that may threaten the continuity of the 
corporations in which they have vested interest. When such issues are identified F&C acts, informing 
investee companies through dialogue, the organisation of workshops and distribution of relevant 
research documentation on the issues in question. The use of dialogue as a tool to influence 
corporate behaviour, practices and policies has been extensively examined in the extant literature 
review (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Solomon, 2010). 
 
F&C Investments encourages companies to engage in the process of shaping and meeting evolving 
standards of best practice. F&C Investments strives to approach each company‟s case on its merits 
and in so doing relies on staff expertise, discretion and dialogue with companies. For this reason, 
F&C Investments encourages companies to provide information unique to the company on particular 
governance practices, directors and challenges. F&C Investments believes that proper management 
of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues which a business faces can 
enhance corporate behaviour and practices. F&C, through its Responsible Engagement Overlay 
Service, uses its influence as a major asset manager to persuade companies in which they have 
vested interests to adopt better investment in environmental, social and governance risks and 
opportunities.  
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5.3.2 Voting 
Voting is considered a mechanism that allows shareholders and investors to express their views on 
particular corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues which affect the firms in 
which they have vested interests (Southwood, 2003; Tkac, 2006).  In this regard, F&C states that 
voters should be well informed and that, as investors, they must make use of their votes responsibly 
and considerately taking into account their knowledge of the companies and the markets in which 
they operate and also good corporate governance practice and internationally accepted standards. 
Their approach to voting is more proactive than the use of the „tick box‟ mentality, paying due 
consideration to the explanations offered by companies for deviation from international standards 
and good practice. F&C maintains that there is a close linkage between engagement and voting: 
engagement tends to have more leverage, while voting tends to have greater impact when 
associated with detailed communication of concerns. As part of its commitment to good corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices F&C Investments publishes its voting 
positions and records. For instance, F&C has recently escalated its vote against pay packages in 
order to crackdown on excessive executive pay including against pay plans at Morgan Stanley, 
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, HSBC and J.P. Morgan Chase (Brenton, 2012). 
 
5.3.3 Collaboration 
Stakeholder theory views collaborative engagement as a means to increase the power and 
legitimacy of shareholders‟ and investors‟ demands (Solomon, 2010). Collaboration enables 
investors to pool resources and co-ordinate their engagement strategies and methods (Black, 1998). 
In collaborative engagement, a large proportion of shares are held by institutional investors enabling 
them to wield enormous influence, increasing their chances of influencing corporate behaviour, 
practices and policies (O‟Rourke, 2003). F&C Investments prefers one-to-one engagement with 
companies, however it is often more effective for several investors to collaborate; pooling resources 
and coordinating their approach to address particular corporate governance or corporate social 
responsibility issues (Becht et al., 2007). There are particular corporate social responsibility issues 
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such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), 
biodiversity and climate change that cannot be convincingly addressed by institutional investors 
engaging with individual companies. A collective approach is considered more appropriate and 
companies are more likely to heed investors when it is evident that they convey a true representation 
of a broad range of views (Sullivan and Mackenzie, 2006). 
 
5.4 Use of Multiple Methods in Engagement by F&C Investments’ 
F&C Investments is considered a market leader in corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility and has won several distinguished financial industry awards for its contribution to 
improving shareholder engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices (Bow, 2010). Other notable awards won by F&C for its corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices include: 
 The Gold Standard Award for best fund management for four consecutive years (2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010). 
 Liability Driven Investment Manager Award 2012. 
 The Investment Trust Award F&C Global Small Companies for 2012. 
 Investment Life and Pensions Moneyfacts Awards for Best Investment Trust Provider 2011. 
 Best Climate Change Fund for 2011. 
 European Socially Responsible Programme of the Year Award 2009. 
 Top Sustainable Fund Manager 2007. 
 Responsible Investment Award 2005. 
 
In addition to numerous awards, F&C Investments also provides shareholder engagement 
programmes and services for 20 clients, most notably Dutch pension funds 
(PGGM),BayerischeVersorgungskammer, the largest German Public Pension Fund (Walker, 2011) 
and the National Employment Savings Trust which has appointed F&C Investments to manage its 
responsible investment portfolio (Brooksbank, 2012).F&C Investments‟ philosophy is integral to its 
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responsible engagement practices. F&C Investments‟ approach to institutional investors‟ 
engagement is the most extensive when compared to other mainstream pension funds and financial 
institutions in the UK. Its commitment to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues constitutes its identity and ensures its distinctiveness as an organisation in the way it resolves 
differences with its investee companies.  It strongly maintains that institutional investors‟ 
engagement can provide the tools to achieve influence in corporate behaviour, practices and policies. 
F&C Investments seeks to deliver strong investment performance through active management.  
 
The approach used by F&C in sustainable and responsible investments differs from the approaches  
applied by traditional ethical investors who make use of screening and „best in class‟ techniques 
(Solomon, 2010). The use of screening and the best in class approach allows ethical investors to 
exit companies who fail to meet their ethical standards. In F&C Investments exiting is not an option, 
F&C deliberately engages with investee companies to change corporate behaviour, practices and 
policies. This approach does not interfere with fund managers‟ selection or construction of their 
portfolio. The sole objective is to influence change in poor corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility practices. F&C uses its large share ownership and that of its clients to 
encourage investee companies to adopt corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices that add long-term value to the company. 
 
There is a wealth of information on its engagement practices in corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility on F&C website. The breadth and depth of this information afforded the 
researcher a holistic view of F&C‟s engagement practices. The existing literature on institutional 
investors‟ engagement has been static and research has primarily focused on current corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues, largely as a result of the lack of available data 
on institutional investors‟ engagement. Some engagement strategies such as dialogue and 
negotiation occur „behind the scenes‟ and researchers are not privy to such information.  
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The availability of this wealth of information provided by F&C has enabled the researcher to examine 
the ways in which F&C‟s engagement practices have changed overtime, which is not the case with 
many other institutional investors who publish ad hoc reports on their engagement practices 
impeding the execution of rigorous and extensive research and analysis. During 2005 to 2011, F&C 
Investments consistently published quarterly reports of its engagement activity. This consistency and 
reporting of its engagement has enabled the researcher to capture the long-term dynamics ofthe use 
of multiple methods in its responsible engagement practices. 
 
In addition to engagement reports, F&C Investments also makes publicly available numerous 
research publications containing detailed reporting on, and outcomes of, their engagement 
strategies. No other UK institutional investors have consistently published comprehensive and 
detailed information over a six-year period. The available data allowed the researcher to follow the 
engagement activity of a specific company over a period of time to ascertain the strategies used to 
influence corporate behaviour; those which were effective and those which were not. 
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5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter provides an in-depth explanation of F&C Investments as an institutional investor. In 
chapter one, a brief discussion of F&C investments was given. The selection of F&C as a case study 
to examine is explained and justified. Firstly, F&C appears to have a significant amount of data on its 
engagement practices over a long period of time that enabled the researcher examine engagement 
practices in detail. Its transparency, through the quarterly publication of numerous engagement 
reports for more than six years, has been pivotal in enabling the researcher to examine the use of 
multiple methods in its engagement practices. Institutional investors‟ engagement must occur over a 
considerable period of time to make possible an assessment of the efficacy of a particular strategy. 
The wealth of information F&C Investments has consistently published over the years made possible 
the study of the dynamic nature of institutional investors‟ engagement. This is the first analysis of 
institutional investors‟ engagement undertaken with a longitudinal data set. 
 
Secondly, it is also regarded as a market leader in the field of responsible investments and has won 
many awards for enhancing responsible engagement practices in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility. The most notable awards include: Responsible Investment of the 
Year Award 2005, Top Sustainable Fund Manager 2007, European Socially Responsible 
Programme of the Year Award 2009, Gold Standard Award for Best Fund Management 2010, 
Investment Life and PensionsMoneyfacts Award for Best Investment Trust Provider 2011. 
 
This chapter goes into more specific details on F&C engagement practices. It explains F&C 
Investments applies a variety of methods and strategies to influence corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility issues: dialogue, voting and collaborative engagement are considered 
essential elements of its engagement strategy. The current stream of research on institutional 
investors‟ engagement has focused more on capturing static and specific engagement incidents. 
This is understandable as it is difficult to gain access to information on investors‟ engagement due to 
the private nature of engagement practices and the decision of investors to keep details of their 
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engagement activities hidden. Consequently, it has been largely unfeasible to examine the use of 
multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement practices since institutional investors do not 
disclose data on engagement activities. In the case of F&C Investments there is a lack of existing 
academic literature on its engagement practices and procuring information on its engagement 
activity from other sources has been quite challenging. The Financial Times and other magazines 
have proved valuable, relevant and insightful, however the researcher found the information to be 
insufficient and would have greatly appreciated more information, from various sources. Insufficient 
in the sense that, the discussion on F&C engagement practices tended not to be detailed and 
specific with regards to outcomes of engagement activities. 
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Chapter 6:  Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the study‟s key empirical findings relating to the many proactive engagement 
initiatives undertaken by F&C Investments. These are primarily derived from a systematic 
examination of highly-detailed periodic reports published by F&C over a six-year period (2005 - 
2011).In addition, a longitudinal analysis of the of its corporate governance and CSR activism over a 
six-year period is executed. The analysis‟ focus is if and how F&C tailors and/or changes its 
engagement strategies whenever an adopted initiative is deemed to be inadequate in terms of 
effectiveness. In so doing, the study would improve current academic understanding of: 
(i) which of the many institutional investors‟ engagement strategies/approaches are generally more 
effective (considering also the nature of issues being dealt with), 
(ii) whether or not alternative strategies are subsequently adopted when initial strategies do not 
achieve their intended outcomes, and 
(iii) typologies indicative of the purported use of multiple methods in engagement based on an 
examination of case studies of F&C Investments‟ engagement practices.  
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the contributions above are distinctive, as past empirical studies 
have simply considered engagement strategies as static, one-stage processes for each issue in 
which an institutional investor is interested or when focusing on a particular corporate incident (e.g. 
instances of corporate fraud). 
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6.2 F&C Investments’ Engagement in Corporate Governance Issues 
The total number of incidents of institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance issues 
undertaken by F&C Investments over a six-year period (2005 -2010) is listed below. The table below 
is an aggregation of all the 225 instances when engagement on corporate governance issues by 
F&C took place over the five year period. Like I previously mentioned, engagement was analysed on 
the basis of three criteria, the issues of engagement must be mentioned, the method of engagement 
used and company F&C engaged must be specified. Of the 225 instances when engagement took 
place, a total of 20 corporate governance issues emerged from the data as can be seen in Table 10.  
Table 10: F&C Investments‟ Engagement in Corporate Governance Issues 
   
No of Times 
Incidents 
Discussed Percentage 
1 Executive remuneration 61 27.1 
2 Bribery and corruption  31 13.7 
3 Pre-emptive rights 1 0.4 
4 Poor governance practice  6 2.6 
5 Restructuring of the board and board performance 89 39.5 
6 Concerns regarding issuance of new capital 2 0.8 
7 Illegal transfer pricing 1 0.4 
8 Transparency  3 1.3 
9 Risk oversight management 3 1.3 
10 Voting issues 7 3.1 
11 Improvement in governance practices 2 0.8 
12 Encourage shareholders to vote 4 1.7 
13 Concerns regarding financial restatement of 
accounts 2 0.8 
14 Improve production practice 1 0.4 
15 Concerns regarding management and 
governance 1 0.4 
16 Shareholder approval 2 0.8 
17 Approval of anti-takeover 1 0.4 
18 Shareholder blocking 2 0.8 
19 Poison pill 4 1.7 
20 Shareholder repurchase scheme 2 0.8 
    225 100 
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Some of the corporate governance issues that emerged from F&C engagement report include: 
executive remuneration, bribery and corruption, pre-emptive rights, poor governance, restructuring of 
the board and board performance, concerns regarding issuance of new capital, illegal transfer 
pricing, transparency, risk oversight management, voting issues, improvement in governance 
practices, encouraging shareholders to vote, improve production practice, encouraging shareholders 
to vote, concerns regarding financial statements of accounts, shareholder approval, approval of anti-
takeover, shareholder blocking, poison pill, and shareholder repurchase scheme. The number of 
times these incidents were discussed in the engagement report has been listed in the third column 
and the fourth column shows the percentage value of the corporate governance incidents. 
The table clearly shows that three particular issues accounted for over 70% of F&C Investments‟ 
engagement in corporate governance issues: executive remuneration, bribery and corruption, 
restructuring of the board and board performance. These three core issues seemed to be the main 
focus of F&C engagement activity. The focus on executive remuneration and restructuring of the 
board and board performance is consistent with the findings in the literature review, the works of 
(Black 1992; Romano 2001, Ferrani et al., 2003; Monks et al, 2004; Dong and Ozkan, 2008). 
However there is an emergence of some very interesting findings, one of the more significance is the 
increasing focus on improving governance practice, encouraging shareholders to participate more in 
voting on corporate governance issues, risk management oversight, transparency and bribery and 
corruption. These are aspects of corporate governance that are not currently receiving significant 
attention (Gifford 2010; Tess et al, 2010). There is some indication to suggest that corporate 
governance is broadening in scope to include other aspects of corporate governance that have been 
largely ignored, that have previously been considered unimportant and of no significant import. 
The focus on risk management oversight and encouraging shareholder to participate in the 
governance process are normally issues raised by regulatory bodies or statutory requirements and 
principles that the corporate governance codes such as the Stewardship codes (2010) require of 
investors. 
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The increasing focus on the importance of risk management cannot be unconnected with the global 
financial crisis in 2008 that has significantly raised the importance of good risk management 
practices in corporate governance. Poor risk management practice as revealed by the financial crisis 
is capable of causing a significant financial meltdown of global proportions. This is consistent with 
the work of Solomon (2010) who has posits that corporate governance is broadening its scope to 
include issues such as risk management and ethical aspect of governance such as bribery and 
corruption. 
The finding of this research does reveal that investors are beginning to take ethical aspect of 
corporate governance more seriously. Bribery and corruption, for instance, is an aspect of corporate 
governance that has not been given significant attention, the literature on corporate governance 
appears to ignore the fact that corruption can significantly damage and negatively impact the 
performance of any company. Significant attention has been paid by F&C to strengthen whistle 
blowing and internal mechanisms, this has been done with the intention nipping the issue of bribery 
and corruption in the bud and not allowing it to fester so as to cause significant damage to the 
company in question. The collapse of multinational companies such as Enron, WorldCom and 
Parmalat largely as a result of unethical practices has brought to the fore, the likely consequences 
that may occur if unethical practice of bribery and corruption are left largely unchecked or ignored. 
The next section will begin by examining the most frequently occurring corporate governance 
themes. This will provide the reader with a better understanding of the issues involved. 
Disaggregating the corporate governance themes into sub-themes will also allow the reader a better 
perception of the governance issues addressed by F&C Investments. 
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6.2.1 Executive Remuneration 
Executive remuneration can be considered an important corporate governance issue raised by F&C 
Investments.  F&C Investments were concerned about the following issues (listed in Figure 5 below): 
review on executive pay, voting on executive pay, disclosure on executive pay, bonus payments, 
executive pay and performance, clawback and independence of remuneration consultants. An 
estimated 60% of F&C Investments‟ concerns were focused on three core issues: bonus payments, 
executive pay and performance and voting on executive pay.  
Figure 5: Percentage Estimates of Executive Remuneration Issues (2005 -2011) 
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The bonus payments concern could further be sub-divided into the following issues: abolishing of 
retirement pay for board executives, payment of retirement pay to board executives and disclosure 
of bonus payments. Executive pay in relation to performance was a major corporate governance 
issue which F&C Investments tended to address. Executive pay and performance issues could be 
further divided into sub-themes that include: restructuring of executive pay to meet certain 
performance criteria, disclosure of executive pay, rewarding exceptional performance with 
exceptional pay and linking executive pay to performance in corporate social responsibility issues 
such as health and safety. Voting on executive pay was an issue which F&C Investments repeatedly 
raised; the core voting on executive pay concerns can be categorised into three sub-themes: 
encouraging shareholders to get advisory votes on pay, encouraging shareholders to vote on 
executive pay-related issues and voting for and against directors‟ fees. 
 
6.2.2 Restructuring of the Board  
The board continues to be a resonating theme in the focus of F&C Investments; issues concerning 
the board have continued to be relevant in today‟s business organisation. In Figure 6 below, the core 
corporate governance issues that have emerged from restructuring the board include acting without 
board approval, removal of board of directors, request for board performance to be linked to 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices, separation of the roles of 
chairman and chief executive officer, board transparency, reduction of board size, Board 
declassification, re-election of board of directors and board independence. Board independence, re-
election of directors, the request for board performance to be linked to corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices and reduction of board size account for an estimated 70% of 
F&C Investments‟ engagement in board restructuring. 
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Figure 6: Percentage Estimates of Board Restructuring Issues (2005 -2011) 
 
 
Reduction of Board size, Board transparency and the request for Board performance to be linked to 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices can be further categorised into 
sub-themes. In reducing the Board size, F&C Investments were concerned about two main issues; 
increasing Board independence and reducing a three-tier Board structure to a two-tier structure. The 
Board transparency issue tended to focus on disclosure of bonus payments made to Board 
members and encouraging disclosure of Board-related transactions and pay. The request for Board 
performance to be linked to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices was 
further sub-divided into rewarding Board performance based on corporate social responsibility 
criteria, clawbacks and benchmarking Board performance against earnings and profits. 
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6.2.3 Bribery and Corruption 
F&C investors raised particular concerns about corruption as an important governance issue it was 
imperative to address.  Figure 7 shows the bribery and corruption issues that investors tended to 
focus on and address including: whistle-blowing, allegation of corrupt practices, poor regulatory 
practices, internal controls and reporting systems, inappropriate payments to politicians, corruption 
in the defence industry, corruption as an investment risk and concerns over the UK condoning 
corrupt practices.  Two bribery and corruption-related issues tended to reoccur; whistle-blowing and 
allegation of corrupt practices. The whistle-blowing issue can further be classified into the following 
sub-themes: protection of the whistle-blower, firing of incompetent whistle-blowers, strengthening of 
and lack of whistle-blowing mechanisms. In the case of allegation of corrupt practices, the two 
primary concerns were widespread corruption in the defence industry and inappropriate payments to 
politicians. 
Figure 10:  Percentage Estimates of Bribery and Corruption Issues (2005 -2011) 
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6.3 F&C Investments’ Engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility Issues 
The total number of incidents of institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate social responsibility 
issues undertaken by F&C investments over a five-year period (2005 -2010) is listed below. The 
table below is an aggregation of all the 229 instances when engagement on corporate social  
responsibility issues by F&C took place over the five year period. As I have previously suggested in 
the data analysis section, engagement was analysed on the basis of three criteria, the issues of 
engagement must be mentioned, the method of engagement used and company F&C engaged must 
be specified. Of the 229 instances when engagement took place, a total of 25 corporate social 
responsibility issues emerged from the data as can be seen in Table 11.  
Some of the corporate social responsibility issues that emerged from F&C engagement report 
include: health and safety, sustainability, climate change, human rights, managing security concerns, 
environmental management systems, HIV/AIDS, environment impact assessment, adoption of 
equator principle, extractive industry transparency initiatives, corporate social responsibility reporting, 
biodiversity, reduction of carbon emission, community relations, affordable medicine, labour 
practices, integrating corporate social responsibility and governance themes into investment 
strategies, community relations issues, internet access, privacy and security, supply chain, diversity 
and non-discrimination, political influence and lobbying, recycling, enhancing social responsibility 
practices, and addressing social and environmental risks. 
A total of 25 corporate social responsibility issues are shown in Table 11. The number of times these 
incidents were discussed in the engagement report has been listed in the third column. The fourth 
column shows the percentage value of the corporate social responsibility incidents. An examination 
of the table below reveals four reoccurring core issues as the major focus of the corporate social 
responsibility issues addressed by F&C Investments. These issues account for an estimated 55% of 
F&C Investments‟ engagement activity in corporate social responsibility and include issues relating 
to: health and safety, violated human rights, biodiversity and labour practices. 
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Table 11: F&C Investments‟ Engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility Issues 
   
No. of Times 
Incidents 
Discussed  Percentage 
1 Health and safety 29 12.6 
2 Sustainability 11 4.8 
3 Climate change 14 6.1 
4 Human rights 27 11.7 
5 Managing security concerns  4 1.7 
6 Environmental management systems 2 0.8 
7 HIV/AIDS 17 7.4 
8 Environmental impact assessments 3 1.3 
9 Adoption of Equator Principle 1 0.4 
10 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 6 2.6 
11 CSR report 11 4.8 
12 Biodiversity 33 14.4 
13 Reduction of carbon emissions 12 5.2 
14 Community relation  2 0.8 
15 Affordable medicine 1 0.4 
16 Labour practices 37 16.1 
17 Integrate CSR and governance themes into 
investments strategies 2 0.8 
18 Community relation issues 1 0.4 
19 Internet access, security and privacy 2 0.8 
20 Supply chain 1 0.4 
21 Diversity and Non-Discrimination 1 0.4 
22 Political influence and lobbying 7 3 
23 Concerns regarding recycling 2 0.8 
24 Enhancing corporate social responsibility practices 2 0.8 
25 Social and environmental risk concerns 1 0.4 
  229 100 
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There is evidence to show that the broadening in scope is not only applicable to corporate 
governance, the broadening is scope also applies to corporate social responsibility issues. The 
findings of the research does reveal that there is an emergence of some new areas of interest in 
corporate social responsibility, some of the new interests include sustainability, integrating corporate 
social responsibility themes into investment strategies, biodiversity, corporate social responsibility 
reporting, environmental impact assessment, adoption of the equator principle, enhancing corporate 
social responsibility practices, extractive industry transparency initiatives as well as internet access, 
security and privacy. 
Sustainability, environmental impact assessment, environmental management systems, biodiversity, 
recycling, internet access, security and privacy are current issues in corporate social responsibility 
that are not given considerate attention in corporate social responsibility literature review. The 
increasing concern about sustainability, environment impact assessment and the developing of 
environmental management systems by F&C Investment reveals a crucial understanding of how 
environmental issues can negatively impact the performance of a firm (Clarke, 2007; Keinert, 
2008).It is also an acknowledgement by F&C investments that business organization activities are 
capable of causing significant harm to the environment. F&C investment in ensures that companies 
that they invest in, pay considerable attention to environmental impact assessments evaluation and 
the developing of environmental management systems. These are important measures taken by 
F&C Investments to ensure that the businesses they have vested interest in, pursue environmental 
friendly policies that are targeted at reducing the negative impact of business activities on the 
environment(Andriof& McIntosh, 2001).. 
 
The peculiar interest in Internet access, security and privacy is an entirely new shift from 
environmental, social and governance concerns to the increasing influence of technology on 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. It is the recognition of the fact that 
technology is becoming a tool and instrument that affects all facets of human life and endeavour. 
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This is more so in the field of business activity, the increased reliance on lap top, smart phones and 
other technological devises have immensely contributed to enhancing business activity and 
productivity. Business transactions and activities can easily be conducted across the globe with just 
a touch of the button, it has significantly transformed the way business is done and conducted. 
However, the increased uses of technology in business are not without its own costs and concerns. 
Consequently, the increased use of information communication technology in business is fraught 
with its own risks, hazards and security issues. Of particular importance is how the explosion of 
information as a result of significant advances in information communication technology has led to 
the following issues exposing children to inappropriate materials, disseminating of illegal material 
and content on the internet and also the increased susceptibility to security threats that the reliance 
on technology has produced. 
The next segment will begin by examining the most frequently occurring corporate social 
responsibility themes. This will provide the reader with a better understanding of the issues involved. 
Disaggregating the corporate social responsibility themes into sub-themes will also allow the reader 
a better perception of the issues addressed by F&C Investments. 
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6.3.1 Labour Standard Practices 
Labour standard practices can be regarded as administrative rulings and precedents which address 
the legal rights and restrictions of people and their organisations. As such, it mediates many aspects 
of the relationships between trade unions, employers and employees. F&C finds that there are 
several clearly dissatisfactory labour practices about which it continues to raise objections,  including 
the use of child labour, disclosure of labour standard practices, improving labour standard practices 
and implementation of labour standard codes. 70% of the issues that F&C Investments‟ engagement 
addressed in labour standard practices were related to the disclosure and improvement of labour 
standard practices. Sub-themes of improving labour standard practices include: underpayment of 
wages, poor supply chain practice, poor employment practice, poor factory working conditions,  
unfair terms of work and aggressive anti-union labour practices. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage Estimates of Labour Standard Practices Issues (2005 -2011) 
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6.3.2 Biodiversity 
Biodiversity is a term used to describe the variety of life on Earth. It refers to the various ecosystems 
and living organisms: animals, plants, their genes and habitats. Biodiversity is a measure of the 
health of ecosystems and in part a function of climate. In terrestrial habitats, tropical regions are 
typically rich in life whereas polar regions support fewer species. F&C Investments were found to be 
concerned about the following biodiversity corporate social responsibility issues: loss from 
deforestation, assessment of biodiversity risk, the integration of biodiversity considerations into 
environmental management, disclosure of key biodiversity performance indicators and disclosure of 
its biodiversity policy. Disclosure of its biodiversity policy and biodiversity performance measures, 
and integrating biodiversity concerns into environmental management account for more than 75% of 
F&C Investments‟ biodiversity engagement. 
 
Figure 9: Percentage Estimates of Biodiversity Issues (2005 -2011) 
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6.3.3 Health and Safety 
The term „health and safety‟ relates to an organisation‟s procedures for identifying workplace 
hazards and reducing accidents and exposure to harmful situations and substances. It also includes 
training of personnel in accident prevention, accident response, emergency preparedness and use 
of protective clothing and equipment. The health and safety issues which F&C Investments 
considered important include linking health and safety performance to executive pay, concerns 
about health and safety practice, developing health and safety performance measures, disclosure of 
health and safety records and poor management of, and developing guidelines for, health and safety. 
Concerns around health and safety practices can be considered the most prevalent engagement 
issue for F&C Investments accounting for an estimated 55% of its health and safety engagement. 
Concerns about health and safety practice can be further classified into the following themes: poor 
health and safety records of Royal Dutch Shell, enhancing the safety of mines in developing 
countries and concerns about health and safety in extractive industries. 
 
Figure 10: Percentage Estimate Health and Safety Issues (2005 -2011) 
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6.3.4 Human Rights 
Human rights are commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is 
inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being. Human rights are thus conceived as 
universal (applicable everywhere) and egalitarian (the same for everyone). These rights may exist as 
natural rights or as legal rights, in both national and (United Nation Charter on Human Rights, 1948). 
F&C Investments encourages companies operating in areas subject to weak rule of law, conflict or 
significant incidence of human rights abuses to manage the risks to their business by addressing the 
following issues: lack of non-discrimination policy on sexual orientation, poor legislative and 
regulatory human rights policy, allegations of the misuse of force, the human rights crisis in Darfur 
and human right risks. Human right risks and non-discrimination policy on sexual orientation account 
for more than 70% of F&C‟s engagement. Human right risks can further be categorised into the 
following: developing guidelines and standards for assessing human right risks, managing human 
rights and reputational risks and concerns regarding implementing standards and identifying human 
right risks in business operations. 
 
Figure 11: Percentage Estimates of Human Rights Issues (2005 -2011)
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Table 12: Longitudinal Analysis: F&C‟s Engagement in Corporate Governance  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 Executive remuneration 
Review of executive pay 
Independence of remuneration consultants 
Clawbacks 
Bonus payments 
Voting on executive pay 
Executive pay and performance 
Disclosure on executive pay 
 
3 
0 
0 
8 
2 
1 
0 
 
0 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
4 
1 
 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
5 
0 
 
3 
0 
2 
0 
1 
4 
2 
 
4 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
2 Bribery and Corruption 
Enhancing internal controls reporting systems 
Poor regulatory practices 
Whistle-blowing 
Corruption as an investment risk 
Allegation of corruption 
Concerns about UK government cordoning 
corruption practices 
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
 
 
1 
0 
6 
0 
1 
0 
 
 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
3 Restructuring of the Board and Board 
Performance 
Board Independence 
Re-election of directors 
Board declassification 
Reduction of Board size 
Separate the role of chairman and CEO 
Removal of director 
Link performance to CG and CSR 
Board acting without shareholder approval 
Board Transparency 
 
 
9 
3 
1 
3 
0 
2 
1 
0 
3 
 
 
 
0 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
3 
2 
0 
 
 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
 
 
3 
4 
0 
8 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
 
 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
0 
 
 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
2 
0 
4 Concerns regarding issuance of new capital    2   
5 Illegal transfer pricing    1   
6 Transparency in business operations  2  1   
7 Risk Management  2  1   
8 Voting  3 4     
9 Improvement in governance practices  1 1    
10 Encourage shareholders to vote   1  2 1 
11 Concerns regarding financial restatement of 
accounts 
  2    
12 Improve production practice   1    
13 Concerns regarding management and 
governance 
  1    
14 Shareholder approval  1   1  
15 Approval of anti-takeover  1     
16 Shareholder blocking  1   1  
17 Poison pill 3 1     
18 Shareholder repurchase scheme 2      
19 Preemptive rights       
20 Poor governance practice related issues    3 2 1 
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6.4 Longitudinal Analysis: F&C’s Engagement in Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (2005-2010) 
Table 12 above reveals F&C Investments‟ engagement in corporate governance over a six-year 
period. It provides a detailed picture of all corporate governance issues that F&C examined and the 
number of times F&C Investments engaged in a particular corporate governance issue. F&C 
Investments prioritised the following issues: Board independence, reduction of Board size, whistle-
blowing, executive pay and performance, bonus payments, voting on executive pay, re-election of 
directors, request for Board performance to be linked to corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility. Over the six-year period, other corporate governance issues in which F&C engaged 
include: concerns regarding the issuance of new capital, illegal transfer pricing, improving production 
practice, encouraging shareholders to vote, shareholder approval, concerns regarding financial 
statements and accounts and concerns regarding management and governance practice.  
Similarly, an examination of Table 13 below reveals F&C Investments‟ engagement in corporate 
social responsibility over a six-year period. The following corporate social responsibility issues were 
prioritised by F&C Investments: improve labour standard practices, CSR report, concerns about 
health and safety practice, reduction in carbon emissions, climate change, sustainability, political 
influence and lobbying, human right risks and disclosure of biodiversity. Over the six-year period, 
there were also corporate social responsibility issues that F&C engagement dealt with in once, such 
issues include: provide quantitative performance indicators for labour standard practices, biodiversity 
loss, disclosure of health and safety performance measures, poor legislative and regulatory human 
rights policy, environmental impact assessment, adoption of equator principle, HIV/AIDS, concerns 
regarding affordable medicine, community relations issues; internet access, security and privacy. 
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Table 13: F&C‟s Engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 Labour  Standard Practices 
Disclosure of labour standard practices 
Use of child labour 
Implementation of labour standard codes 
Improve labour standard practices 
Performance indicator for labour standard 
practices 
 
6 
1 
2 
3 
1 
 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
 
 
0 
2 
0 
5 
0 
 
 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
 
 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
 
2 Biodiversity 
Disclosure of biodiversity policy 
Biodiversity performance indicators 
Assessment of biodiversity risk 
Biodiversity loss 
Biodiversity management  
Integrate biodiversity concerns into environmental 
management 
 
4 
2 
1 
0 
2 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
1 
3 Health and Safety 
Develop guidelines for managing health and safety 
Concerns about health and safety practice 
Develop health and safety records 
Health and safety performance measures 
Poor management of health and safety 
Aligning health and safety to executive pay 
 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
 
1 
4 
0 
0 
2 
1 
 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
4 Human rights 
Human rights risks 
Non-discrimination policy on sexual orientation 
Allegations of the misuse of force 
Poor legislative and regulatory human rights policy 
Human rights crisis in Darfur 
 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
3 
1 
0 
2 
0 
 
1 
1 
0 
2 
3 
5 Managing security concerns  1  1   2 
6 Development of Environmental Management 
systems 
1  1    
7 Concerns regarding HIV Risks 2 1 2 1 12  
8 Undertaking Environmental Impact Assessments   1   2 
9 Adoption of Equator Principle   1    
10 Support Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 3  1 2   
11  CSR report 10  1    
12 Reduction of Carbon Emissions 2 4 2 2 2  
13 Managing community relation welfares 1  1    
14 Concerns regarding affordable medicine   1    
15 Integrate CSR and governance themes into 
investments strategies 
     2 
16 Community relation issues    1   
17 Internet Access, Security and Privacy    1  1 
18 Concerns regarding supply chain       
19 Diversity and Non Discrimination       
20 Political Influence and lobbying 2 5     
21 Concerns regarding recycling 2      
22 Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility 
practices 
 1    1 
23 Social and Environmental Risk Concerns 1      
24 Sustainability 0 1 2 8   
25 Concerns regarding climate change 2 2 3 4 3  
26 Ecological sensitivity 2      
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6.5 A Comparison of the Findings of F&C Investments’ Engagement in CG and CSR Issues 
and Findings of the CG and CSR Issues in the Literature Review 
A comparison of corporate governance issues from the literature review and from the findings of the 
corporate governance issues in F&C Investments reports reveals some significant differences. There 
are noteworthy changes in the governance issues being examined; a change in focus of corporate 
governance issues and also an emergence of new corporate governance issues that were 
previously largely ignored. The anti-takeover issue was considered to be a significant area of interest 
for institutional investors with issues such as elimination of poison pill, golden parachutes, prohibition 
of green-mails payments and repeal of classified Board (Gillan and Stark, 2000;Karpoff, 2001; 
Romano, 2001). While the anti-takeover issue did receive the attention of F&C Investments, it did 
not receive the same level of attention as the literature review. Bribery and corruption has been 
given little or no attention in the literature review, however it has emerged as a serious concern for 
F&C Investments, where issues such as whistle-blowing and strengthening internal control systems 
were given priority. Executive remuneration remains an area considered to have significant 
importance in the corporate governance literature review and F&C Investments reports; however 
there are some changes in the focus of remuneration (Conyon et al., 2000; Dong and Ozkhan, 2008).  
For example, F&C Investments reports concentrate on aligning executive pay to corporate social 
responsibility performance issues, independence of remuneration consultants and clawbacks. These 
particular issues have not been raised in the corporate governance literature review. The same 
applies to strengthening of the board which is considered an important element of corporate 
governance practice (Mallin, 2006; Solomon, 2010). While the strengthening of the Board issue is 
considered an important area of interest both in the corporate governance literature and the F&C 
Investments report, the focus of F&C Investments has shifted, with issues such as board 
transparency, opposition of Board acting without shareholder approval and request for board to link 
performance to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility criteria issues seemingly 
less important in the corporate governance literature currently. 
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In a similar vein, the comparison between corporate social responsibility issues in the literature 
review and the findings of the corporate responsibility issues in the F&C Investments reports reveals 
some significant differences. The focus of investigated corporate social responsibility issues seems 
to be changing; the literature review on corporate social responsibility appeared to focus on the 
military, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, diversity and non-discrimination (Grave et al., 2001; Monks et al., 
2004). There are significant changes in the corporate social responsibility issues being examined, a 
change in focus of corporate social responsibility issues and also an emergence of new corporate 
social responsibility issues that were previously largely ignored or perhaps non-existent.  
Environmental issues remain relevant in the corporate social responsibility literature review (Tkac, 
2006) however new environmental concerns have emerged such as the development of 
environmental management systems, environmental risk assessments, ecological sensitivity and 
sustainability concerns, which were not discussed in the corporate social responsibility literature. 
Labour standard practices is another issue given considerable attention in the corporate social 
responsibility literature (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Some labour standard practice issues 
such as child labour and improving labour standard practices are still of concern to F&C 
Investments(Grave et al.,2001) however other issues in the corporate social responsibility literature 
such as the third world debt crisis/cancellation policy and implementing the MacBride Principles do 
not appear to be an area of concern in the F&C Investments reports.  
In the F&C Investments reports, the military, alcohol, tobacco and firearms are not issues that have 
received significant attention whilst biodiversity, human rights and health and safety concerns have 
been given priority.  New, important corporate social responsibility issues have emerged such as  
recycling, integrating corporate social responsibility and corporate governance themes into 
investment strategies, adopting the equator principle and the extractive industry transparency 
initiative, the internet, security and privacy. These issues are not present in the corporate social 
responsibility literature.  
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In summary, F&C‟s engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is 
beginning to embrace broader corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues and 
in some instances performance in corporate governance is benchmarked against specific corporate 
social responsibility criteria, for example the integrating of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility themes into investment strategies. This is consistent with the findings of Hendry 
et al.(2007) and Hebb et al.(2012). 
 
6.6 Integration of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Issues into 
Institutional Investors’ Engagement Strategy 
Neither agency theory nor stakeholder theory completely explains the motives for institutional 
investors‟ involvement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. Both theories 
however offer a degree of rational explanation (Solomon, 2010). Agency theory explains the 
economic incentive for involvement in corporate governance issues such as to enhance earnings 
and profitability, to address poor company performance and to mitigate situations that allow 
managers of corporations to pursue their personal interests rather than those of shareholders 
(Jecken and Meckling, 1976; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). Agency 
theory has remained dominant for more than five decades as the reason for investors‟ involvement 
in corporate governance, but in reality it is evident that institutional investors are not only incentivised 
by economics(Hendry et al., 2007). 
There is more to institutional investors‟ engagement than is explicated by agency theory. Agency 
theory emphasises the importance of institutional investors‟ engagement addressing financial 
performance-related issues, but it clearly fails to take into consideration addressing the 
environmental and social issues that arise as a result of business corporations‟ activities (Solomon, 
2010). Stakeholder theory tends to embrace a broader theoretical exposition recognising that 
business has a responsibility to address environmental and social issues that may threaten the 
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continuity of their business (Hills and Jones, 1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jonker and Foster, 
2002). The notion that to neglect environmental, social and corporate social responsibility issues 
incurs financial consequences for modern day corporations is not just a theoretical proposition 
(Keinert, 2008). Research on the involvement of institutional investors in corporate social 
responsibility evidences that the neglect of social, environmental and corporate social responsibility 
issues can have a negative impact on the financial performance of a corporation (Armour et al., 2003; 
Solomon et al., 2004). 
The findings of this research reveal that F&C are integrating environmental, social and governance 
issues when making institutional investor engagement decisions. This is consistent with the literature 
review on institutional investors‟ engagement practices in the UK (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; 
Gifford, 2012). According to Solomon (2010), the recent evolution of terminology from SEE (social, 
ethical and environmental) to ESG (environmental, social and governance) factors shows that social 
and environmental issues are being integrated into the core of corporate governance concerns for 
the institutional investment community. This represents a slight change in attitude of business and 
financial institutions towards social responsibility, endorsing a broader remit for governance than the 
encapsulated agency theory.  
The integration of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility indicates that the ways 
in which institutional investors‟ engagement is being practised are evolving (Solomon, 2010). 
Institutional investors‟ engagement with corporations may need to embrace this new reality to allow 
them to adapt their engagement strategies. The literature review on institutional investors‟ 
engagement practices has examined institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility as independent and isolated activities. Corporate governance 
engagement was seen as distinctive and separate from corporate social responsibility engagement; 
they were not considered to be connected. Thus, investors‟ engagement has treated corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices as isolated elements. The findings of this 
research also reveal that investors are equally concerned about corporate social responsibility and 
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corporate governance issues. Institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate governance issues 
such as executive remuneration, restructuring of the Board and independence of directors is equally 
important as institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate social responsibility issues such as 
biodiversity, health and safety, climate change and biodiversity. 
 
6.7 Analysis of Strategies Used in Engagement Practices 
An examination of 26 F&C engagement and responsible investment reports over a six-year period 
reveals that F&C Investments have advanced their methods and strategies of institutional investors‟ 
engagement beyond those methods in isolation. F&C Investments have developed a way of dealing 
with situations where dialogue fails to influence corporate behaviour and practice. For F&C it is very 
difficult to capture the general trend in engagement in terms of percentage since F&C presents its 
data quarterly and engagement occurs over several quarters. However it is possible to observe how 
engagement strategy has unfolded over various quarters and what strategies have been effective in 
influencing changes in corporate behaviour, practices and policies. Due to the longitudinal 
examination of F&C‟s engagement it is also possible to identify what measures F&C takes to 
influence corporate behaviour and practices.  
 
Dialogue is an essential tool employed by F&C in engaging with investee companies. Dialogue is not 
undertaken lightly and is used in a variety of ways; letters and e-mails, telephone conversations and 
one-to-one meetings with executive members of the companies. There is no indication of a fixed 
amount of time over which dialogue can occur; the findings in F&C engagement reports demonstrate 
that dialogue on particular issues can continue for a considerable length of time, possibly a few 
months, or a period of years, depending on the issue in question. F&C also seeks to influence, 
encourage and support companies in their efforts to adopt „best practice‟ across a range of 
mainstream environmental, social and governance issues. This is achieved by engaging in sustained, 
constructive, two-way communication with companies to understand and discuss how they can 
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better reduce their risks and manage any negative impacts on the environment and society. The 
opportunities that exist as the economy adapts to challenges such as climate change are also 
discussed. F&C seeks to develop dialogue with companies in order to better understand and 
encourage improvements to individual market circumstances and company practices.  
 
The findings of this research reveal that institutional investors such as F&C Investments do not 
resign themselves when dialogue fails to achieve a desired outcome; they usually pursue an 
alternative course of action. F&C also co-operates, where appropriate, with like-minded investors or 
other stakeholders in order to emphasise shared concerns. As a general rule, F&C will avoid public 
comment on the details of its engagement with companies in order to enable in-depth, constructive 
discussions in a climate of trust and confidentiality. However, where discussions on an issue of 
major significance have not been satisfactory, F&C has filed a shareholder resolution/proposal. 
There are 30 significant cases that show the use of multiple methods in engagement by F&C in its 
engagement reports. Table 14 below shows five main issues in which dialogue failed to resolve an 
issue and shareholder proposals by F&C resulted in change in corporate behaviour. Executive 
remunerations and restructuring of the Board accounted for more than 60% of these issues. The 
researcher will discuss seven specific instances in detail. 
 
Table 14: Use of Shareholder Resolutions When Dialogue Fails  
  Number of 
Incidents 
Percentage 
1 Executive Remuneration 9 30 
2 Restructure of Board and Board Performance 11 36.7 
3 Voting 4 13.3 
4 Labour Standard Practices 4 13.3 
5 Sustainability 2 6.7 
  30 100 
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6.7.1 Engagement 1: Labour-Related Concerns and Abercrombie & Fitch 
F&C views shareholder proposals as a potentially useful tool for escalating pressure when all 
attempts at dialogue have failed. Disappointingly, in 2010, proposals were often too issue-specific; 
overly prescriptive or poorly aligned with investors‟ interests.  As in the past when dialogue proved 
fruitless, F&C resorted to filing a shareholder resolution – in the case of the US teen clothier 
Abercrombie & Fitch, following four years of efforts to persuade the company to address serious 
labour-related concerns. This included the company‟s failure to take an ethical stance on the 
sourcing of Uzbek cotton, despite evidence of the systematic use of children in the annual cotton 
harvest, and its reluctance to publish its code of conduct and the results of its factory inspections. A 
remarkable 53% of investors supported the first-time resolution. The resolution on F&C intensive 
engagement in 2009 and 2010 proved effective in resolving the impasse: in autumn 2010, F&C met 
with company managers responsible for human rights to discuss the implication of this extraordinary 
demonstration of investors‟ concern. Subsequently, Abercrombie & Fitch has published its supplier 
code of conduct, begun to disclose limited information on its audit procedures and adopted a policy 
of banning suppliers from sourcing cotton from Uzbekistan until the use of forced and child labour 
has been addressed. 
 
6.7.2 Engagement 2:  Excessive Executive Remuneration Payouts in US Companies 
In 2005 F&C issued letters to several US companies in their portfolio regarding excessive payments 
to executives despite their poor performance. When dialogue and discussion surrounding executive 
pay failed to produce any meaningful results, F&C began voting against members of the 
compensation committee of companies such as Gillette, Home Depot and Wells Fargo. In 2007, 
F&C continued to oppose committee chairmen and members where pay was disproportionate to 
performance.  
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However, they began to realise that voting against compensation committees was proving 
inadequate in addressing pay issues. In the same year, F&C remained concerned about large 
payouts on performance metrics that proved inaccurate when companies restated their financials. 
F&C devised a new strategy for tracking excessive executive payouts and now request that 
companies sign executive contracts that allow performance-based equity and cash rewards to be 
clawed back, not only from executives whose errors directly lead to restatements, but potentially 
from senior leadership as a whole, should the Board deem it appropriate. The purpose of the 
clawback policy is to address instances where executive pay is not commensurate with performance. 
In such instances, if deemed necessary by the Board, clawback allows for a refund of excess 
remuneration paid to executives. In 2007, following two years of communicating the pay practices its 
US holdings were to adopt, F&C filed shareholder resolutions, including proposals asking companies 
to give shareholders a vote on compensation committee reports. As a result of the shareholder 
resolutions, Ingersoll Rand, Motorola and Verison have made the necessary revisions that allow 
shareholders to make meaningful contributions in establishing executive remuneration. 
 
6.7.3 Engagement 3: Transparent Reporting on Environmental and Health and Safety 
Management Systems 
Despite F&C‟s best efforts to engage companies in constructive dialogue, some resist calls for 
transparent reporting of environmental and health and safety management systems. Such was the 
case with national US drug store chain CVS. After two years of blocked dialogue and repeated 
fruitless attempts to ascertain how CVS managed sustainability, F&C filed a shareholder proposal, 
formally requesting a sustainable report. The threat of inviting the entire shareholder base to opine 
on the issue appears to have induced CVS to make a commitment to producing sustainability reports, 
subsequently undertaken by the company. 
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6.7.4 Engagement 4: Labour Violations and Lack of Effective Internal Controls 
F&C prefers to engage in long-term dialogue with companies in order to encourage change and 
protect shareholder value. However, gentle diplomacy can prove inadequate, at which point it is 
necessary to call on fellow shareholders to add their weight to debate via shareholder resolution. For 
example, in the 2008 annual general meeting season, F&C opted to escalate its concerns with Wal-
Mart. F&C was the lead filer of a proposal aimed at Wal-Mart following reports of consistent 
violations of a wide range of labour practices which raised concerns over the effectiveness of 
internal controls. Eventually the company agreed to meet with a number of stakeholders – including 
F&C, its co-filers and other investors – to provide information and a forum for stakeholders to 
develop a deeper understanding of how the company implements its domestic labour policies as a 
large, fast-moving corporation.  
 
6.7.5 Engagement 5: Voting Caps 
With a deep-rooted tradition of unequal voting structures, France - like several other European 
countries - is far from adopting the principle of „one share one vote.‟ Shareholders in French 
companies face particularly large obstacles to establishing meaningful dialogue as companies are 
shielded from shareholder discontent at the ballot box. Most pernicious is the use of voting ceilings 
or voting caps. For example, larger shareholders cannot effectively vote on their holdings if they 
exceed a certain percentage of the company. F&C has been engaging with French companies on 
this issue for over five years, but most have strongly resisted. Following long-standing but almost 
entirely fruitless attempts at dialogue, F&C joined French governance specialist Pro-Invest active 
investors in an unprecedented campaign to put voting caps to a shareholder vote. This resulted in 
the decision to abolish voting caps in two companies: Vivendi and Lafarge, a milestone in French 
corporate governance which will increase pressure on other companies to end the practice. 
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6.7.6 Engagement 6: Sustainability Reporting 
Shareholder resolutions and proposals are not necessarily F&C‟s primary methods of engagement. 
Dialogue with companies is usually the preferred method, but when a concerted attempt at dialogue 
fails, F&C files a shareholder resolution. For example in its 2006 engagement report, it clearly states 
that F&C prefers to build rapport with companies through discreet, long-term dialogue, but that when 
the limits of diplomacy are reached, the next step is to file shareholder proposals. F&C recently took 
its case for change to shareholders, filing resolutions at Illinois Tool Works. As an industrial 
manufacturing company, Illinois Tool Works‟ health and safety and environmental impacts need to 
be managed carefully, yet the company was conspicuous for its poor transparency around these 
issues. After two years of unsuccessful dialogue, F&C filed a first-time shareholder proposal 
requesting the company to publish an annual sustainability report. This prompted the company to 
resume dialogue and commit to improvements. 
 
6.7.7 Engagement 7: HIV/AIDS Beyond Africa  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is one that has continued to cause F&C and other institutional investors 
much concern. HIV/AIDS is already being acknowledged as potentially one of the 21
st
 century‟s 
greatest humanitarian crises. Its economic impact has yet to be fully understood, and only hindsight 
will reveal whether it joins the ranks of major economic shocks. In a unique collaboration between 
one of the UK‟s largest fund managers and a sell-side investment house, UBS‟s Customized 
Research Team worked with F&C to produce the report: HIV/AIDS Beyond Africa: Managing the 
Financial Impacts. F&C and UBS focus on the ways in which HIV/AIDS could affect financial 
performance and what companies can do to manage the effects of the disease.  
 
F&C distributed the HIV/AIDS Beyond Africa report, sending copies to 50 emerging market 
companies in Brazil, Russia, India and China. During the same year, F&C engaged with the 
following companies on their management of HIV/AIDS-related issues: Anglo-American, Barclays, 
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BHP Billiton, BP, Chevron-Texaco, Coca-cola, Colgate, Palmolive, Compass Group, CVRD, Imperial 
Tobacco, Lonim, Newmont Mining, Xstrata, and Standard Chartered. 
One year later, the  following changes had been made: 
1. BHP Billiton and Xstrata had launched a voluntary council and testing programmes. 
2. Anglo-American and Lonim had begun to offer anti-retroviral treatment to workers. 
3. Exxon-Mobil, HSBC, Colgate and Palmolive introduced a policy to communicate clearly its 
non-discriminatory policies regarding HIV status in order to de-stigmatise the disease. 
4. Johnson and Johnson, Barclay, Absa, BP and Standard Chartered now report to 
shareholders and stakeholders how HIV/AIDS is being managed. 
 
6.8 Use of Multiple Methods in Institutional Investors’ Engagement  
The significance of agency theory in engagement is easily observable: the most important 
perspective it reveals is the tension that generally exists between the principal and the agent (Kim 
and Mahoney, 2005; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). This tension exists in modern day 
corporations. Institutional investors use various engagement methods and strategies to steer or align 
the values of the principal and the agent (Smith, 1996; Gillian and Stark, 1998) including incentives, 
monitoring and threat of exit (Mclaren, 2004). Incentives are gentle measures such as offering 
attractive bonuses and allowances to encourage agents to be more responsive to the needs of the 
principal (Filatocheve et al 2011). Monitoring the agent through the use of non-executive directors 
can be expensive and at times inefficient – a simple explanation for this is that it is largely due to the 
asymmetries of information that exist between these two parties (Mallin, 2006): one party has more 
information – more power and more control – while the other has less. 
Using threat of exit may lead to investors selling their ownership rights, but it is mostly used as a last 
resort (Mclaren, 2004). Although exit from a firm may ensure that investors‟ dignity and monies are 
intact does it actually solve the issues and predicaments faced by the firm – for example 
incompetent Board members or poor financial performance – issues which tend to remain despite 
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exiting (Solomon, 2010). On the other hand, exiting may send misleading signals which, in the long 
run, may reduce the market value of the company, thereby worsening the situation (Gillan and Stark, 
2007). Exiting may not be an option for fund managers and institutional investors who have large 
amounts of company shares and stockholding (Monks et al., 2004) as it would result in substantial 
loss in value in their shares and stockholding (Mallin, 2006). The last remaining option is proactive 
engagement; addressing the issues at hand, ensuring that ailments are rectified, creating the way for 
the firm to return to a productive form and ensuring that long-term shareholder value is created 
(Southwood, 2003). 
The literature review emphasises that institutional investors use various strategies and methods to 
influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies (Logsdon and Van Buren 2009). Dialogue with 
investee companies may take the form of one-to-one meetings, discreet negotiation and 
communication to management in writing(Collier, 2004). Other methods include the use of 
shareholder resolution, voting, buying and selling of shares, use of public campaigns and media 
pressure (Gifford, 2010; Hebb et al., 2012). Dialogue, gentle negotiation and rational discourse is 
considered the preferred method and strategy of institutional investors‟ engagement (Sparkes and 
Cowton, 2004; Solomon, 2010). While there are advantages and disadvantages to the use of 
dialogue, there is evidence to suggest that results are difficult to quantify and that, at times, dialogue 
fails to influence corporate behaviour (Hebb et al., 2012).  
When failure to influence corporate behaviour occurs, what action do institutional investors take? 
What is the alternative course of action? In the case of F&C, a shareholder resolution/proposal is 
filed with the intention of raising public awareness of an issue, inviting other investors and 
stakeholders to add leverage by voting either in support of the proposal or 
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Figure 15: Use of Multiple Methods in Engagement by F&C Engagement  
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against it. The case studies above show that F&C initially engages with the companies in question 
on an issue, with dialogue occurring over a substantial period of time. There are indications that 
dialogue can last a number of years before a shareholder proposal is filed. When a shareholder 
resolution is filed there are three possible outcomes: failure to achieve a majority vote and the issue 
in question is dropped by F&C and other shareholders; the shareholder proposal succeeds with an 
overwhelming majority and subsequently a change in corporate behaviour and practice is initiated;  
the shareholder proposal does not receive a majority of votes but receives enough to allow for the 
shareholder proposal to be submitted again the following year. When a shareholder proposal is re-
submitted the following year, there are two possible outcomes: the issue fails to receive majority 
support and is dropped or; it succeeds in receiving majority support and the process of change in 
corporate behaviour is initiated. In the diagram above, F&C filed a total of 39 shareholder resolutions 
when dialogue failed to yield the desired outcome. A total of 30 shareholder proposals succeeded in 
changing corporate behaviour and practice, five shareholder proposals failed and consequently the 
issues were dropped. Four other shareholder proposals failed to garner a majority vote, the four 
were resubmitted the following year, two of the shareholder proposals failed and the other two 
shareholder proposals succeeded in garnering majority vote. 
 
There are particular instances when collaboration with other investors may be the most effective 
form of engagement (Becht et al., 2007). Collaborative engagement may be most appropriate at 
times of significant corporate or wider economic stress, or when the risks posed threaten the viability 
of an industry instead of a particular company. Institutional investors should disclose their policy on 
collective engagement (McLaren, 2004). When participating in collective engagement, institutional 
investors should pay due regard to their policies on conflicts of interest and insider information. 
F&C‟s engagement tends to focus on one-to-one engagement with companies, but at times it 
suggests that it is more effective for many investors to collaborate; pooling resources and co-
ordinating their approach. For this reason, F&C actively participates in many collaborative investor 
networks world-wide. 
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Certain issues such as escalating executive pay, climate change and biodiversity cannot be 
addressed by engaging a single corporate entity (Hebb et al., 2012). For engagement on issues 
such as climate change and biodiversity to be effective, many more corporations and firms must be 
involved at industry level for any meaningful result to be attained. The process of collaborative 
engagement involves presenting the financial implications in terms of social, environmental and 
reputational risks. Institutional investors such as F&C begin by researching a particular issue 
extensively and ultimately produce a report which highlights the threats that a particular industry may 
face if the issue is not addressed. These extensively researched reports are distributed to the 
companies affected, whilst simultaneously F&C and other investors hold meetings and discussions 
with the companies in question. This collaborative engagement and use of extensive research 
provides the financial implications of failing to respond to concerns.  
 
F&C also collaborate where possible with investee companies to drive improvements in policy and 
practice through working groups and joint initiatives on a wide range of ESG issues. Particular 
issues such as climate change, environmental pollution, global warming, HIV/AIDS, biodiversity and 
corruption cannot be handled effectively by engaging with specific firms; a collective approach must 
be pursued if any meaningful progress is to be achieved. It is important to identify that F&C‟s 
approach to collaborative engagement differs significantly from its company-specific approach. In its 
collaborative approach, a report on HIV/AIDS was produced revealing the implications of ignoring 
the epidemic. F&C makes a case for addressing HIV/AIDS by suggesting that the disease could lead 
to reduced productivity of the workforce and an increase in worker turnover and absenteeism which 
in turn can greatly affect a company‟s earnings and profitability. In addition, F&C also recommends 
specific actions companies can take to address issues. For example, in the case of HIV/AIDS, F&C 
and UBS recommend their investee companies should implement a voluntary counselling and 
testing policy. In reality, this represents a risk assessment that enables companies to ascertain the 
percentage of their workforce that has been infected by the disease. Programmes also exist that are 
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targeted at education, awareness, prevention, wellness and treatment to manage the disease and 
mitigate its impacts. 
A cursory examination of F&C engagement over a six-year period reveals that its strategic approach 
to engagement is targeted at creating long-term value. The intention of F&C engagement is to 
ensure that companies focus on tackling issues that can, in the long-term, create significant 
shareholder and stakeholder value. In five instances where dialogue failed, shareholder proposals 
were filed by F&C. There is evidence to suggest that F&C engaged in dialogue with some of the 
companies for a considerable length of time and when dialogue broke down used another method of 
engagement (shareholder resolutions) in applying pressure to influence corporate behaviour and 
practices. When F&C realised the first method of engagement was not yielding results, it changed 
strategy. 
The long-term perspective can also be perceived in F&C‟s approach to tackling complex issues such 
as biodiversity, climate change, labour standard practices and HIV/AIDS. Addressing theHIV/AIDS 
epidemic will not achieve any significant results in the short-term. A long-term approach must be 
taken to address the issue over a significant period of time. The initial step taken by F&C was to 
ensure that companies understood the business costs of HIV/AIDS and to a large extent this has 
been very useful in creating an awareness of the financial damage companies will suffer if they 
choose not to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. F&C‟s recommendations also provide useful long-
term measures to tackle the disease such as education and creating an awareness aimed at 
promoting safe sex and also non-discriminatory policies targeted at ensuring those who are infected 
with the virus are treated fairly in the workplace. Addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic and mitigating 
its impacts is not a project that would yield significant returns to companies in the short-term, 
however there is no doubt that a healthy, vibrant workforce in any organisation is more productive 
than an unhealthy one.  
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From the investigation of the various case studies of engagement by F&C in corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility, four types of engagement can be derived as shown in Table 15: 
use of dialogue, shareholder proposals, collaborative engagement and F&C engagement with 
regulators. 
1.) Dialogue and negotiations sometimes fail to change corporate behaviour and practices and 
the use of shareholder resolutions applied by F&C has initiated a change in corporate 
behaviour and practice. 
2.) Individual investors‟ engagement on complex issues such as climate change, biodiversity 
and excessive executive remuneration may not incur any meaningful change in corporate 
behaviour; a collective or collaborative approach is necessary if any meaningful change in 
corporate behaviour is to be achieved. 
3.) In a few instances the use of dialogue, shareholder proposals and a collective approach may 
fail to influence change in corporate behaviour and practices. In some of those instances, 
F&C has turned to regulators such as the European Commission and the Hong Kong 
exchange. 
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Table 15: A Typology of Investors‟ Engagement with Examples from F&C Investments 
 Type of 
engagement 
Details Potential outcomes When one method fails 
1 Dialogue Dialogue is the use of meetings, discussions and letters to 
influence corporate behaviour. 
 
In 2010, F&C held one on one discussions with major 
technology companies including Apple, Advanced Micro 
Devices, Microsoft, Motorola and Sony to encourage 
responsible sourcing, compliance with emerging legal 
standards and support for sustaining mining in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Thus far, companies have 
developed policies to avoid 
sourcing conflict minerals from 
DRC, implementation still remains 
a challenge. 
However, there are some 
instances when dialogue fails 
to influence change in 
corporate behaviour, F&C 
tends to make use of 
shareholder proposals. 
2 Shareholder 
proposal 
A shareholder proposal is a document recommendation 
that a shareholder formally submits to a publicly traded 
company advocating the company take a specific course 
of action. 
 
F&C has engaged on the environmental and social risks 
associated with oil sands extraction since 2007, but filing 
a shareholder resolution at Shell saw an intensification in 
its activities.  
The company improved on the 
information it had already provided 
by publishing a standalone report 
and offering meetings with the 
heads of its Canadian oil sands 
operations.  
Shareholder proposals are 
filed, and in some instances 
result in changing corporate 
behaviour. 
3 Collaborative 
approach 
A collective approach involves teaming up with more than 
one investor to address a particular issue. 
 
Leading a UN PRI Clearing House on anti-corruption, 
F&C brought together 20 investors to write to selected 
global companies to urge better practice policies and 
disclosure on corruption and business ethics.  
The project, continuing into 2011 
was coordinated with Transparency 
International and has already 
resulted in numerous positive 
responses. 
At times the use of dialogue 
and shareholder proposals 
may fail, F&C may decide to 
make use of a collaborative 
approach. 
4 F&C engages with 
regulators 
In addition to one-on-one dialogue, F&C also joins policy 
and regulatory debates, in recognition of the fact that 
individual companies cannot afford to overreach on 
sustainability at the expense of competitiveness.  
In 2010, F&C contributed to the 
UK‟s stewardship code, aimed at 
setting standards for investors‟ 
responsibility, numerous policy 
initiatives on building a low-carbon 
future and regulators around the 
world including the SEC, the 
European Commission and the 
Hong Kong Exchange. 
There are instances when 
dialogue, shareholder 
proposals and a collective 
approach to engagement do 
not influence change in 
corporate behaviour. F&C then 
turns to regulators. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining the corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues addressed by F&C Investments‟ engagement that have been extensively discussed in the 
literature review in chapter two. The findings of this research reveal that there are core corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues that F&C Investments‟ engagement is 
targeted at in order to influence corporate practices and policies. Some of the most pressing 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues include: executive remuneration, 
bribery and corruption, restructuring of the Board, biodiversity, labour standards, climate change and 
health and safety. Executive remuneration, restructuring of the Board, labour standards, climate 
change and health and safety are corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues 
similar to those existing in the literature upon which institutional investors have spent time and 
resources in order to influence practices and policies. Bribery and corruption and biodiversity appear 
to be emerging issues that F&C Investments‟ engagement intends to influence in terms of corporate 
behaviour and practice. Existing literature on institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility has paid little attention to risk management, bribery 
and corruption, biodiversity, sustainability, environmental management system and internet access, 
security and privacy issues. Particular corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues such as bribery and corruption, climate change and biodiversity cannot be resolved by a 
single institutional investor alone, for any meaningful result to be achieved it is necessary for 
institutional investors to combine resources and knowledge in order to influence behaviour, practice 
and policies. 
Agency theory postulates that because of the existence of an agency relationship in corporations, 
the incentive for managers to act in their own interest rather than the shareholders interest, there is a 
need for a monitoring role by shareholders who can encourage goal alignment (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Attitude to risk is just one of the areas in which agents and 
principals have divergent views. Consequently, without shareholders monitoring, managers may with 
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the intention of increasing their performance based earnings and remunerations are likely to throw 
caution to the wind and take on excessively risky projects.  
Consequently, there is the tendency of managers accruing significant losses as a result of risky 
investment decisions they made. Such losses are capable of leading to the collapse of firms and 
business organizations as a result of excessive risk taking and poor risk management practices. The 
collapse of firms because of poor risk management practices also affects shareholders as well as 
the wider community as a result of job losses and loss of production of goods and services.  
Kim, Nosfinger and Morh (2010: p.162) state that, “In large part, the recent financial crisis was 
triggered by poor corporate governance practices. The firms that required bailouts took excessively 
risky positions that relied on the continuing boom in the U.S real estate industry. From the 
shareholders perspective, a well-run firm would not be in danger of bankruptcy if one sector of the 
economy collapses. Falling real estate prices would cause some losses but would not put a firm that 
survived the Great Depression out of business. The reason these failures occurred was that many 
companies were not well governed. Executives loaded up on risk from one sector of the economy 
seeking extra profit with little concern for additional risk.” 
The increasing importance of integrating risk management strategies in corporate governance 
cannot be overemphasized (Solomon, 2010), while there are well defined and articulate risk 
management codes in the Turnbull report, and other corporate governance codes, the realities, as 
evidenced by the global financial crisis in 2008, is that risk management is not properly integrated 
into investment decisions making and strategies. Therefore, it is of significant importance that 
institutional investors ensure that managers update their risk management system and risk 
management practices in corporate governance. It does appear that while significant attention has 
been made in safeguarding against corporate social responsibility risks such as health and safety, 
climate change and biodiversity and developing environmental management systems. The same 
cannot be said with regards to risks that emerge from corporate governance practices. Risk 
management in corporate governance, it appears, has not been given significant attention. Another 
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emerging issue in corporate governance is the ethical aspect of corporate governance. The issue of 
bribery and corruption, and the need for increased transparency and disclosure in corporate 
governance practices is beginning to gain ground and is receiving a lot of attention. Institutional 
investors such as F&C investment are beginning to take an active stand to ensure that companies 
that they have vested interest in, are strengthening their whistle-blowing mechanisms and are also 
strengthening internal mechanisms targeted at addressing ethical issues.  
In the existing literature as can be seen in chapter two, research on institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility appears to make use of 
agency theory or stakeholder theory. Agency theory explains the economic and financial motivation 
for institutional investors‟ engagement; however it falls short in explaining the reasons for institutional 
investors‟ involvement in corporate social responsibility. F&C Investments is engaging not only in 
corporate governance issues but also in corporate social responsibility issues. This has implications 
for theory; in practice F&C Investments‟ engagement is not based solely on agency theory 
postulations, it also embraces key elements of stakeholder theory which emphasise that investors 
should also take into consideration social, environmental and ethical issues. Although agency theory 
and stakeholder theory have very different philosophical stances, it appears that both may share the 
long-term objective of maximising value for shareholders and stakeholders 
Also, the findings of this research reveal that institutional investors are applying multiple methods in 
the way they practice engagement. The various methods and strategies institutional investors use to 
influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies have been well extensively discussed in 
chapter three. Agency theory posits that institutional investors willing to influence corporate 
behaviour, practices and policies can choose to use any of the following methods: raising their 
concerns with management via writing letters, attending meetings and participating in negotiations 
with the management Board; shareholder resolutions and shareholder voting; public campaigns and 
media pressure; takeover mechanisms; threat of divestment and collaborative engagement.  
The Use of Multiple Methods of Engagement: A Case Study of F&C Investments 
 
159 | P a g e  
 
In the extant literature on institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility, the norm is for institutional investors to apply one method of engagement to 
influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. However, the literature does not explain what 
action institutional investors take when a particular method of engagement fails to produce the 
desired results. Dialogue has been used extensively by investors in influencing corporate behaviour 
and has achieved some significant success, however dialogue is not always effective. The analysis 
of F&C Investments‟ engagement practices finds that there are instances when one method of 
engagement fails to change corporate behaviour and practices. F&C Investments has discovered 
that at times it is necessary to change engagement methods. The introduction of a different method 
of engagement can significantly influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. When one 
method proves to be ineffective, institutional investors should not resign themselves, they should 
change their approach.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Research Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
At the core of institutional investors‟ engagement is the need for investors to influence corporate 
behaviour, practices and policies in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. The 
research in the extant literature thus far has examined institutional investors‟ involvement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as separate and isolated issues. This 
research has shown that institutional investors are beginning to engage in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility in an inclusive manner. Institutional investors‟ engagement in 
corporate governance is important, as is institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate social 
responsibility.  This research also finds that institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility is applying multiple methods to in their engagement 
practise; institutional investors are using more than one method of engagement to influence 
corporate behaviour, particularly in situations where an initial method fails to yield desired results, 
another method is applied. This chapter begins by providing a summary of the chapters of this 
research. The next section examines the questions that were posed at the beginning of this research 
and provides a summary of the findings. The findings, hence contributions, to knowledge and 
practice are explained. The limitations of this research are explicated and the direction for future 
research is examined. 
 
7.2 A Summary of the Research 
Chapter 2 began with a discussion of the agency theory framework that explains the tensions 
between agents and principals, the underlying reason for institutional investors‟ engagement and the 
need to reduce agency costs. Agency theory explicates that institutional investors‟ engagement is 
necessary to align the needs of investors and company managers. The agency theoretical position 
posits that institutional investors‟ engagement should be focused exclusively on corporate 
governance issues and issues that directly impact the financial bottom line, social and environmental 
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issues are not taken into consideration. This is evidenced in earlier papers on shareholder activism 
that deal exclusively with governance issues such as executive pay, independence of Board 
members, structure of Board, improving poor performance and mergers and acquisitions. 
Institutional investors were not concerned about social and environmental issues.  
Agency theory fails to provide a coherent explanation for institutional investors‟ involvement in social 
and environmental issues. It does not explain why investors are integrating corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility issues in engagement. Stakeholder theory offers a theoretical 
explanation of why institutional investors should be concerned about social and environmental 
issues. Resurgence of institutional investors‟ engagement in the UK resulted largely from corporate 
governance failures such as the collapse of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley and the bailout of 
banks such as Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB. Stakeholder theory argues that, 
institutional investors‟ engagement influences corporate behaviour, practices and policies in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the various approaches to institutional investors‟ engagement, explaining the 
macro and micro approaches. The most suitable strategy used by various firms in achieving 
significant results in engagement practices has been the use of dialogue; virtually all cases of 
engagement practices studied revealed that communication and trust had been vital in the 
achievement of positive outcomes in engagement practices, although there are indications that 
collaborative engagement has the potential to achieve more (McLaren, 2004; Collier, 2004; Sparkes 
and Cowton, 2004; Solomon, 2010).  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the research philosophy and methodological approach used in the research 
and begins by explaining the epistemological stance and lenses adopted to examine the use of 
multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement. The choice of a positivist philosophy is 
discussed and the researcher‟s ontological position explained. The selection of case study 
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methodology, research design, research sample and analysis of the research data is explained. At a 
strategic level the research methodology and process could be explained in broad terms to take into 
consideration the general philosophical approach adopted by the researcher. 
 
Chapter 5 takes a detailed look at F&C Investments. It begins with a brief discussion of the history of 
F&C, the organisation structure and the size of its assets and investment holding. The corporate 
governance principles and guidelines used in F&C engagement practices are elucidated. An 
explanation is given of the decision by F&C to effectively manage the risks and opportunities 
associated with significant social, ethical and environmental issues as an important component of 
good governance practice. The reason for the selection of F&C Investments for the research is 
discussed in detail. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the research into institutional investors‟ engagement by F&C 
Investments. The findings reveal the evolving nature of institutional investors‟ engagement and that 
instances exist where a particular method of engagement has failed to produce desired results. An 
important contribution from the findings of this research is that when a particular method fails, F&C 
makes use of shareholder proposals to influence corporate behaviour and practices, having proved 
to be a very important and useful tool in getting corporations to change position on particular issues 
of concern to F&C. 
 
7.3 Use of Multiple Methods in Institutional Investors’ Engagement  
The central aim of this thesis is to examine the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement in the UK. In pursuit of that aim, the thesis seeks to examine institutional investors‟ 
engagement through the agency theory framework. In a bid to fill the gap between existing literature 
and practice, this research, at its inception, posed two research questions: (1) What are the types of 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues that institutional investors are 
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concerned with? (2) How do institutional investors‟ use multiple methods in engagement, especially 
in relation to those strategies that do not seem to achieve the desired outcomes? 
 
Table 16 presents a list of the most important corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility issues addressed by F&C engagement. A more comprehensive list of corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues is discussed extensively in Chapter 6. The 
following corporate governance issues appeared to reoccur most frequently over the five-year period: 
executive remuneration, restructuring of the Board and Board performance, bribery and corruption, 
voting rights and pre-emptive rights. In the case of corporate social responsibility, the following 
issues emerged consistently from the data: labour standard practices, biodiversity, health and safety, 
human rights and HIV/AIDS. F&C engagement in corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility reveals that a broader range of issues is being addressed. For instance, in corporate 
governance F&C engagement focused on issues such as bribery and corruption, provision of risk 
oversight and transparency. Similarly, F&C engagement targeted corporate social responsibility 
issues such as internet privacy, security and access, biodiversity, environment impact assessment 
and integrating corporate social responsibility and corporate governance themes into investment 
strategies.  
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Table 16: A Summary of F&C Engagement in Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Issues Ranked in Order of Importance to Institutional Investors 
 Corporate Governance Corporate Social Responsibility 
1 Executive remuneration Labourstandard practices 
2 Restructuring of the Board and Board performance Biodiversity 
3 Bribery and Corruption Health and Safety 
4 Voting rights issues Human rights 
5 Pre-emptive rights HIV/AIDS 
6 Improvement in governance practices Reduction in carbon emissions 
7 Failure to provide risk oversight Climate change 
8 Transparency CSR reporting 
9 Poison pills Sustainability 
10 Poor governance practices Political influence and lobbying 
11 Risk management oversight Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
12 Illegal transfer pricing Internet access, security and privacy 
13 Improvement of governance practices Environmental impact assessment 
14 Approval of anti-takeover Concerns regarding recycling 
15 Concerns regarding issuance of new capital Integration of CSR and CG themes into 
investment strategies 
 
 
One important finding of this research is the integrating of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility in F&C Investments‟ engagement practices. Integration in the sense that 
institutional investors do not engage in corporate governance practices to the detriment of corporate 
social responsibility practices, as was previously the case as revealed through an examination of the 
literature.  Agency theory makes the erroneous assumption that institutional investors‟ interests are 
purely monetary, this has been reinforced over subsequent decades in the mathematical modelling 
of formulas of financial economics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Seth and Thomas, 1994). However, 
modern institutional investors bear little resemblance to the individual investor of the last century.  
The modern investor, including pension funds, labour union pension funds and social-interest mutual 
funds, pursues environmental and social, as well as financial, goals. There is an emergence of the 
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modern institutional investor who understands the necessity of attending to social and environmental 
issues and the threat to the continuity of a business that may result from neglecting such issues. The 
researcher deems it important to understand that the nature of investor engagement has significantly 
changed in focus from purely economic to embracing social and environmental issues; it is 
necessary for institutional investors to embrace this new reality of emerging trends otherwise serious 
consequences may be incurred. 
 
The integration of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility indicates that the ways 
in which institutional investors‟ engagement is now practiced may have changed. In engaging with 
companies, institutional investors may need to embrace this new reality in order to adapt their 
engagement strategies. The literature review on institutional investors‟ engagement practices has 
examined engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as independent 
and isolated elements. Corporate governance engagement was seen as a distinctive and separate 
element from corporate social responsibility engagement, they were not considered to be linked or 
connected in any way. Institutional investors‟ engagement has treated corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices as isolated elements. This will have presented policy 
implications and informed their choice of strategy in engagement with companies in which they have 
a vested interest.  
F&C Investments‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility suggests 
that corporate social responsibility has become mainstream; having surpassed the initial boundaries 
of religious and ethical investors to become a major aspect of corporate governance. Ignorance of 
this development would result in investors‟ thinking, engagement and strategies in tackling corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility practices to be flawed, in which case it is difficult to 
arrive at sensible solutions to address poor corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices. Flawed thinking would inevitably lead to flawed policies, and it is impossible to have any 
meaningful success in engagement through the implementation of flawed policies. 
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The second question this research set out to address was how do institutional investors‟ use multiple 
methods in engagement, especially in relation to those strategies that do not seem to achieve the 
desired outcomes? 
It has not been possible for previous research on institutional investors‟ engagement to shed light on 
the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement, particularly as a significant 
amount of engagement is conducted discreetly, and the information and data of engagement 
activities are not usually publicly disclosed (Solomon, 2010; Hebb et al., 2012). Gifford (2010) 
maintains that institutional investors‟ engagement is a field of business and management research 
which has trailed significantly behind practice. The internal engagement processes as well as the 
systems that support engagement of leading UK fund managers have been scarcely documented, 
with any actual documentation lacking in detail and specifics.  
 
Research on institutional investors‟ engagement thus far has focused on exploring issues such as 
existing practices of institutional investors‟ engagement and the effectiveness of engagement 
activities (Dresner, 2002); motivations and attitudes towards institutional investors‟ engagement 
practices (Maier, 2002); strategy, drivers and tools of institutional investors‟ engagement 
(Southwood, 2003; Sparkes and Cowton, 2004,); emergence of standards in institutional investors‟ 
engagement (McLaren 2004;Vanderckckhove et al., 2008) and; factors that are likely to ensure 
successful engagement outcomes (Gifford 2010).  
 
However, very few researchers, if any, have examined the ways in which institutional investors‟ 
engagement strategies are evolving. Very little research on institutional investors‟ engagement refers 
to the possibility that dialogue can prove inadequate and may fail to produce the intended and 
expected results. However, current research has not examined what course of action institutional 
investors take when a particular method of engagement fails to yield the desired result. The norm in 
existing literature on institutional investors‟ engagement is to focus on the use of one method of 
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engagement and its influences on corporate behaviour, practices and policies. In an attempt to 
influence corporate behaviour and practices, institutional investors may use the following methods 
and strategies:  
i) Raising their concerns with management by communicating in writing, meeting with the 
management Board and negotiation.  
ii) Shareholder resolutions and shareholder voting. 
 
 
The findings of this research into F&C‟s engagement in corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility reveal that F&C has progressed beyond the use of one method to influence corporate 
behaviour and practices. Research on the strategies and methods of institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility tends to focus on the static 
nature of engagement. Where one method is used and the intended outcome is not achieved, 
engagement by institutional investors seems to falter. Extant research provides no further discussion 
around the courses of action institutional investors take when a particular method fails to yield 
results. This is not the case with F&C however. F&C recognises that in some instances it is 
necessary to use more than one approach to engagement in order to influence corporate behaviour. 
Some of the case studies examined in the previous chapters revealed that F&C initially endeavoured 
to influence corporate behaviour and practices through constructive dialogue with investee 
companies. However, when the use of dialogue fails to influence change in corporate behaviour, 
F&C apply a different method and strategy. F&C also understands that there are particular corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility issues where individual investors‟ engagement will 
not achieve any meaningful results.  In such circumstances, the use of a collective approach is 
deemed more suitable. Gillian and Stark (1998) suggest that activism and engagement, in some 
situations, is more effective when institutional investors participate collectively, than when individual 
investors raise issues that need to be addressed.  
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7.4 Contribution to Knowledge and Practice 
In terms of theoretical perspective, agency theory posits that institutional investors‟ involvement in 
corporate governance is purely a result of economic considerations targeted at improving a 
corporation‟s performance, however the findings of this research oppose this view. Institutional 
investors‟ engagement has reached beyond the scope of economic considerations to include 
corporate social responsibility. Institutional investors do not have to favour economics over acting 
responsibly as acting responsibly can reap economic benefits as well as mitigating perceived social 
and environmental risks. This finding is consistent with that of Hendry et al. (2007) and Hebb et al. 
(2012) whose work on institutional investors‟ engagement concludes that institutional investors‟ 
engagement now incorporates broader corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues. Institutional investors are integrating elements of agency and stakeholder theory in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility engagement. Stakeholder theory provides valuable 
insight into the motivations and importance of institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate social 
responsibility. In short, although agency and stakeholder theory seem to be theoretical opposites, 
they share the same goal of enhancing long-term value for shareholders and stakeholders. This 
clearly presents the business case for institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility.  
 
From a practitioner‟s perspective, it is important to be aware of the ways in which engagement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is advancing and making significant 
progression. Of particular importance is the fact that changing their approach and strategy in 
engagement, institutional investors can influence corporate behaviour, practices and policies. 
Institutional investors‟ engagement is moving beyond the static and one method/strategy 
approaches to engagement extensively discussed and researched in the extant literature. 
Engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is becoming dynamic, 
institutional investors should not falter or feel humiliated when a particular strategy or method to 
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influence corporate behaviour and practices fails but recover, re-strategise and select an alternative 
method. For example, employ shareholder voting where constructive dialogue failed to yield the 
desired results or when dialogue or voting fails to achieve the intended outcome, investors may 
adopt a collective approach to engagement instead of an individual approach, drawing in other 
investors concerned with similar issues. Changing engagement methods and strategies and  pooling 
the resources of several investors may well succeed in pressuring investee companies to change 
corporate behaviour and practice. In summary, there is no „one size fits all‟ approach or strategy that 
institutional investors can apply to influence corporate behaviour and practices. Institutional investors 
can and should make use of a variety of methods and strategies in order to influence corporate 
behaviour and practice. 
 
Institutional investors‟ engagement has seen significant progress in the UK. However it is important 
to note that UK institutional investors‟ success has not been entirely of their own making, regulatory 
reforms in the UK such as the Cadbury Report, Turnbull Report, Combined Codes, Turner Review, 
and Walker Review have created an enabling environment for investors to become more involved in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices. This may not be the case for 
institutional investors in other parts of the world. Rethinking institutional investors‟ approach to 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility should become imperative 
for institutional investors, policy makers, practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. 
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7.5 Limitations of the Research 
The greatest limitation of this research is the lack of academic and practitioner research and analysis 
of F&C Investments. Investigation into the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility from the perspective of 
F&C Investments is also lacking. Although F&C Investments disclosed a significant amount of 
information on its engagement activities, the materials used were secondary and the research would 
have benefited immensely from interviews and a larger number of case studies with fund managers 
who were actually involved in specific investors‟ engagement activities. However as access to 
company representatives was severely restricted, the researcher elected to limit the research to 
information and data available from F&C Investments and other existing information from credible 
newspapers and magazines such as the Financial Times. Fortunately, F&C Investments disclosed a 
wealth of information that allowed for a longitudinal analysis enabling the researcher to investigate 
the advancement of its engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
practices. 
 
An additional limitation of the research is the number of cases used in examining the use of multiple 
methods in institutional investors‟ engagement. Consequently, it is possible that by using only a 
small amount of cases some important insights could be omitted. It is also acknowledged that the 
selected cases are not wholly representative therefore generalisations cannot be drawn from the 
findings of the research. However, as referred to by discussion in the research methodology chapter, 
the research did not seek to generalise the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility on the basis of analysis of 
a small number of cases.  
 
However, it is important to note that, from the onset, the researcher intended to reveal that 
institutional investors‟ engagement strategies, methods and practices are evolving. Institutional 
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investors‟ engagement has moved beyond the static nature of engagement that has been 
extensively discussed in the extant literature. Institutional investors, as the findings of the research 
reveal, need more than one method of engagement to change corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility practices when a particular method of engagement fails to achieve expected 
outcomes. Essentially, the rationale of the research has been to learn from F&C Investments‟ 
engagement practices in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility enabling greater 
success for other investors and practitioners who engage in influencing corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility practices.The researcher posits that this research provides a platform 
from which other researchers investigating the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility can continue. 
 
7.6 Direction for Future Research 
The researcher has made a case for the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ 
engagement based on the findings of the research into F&C Investments‟ engagement practices. 
The inadequacy of the sample size and the fact that F&C Investments is one organisation illuminates 
the need to increase the sample size and the number of fund managers engaging in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility in order to ascertain whether the findings of this 
research hold true for other organisations. It is possible that the use of multiple methods in 
institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility could 
be much broader and widespread than this research is capable of revealing, or the opposite may be 
true. The researcher suggests that an expansion of sample size and number of organisations 
examined in another research will be insightful in examining institutional investors‟ engagement in 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility and whether the use of multiple methods in 
engagement is similar or whether different fund manager engagement in corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility has significantly changed in practise in comparison to what was 
previously being done. This research has relied on a case study approach and the use of documents 
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provided by F&C Investments to conduct a longitudinal analysis of F&C engagement in corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. The use of various research methods such as 
interviews and questionnaires would provide valuable and insightful information regarding 
institutional investors‟ engagement practices. In addition, comparative research on the use of 
multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement in corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility between, for instance, the UK and America would also be very useful, or 
between the UK and Japan. 
A significant amount of institutional investors‟ engagement research in the UK has focused 
extensively on the use of dialogue to communicate investors‟ concerns and as a means of 
influencing corporate behaviour and practices. Unfortunately, research on institutional investors‟ 
engagement has yet to examine in detail what courses of action institutional investors take when 
dialogue fails to produce results or influence behaviour and practice. It would be very useful and 
insightful to learn what measures other UK institutional investors take when dialogue fails: what 
strategies do they use to engage with companies, are they similar to those used by F&C or do they 
have an alternative approach? While the researcher believes it is important to use dialogue to 
influence corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices in institutional investors‟ 
engagement, the researcher is of the opinion that it is unrealistic to expect dialogue to always yield 
meaningful results. As the research on F&C Investments has revealed, there are instances where 
dialogue proves inadequate, where other measures must be taken to influence managers of 
corporations to improve corporate behaviour and practice. It would be interesting to learn whether 
the use of multiple methods in institutional investors‟ engagement is the norm or if it is peculiar to 
F&C Investments and what courses of action other institutional investors take when dialogue fails to 
produce desired results. 
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Appendix 1: Writing a DBA Thesis: My Personal Experience 
I guess the most interesting period of doing a DBA was the first few weeks after I had been given my 
admission letter. I would introduce myself loudly and clearly to anyone who would listen, and as 
audaciously as I could manage, I would inform them that I was doing a DBA. Looking back, I do think 
that I must have seriously underestimated in my mind what was involved in writing such a difficult 
piece of work. The journey, if I can call it one, has been long and winding with so many twists and 
turns that it seemed it would never end. It all appeared like a massive maze to me when I began. It 
felt like there was so much to be done, the harder I worked, it seemed like my research work 
continued to expand and I didn‟t not feel I would ever get it done. Doing a DBA can be mentally and 
emotionally exhausting. The number of hours  I had to put into my research was enormous and 
having to look at a piece of work over and over again for a long period of time can take its toll on any 
individual.  
 
When I began my doctoral degree, I must have been confounded by the number of decisions I had 
to make: where do I begin my research, what literature review is relevant, what do I leave out, what 
should the focus of the research be, what should be emphasized, and what should be left out? 
These questions continued to plague me until the very end of my writing the thesis. More frustrating 
was the fact that most times I didn‟t seem to be getting the forthright answers I wanted. When I 
would put forward these very same questions, my supervisors would ask that I go back to my 
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research question. They told me that the research question has a way of informing what is important, 
and what to focus on. I eventually discovered that they were absolutely right about that. 
 
I cannot stress the importance of having a good supervision team. I would not have been able to 
finish this thesis without the help and support of the supervision team assigned to me. I found that 
my research work progressed very quickly when I had regular meetings and quick feedback from my 
supervision team. When I initially started my research work I was quite reluctant to ask for help and 
support when I got stuck in a difficult position. I struggled with asking for help with my thesis, and I 
think my work suffered some setbacks during that period when I did not solicit support from my 
supervision team. However, when I learnt to ask for help from my supervision team when I got into 
difficult spots, I found them to be very supportive. 
 
I had always been inclined to write my thesis in a loosely structured manner; I am not a person who 
would have a structure in place before I begin writing. I have always preferred writing first, and then 
restructuring the work later. In my opinion, this allows me the opportunity to be creative in the way I 
write my research. It allows me a bit of flexibility in the way my research thesis develops. With 
hindsight, however, I think that one of the things I would do differently would be to adopt a more 
structured approach in writing my thesis. I have learned that using a loosely structured approach has 
some weaknesses. Through some constructive feedback from my supervision team I have come to 
see that the downside of using a loosely structured approach is that it can lead to repetition in the 
research work. It has taken a lot of work to get the repetitive phrases in my work out of it. I have 
come to see that one of the advantages of having a structure in place before writing is that it allows 
the researcher focus on particular research issues and themes. Having a structure in place also 
gave me purpose; it had the added advantage of giving me a sense of accomplishment when I could 
tick off areas which had been tackled. 
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In my own experience, one thing that has continued to puzzle me about supervision is how 
supervisors can change positions on a particular piece of writing. This happened on a few occasions. 
I had submitted a piece of work and it had been looked at by my supervisor and deemed acceptable. 
Then a few weeks later the same piece of work was submitted again and I found my supervisor had 
changed his position on the work. It had been fine a few weeks before, but this week, the same 
piece of work was found wanting. I still haven‟t found an answer to the question of how a piece of 
work was fine last week, and a few weeks later, it is no longer fine. What happened, what changed? 
These are questions I think I was too scared to ask, but nevertheless, it is something I still find 
puzzling. Initially I found it bit perplexing and very frustrating, but I had to learn to accept it all in good 
faith. I have also learned to trust the academic competence of the supervisor team as well as their 
judgment. I do believe that whatever they did, they did with the sole intention of improving my 
research work. 
 
So many times I came close to throwing in the towel, putting down my tools, and literally giving up. I 
could not see how I would be able to finish the journey. So many minor obstacles tended to rear their 
ugly heads and almost at the same time. My finances were running thin and I had to spend so much 
time thinking about paying the rent and looking for where the next pound would come from. To make 
matters worse were the psychological fears that I had to deal with, the possibility that with all the 
issues I had to grapple with, I would be unable to finish up. Seeing all the resources that had been 
invested in the programme, I wondered how I would look my dad in the face, or face by colleagues 
at work. How would I explain it to people close to me? What would I tell them was the reason I could 
not complete my studies?  
 
Sitting down in front of my computer today, I could not have imagined how the DBA 
journey would have unfolded over the past four years. There have been a lot of twists and turns and 
it has been a bitter sweet experience. There has been some excitement- those Eureka moments, 
times of sudden clarity and insight when it seemed a light bulb appeared over my head. There have 
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also been many disappointments; times when it seemed like I wasn‟t making any headway, and 
other times when my work had to be refocused which meant hours and pages of research had to be 
done away with. There were also the challenges of delays and extensions, as well as those of 
different supervisors with their corresponding differing perceptions of the work. I doubt I will ever be 
able to fully understand how I have been able to wade through all the intricacies until I have come to 
this moment where it‟s only a month away from the submission of my thesis. 
 
Now that I have finished writing up, it feels a bit surreal, a bit like I am still dreaming. It seems too 
good to be true! In a few more days, I will not have to wake up thinking about writing my thesis 
anymore. I would have handed in the work, and I would have moved on to other things. I am a bit 
euphoric. Although on the one hand there is the joy of moving on to something else, on the other 
hand there is the sadness, I guess, of letting go and putting away the work that I have been neck-
deep in for years. There are also all the other anxieties that are likely to come with the next stage, 
which is preparing for the viva. I think I feel a tinge of worry about the question and answer session 
followed by the thirty minutes wait after the viva, where the examiners will evaluate and assess the 
work, and come out with the decision to grant me a doctorate or not. These are very valid concerns, 
especially due to the time, money and energy I have invested in this programme. I am optimistic, 
however, that in the same way the previous challenges were faced and overcome, I am hopeful that 
I shall overcome successive ones as well. 
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Appendix 2: Corporate Governance Issues Institutional Investors Address 
Issues related to repealing anti-takeover 
devices 
Board and committee independence 
issues 
Voting issues Other issues 
Repeal classified Boards     
Eliminate poison pill 
Eliminate golden parachutes 
Eliminate supermajority requirements 
Opt out of state antitakeover law 
Prohibit greenmail payments 
Targeted share placement 
Reincorporate to another state 
Fair price provision 
Director ownership 
Other related to director 
Increase Board independence 
Limit directors‟ terms 
Nomination of directors 
Directors‟ compensation 
Directors‟ attendance at general meetings 
Cumulative voting 
Confidential voting 
Other voting related matters 
 
Other 
Annual meeting 
Prohibit dual CEO/Chair 
Audit related 
 
Executive Compensation Auditor independence Shareholder rights Other issues 
Restrict executive compensation 
Disclose executive compensation 
Review executive compensation 
Require option shares to be held 
Abolish stock option 
Implement executive compensation plan 
 
Limit consulting by auditors 
No consulting by auditors 
Limit non-audit fees 
Minority shareholders‟ rights 
Pre-emptive rights 
 
Sell the company 
Restrict options 
Equal access to proxy 
Establish shareholder 
committees 
Source: Compiled from Gillan and Stark (2000); Karpoff (2001); Romano (2001); Thomas and Cotter (2006) 
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Appendix 3: Corporate Social Responsibility Issues Addressed by Institutional Investors 
Diversity/non discrimination Executive (performance-related) pay International conduct Environmental 
EEO reports Social performance World debt crisis (debt cancellation/policy) Adopt Valdex/Ceres Principles 
Board diversity EEO record 
Foreign operations in Northern Ireland, South Africa, 
Burma, China, Nigeria and Maquilidoras Radiation releases 
Predatory lending Healthcare quality NAFTA Greenhouse gases (CO2 emissions) 
Reports on glass ceiling Overseas labour standards Labour standards for overseas suppliers „Pure profit‟ environment risks 
Domestic partner benefits Reduction in teen smoking Child/slave labour Alaska National Wildlife Refuge drilling 
Sexual orientation non discrimination   ILO standard   
    Implement MacBride principles   
        
Military Energy Corporate policy Social issues – miscellaneous 
Foreign military sales and contracts Energy conservation Implement ethical criteria for Board outsiders Matching shareholder gifts 
Star wars/space weapons Nuclear plants (information and closure) Money laundering Charitable contributions 
Land mine production Sustainable energy policy Corporate tax benefits and subsidies Social criteria for financial decisions 
Economic conversion of military assets Alternative power sources 
  
Animal rights 
Animal right research   
Criteria for military contracts       
        
Alcohol, tobacco, firearms Reproductive issues Media Political donations 
Decrease youth smoking, tobacco sales Contribution to abortion providers 
Reduce television violence/raise broadcast 
standards End or disclose political donations 
Smoke-free restaurants Contraception warnings Eliminate negative image marketing ads Affirm non-partnership 
Gun sales   
  
Healthcare 
Healthcare policy and reform 
Drug pricing/restraint 
Marketing of infant formula Enact shareholder vote on political donations 
        
Source: Compiled  from  Grave et al. (2001); Monks et al. (2004) ;Tkac (2006)    
  
 
